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Statutes are a written communication between 
Parliament and the Ie slative ciud ence. 
ation is the process W}l slative audience 
seeks to understand and there govern its actions 
dictates of Parliam~nt. Judicial interpretation occurs 
only when there has been some breakdown in this process -
either Parliament failed to express its 'ideas clearly 
or those ideas are inc Ie of precise expression. A 
broad aim of thi~ thesis is to examine the functioning of 
language and the communication process llith a view to 
understanding more -clearly the nature of meaning and its 
ascert"ainment~ An analysis will be made of those features 
of language giving rise to uncertainty and so to the 
problem case of interpretationo An analysis will also be 
made of the nature of linguistic certainty; it is hoped 
that a better understanding of the edients of success-
ful communication "dll eventual lead to the reduction of 
statutory doubt. Next the theory of judicial interpretation 
will be considered and its correspondence to accepted 
linguistic theory assessed e ParticUlar emphasis ,.;ill be 
placed on a discussion of the adequacy of the tra&tional 
canons. Finally judicial practice will be considered by 
means of a survey conducted from two years of the New 
Zealand Law Reports. The results from this survey will 
then be compa:red with earlier findings from the thesis~ 
Conclusions of a general nature will be drawn; in particular 
it ~ill be submitted that a shift in the dominant 
igm icable to the construction of statutes is 
presently under way in New Zealand. The traditional 
canons are being replaced by a more unified and consistent 
igm whose features include liberalisation 0 the 
literal rule to encompass consideration of context, 
the statutory purpose~ and e icit sion 
for assessment of consequences. igrn is 
d +- tl t' t d''''''' rl Ser-f:';on S( i)' more a aqua ve :lan ,ne -ra ::L 1,.,10na.L canons an.1 ,- -~ .... ~- <J 
both as a source of reasons for me and re21sons for 
decision" 
1 
PART A: UNDERSTANDING MEANING 
INTRODUCTION 
A distinction is ~requently made between two stages 
in the interpretative process, interpretation and 
application. 'Interpretation' is concerned principally 
with the ascertainmento~ statutory meaning; 'application' 
with the relationship o~ that meaning to the ~acts o~ a . 
case. I~ one can accept such a distinction, this thesis 
can be described as having as its primary concern an 
analysis o~ the~ormer •. Its broad aim is to clari~y and 
analyse judicial approaches to the ascertainment o~ 
statutory meaning. 
Broadly speaking, statutes are a ~orm o~ communic-
ation between Parliament and the legislative audience. 
In their modern day ~orm they operate through the medium 
o~ written language and are subject to the normal 
functioning. o~ the English language. In Part A, there-
~ore, we shall attempt to understand something o~ the 
semantic and philosophical nature o~ meaning. Because 
all success~ul communication is dependent upon an element 
of linguistic certainty, we will look at what makes 
meaning 'clear'. And because interpretation always arises 
in the context o~ some dispute arising ~rom the break-
down o~ the statutory communication, we , .. ill look at 
linguistic uncertainty and its potential ~or giving rise 
to the problem case. Finally, we will look at 
classi~ication and its relationship to meaning. In 
2 
theory 'classification' can relate either to the definition 
of statutory terms or to the application of that defintion 
to the facts of a case. But as in the latter sense 
classification in fact provides a more precise definition 
of statutory terms, the distinction is by no means clear-
cut. Indeed, the same can be said of the interpretation/ 
application distinction- itself. On closer examination 
the distinction largely appears to be an artificial one 
devised for ease of analysis by legal commentators. 
Judicial practice does not reflect any such clear. 
distinction. 'Meaning' is an ambiguous term which relates 
to 'scope' as well as to 'sense'. Before going on to a 
consideration of judicial approaches to meaning, we must 
attempt to understand something more about meaning itself. 
3 
CHAPTER I 
THE MEANINGS OF MEANING 
The word 'meaning' is perhaps one of the most 
ambiguous words in the English language. It is used in 
a wide range of contexts in several different senses. 
C.K. Ogden and I.A. Richards in their book 'The Meaning 
of Meaning' list as many as twenty-two definitions of 
1 the word. Among them they include: 
an intrinsic property 
the other words annexed to a word in the dictionary 
the connotations of a word 
that to which the user of a symbol actually refers 
that to which the user of a symbol ought to be 
referring 
that to which the user of a symbol believes 
himself to be referring 
that to which the interpreter of a symbol 
(a) refers 
(b) believes himself to be referring 
(c) believes the user to be referring 
Much of the conflict between these definitions 
is explicable by reference to the ~urpose for which 
they are formulated. Spe?ialists in different fields 
feel the need to tailor the study of meaning to the 
requirements of their own discipline. 2 This will be 
1. C.K. Ogden and I.A. Richards, 'The f..1eaning of }'fearting' 
(1923) pp. 186-7. 
2. G. L.eec11.,.' Semantic s " p. 4. "So, a philospher may 
define meaning for his purposes in terms of truth 
and falsehood; a behaviourist psychologist in terms 
of stimulus and response; a literary critic in terms 
of the reader's response; and so on. ." 
4 
illustrated more clearly in the following chapter in 
which we look at some of the many different theories as 
I 
to what meaning actually is. '1hatever the reasons for 
the multiplicity of definitions, there~can be no doubt 
about the problems they cause. Confusion or misunderstand-
ing often arises in discussions concerning meaning as a 
consequence of fundamental disagreement about the term 
itself. The situation is probably made worse by problems 
of demarcation. The several meanings are often inter-
connected, and shade into one another in various ways.3 
It would be foolish to commence a discussion of 
judicial approaches to meaning with any false idea that 
the 'meaning' referred to is a simple and easily definable 
concept. Likewise, it would be a mistake to attempt any 
precise definition of 'meaning' before discussion of 
the subject begins. 4 The formulation of such a definition 
could well be an impossible task; it is extremely unlikely 
that all judicial statements concerning 'meaning' use 
the term in precisely the same way. We must be content 
with letting the meaning of 'meaning' as used by the 
judiciary emerge from the study itself. However, {t is 
~ossiblet indeed desirable, to consider in advance the 
varieties of meaning with most rel'evance to the lawyer. 
One relevant categorisation is the distinction between 
intended, comprehended and ordinary meaning. 5 
Broadly speaking, communication consists of the 
3. J. Lyons, 'Language, Meaning and Context', p. 15. 
4. Compare the approach of G. Leech op. cit. p.4. 
5. See G. 'iilliams 'LanguFige and the Law' 61 L.Q.R. 71 
at 390. 
5 
transference of information from the. communicator to the 
audience. It is arguable that successful communication 
occurs only when what was in the mind of the communicator 
has been transferred tOt or copied int the mind of the 
d . 6 au 1ence. PresumablYt successful communication in legal 
terms consists of the unproblematic 'clear' case, where 
individual members of the statutory audience govern their 
behaviour in terms of the statutory instrument in the 
manner intended by Parliament. Problems of interpretation 
arise where communication has somehow broken down. The 
message intended by the legislature is not that comprehend-
ed by the individual member of the legislative audience. 
For the linguist, meaning is neutral between 'speaker's 
meaning' and 'hearer's meaning,.7 This is not so for the 
lawyer. Important consequences attach to construction of 
the legislative message by the judiciary. Some uniform 
standard of construction is necessary to ensure the 
proper administration of justice. This is where the 
distinction betwe,en intended, comprehended and ordinary 
meaning is of importance. The general theory with regard 
to statutes is that the court is concerned with the 
8 
meaning of the authors. Frequent reference is made to 
the intention of Parliament~ In practice t however, the 
refusal to look at certairi extrinsic material in the 
ascertainment of this intention means that their concern 
is not with the actual meaning of Parliament but with a 
6. G. Leech OPe cit. p.24. Cf N. Jamieson, 'Towards A 
Systematic Statute Law' (1976) 3 Otago L.R. 543; 544. 
7. Ibid. p.24. 
8. See G. Williams, OPe cit. p.392. 
6 
meaning imput~~ to Parliament. Having largely restricted 
themselves to a consideration of the statutory words, the 
meaning imputed to Parliament is in fact the usual meaning 
in which the words that Parliament used to express its 
actual meaning are commonly employed. 9 In other words, 
Parliament is presumed to have used words in their 
ordinary sense unless the context or statutory purpose 
indicates otherwise. Ordinary meaning can be distinguished 
from comprehended meaning, which is the meaning actually 
attached to the statutory wO'rds by a particular reader or 
hearer. 10 The latter is not the concern of the courts. 11 
Reference to the 'proper' meaning of statutory language 
is a reference to its ordinary meaning or, in certain 
cases, to some specially assigned meaning. Apart from 
these, words have no 'actual', 'correct', 'essential', 
'grammatical', 'legitimate', 'literal', 'natural', 
'necessary', 'rational', 'real', or 'reasonable' meaning. 12 
Related to the classification of various senses of 
'meaning' is classification of the various methods used 
to arrive at that meaning. M.~l. Bryant 13 has identified 
thirteen different classifications into which cases 
involving the definition of a word may fall. These 
literal interpretation 
interpretation based on intent 
interpretation based on putative intent 
interpretation suggested by fact 
common meaning 
9. Ibid. p.393. 
10. Ibid. p.393. 
14 
are: 
11. Compare the general issue of consideratio~ of linguistic 
register. See pp. 126-129 
1 2. G • lH 11 i am s, 0 p • cit. P • 384 • 
13. lvI.H. Bryant, 'English in the Law Courts'. 
14. Ibid. p.26. 
specialised meaning 
technical meaning 
interpretation suggested by technical terms 
dictionary meaning 
etymology. 
historical development 
context 
circumstances 
Classifications (1), (5), (10) and (11) in particular 
7 
need defining so as to avoid possible confusion. Bryant 
uses the phrase "literal interpr~tation" to refer to 
that which a word actually denotes in its usual construc-
tion." according to the authorities on standard English; 
that is, its standard meaning, unexaggerated or un-
embellished in any way and regardless of its connotative 
value. The "common meaning" differs from the literal 
meaning and the etymological meaning in that it is the 
meaning understood by the masses, the one accepted in 
ordinary speech. "Etymology" has to do lY'i th the origin 
or derivation of a word as shown by its analysis into 
elements. The etymological study of a word deals with 
its original constituent elements. In cases decided 
according to etymology the judges have gone back to the 
original meaning of the word as shown in the parent 
language (Latin, Anglo-Saxon, French, etc.). "Historical 
development" traces the history of a word, noting the 
different meanings that have been recognised from 'time to 
time, without going back to its original meaning. As to 
the remaining classifications, "interpretation based on 
intent" refers to the actual intended meaning of the 
communicator. "Interpretation based on putative intent" 
refers to the meaning the court thinks the communicator 
would have intended had such a situation occurred ~o it. 
8 
In an "interpretation suggested by fact" the w"ord takes 
on a meaning according to the facts of the case. 
"Specialised meaning" refers to a meaning assigned to a 
particular use or function. "Technical meaning" refers 
to meanings peculiar to any trade, profession or the like. 
"Interpretation suggested by technical terms" is similar 
to classification (7); the technical terms surrounding 
the word cause it to take on a peculiar meaning. In the 
case of "dictionary meaning" the dictionary is returned 
to and the definition found there is used. A decision 
based on "context" is made according to the meaning a 
word acquires in relation to the subject matter. Finally, 
in a decision based on lIcircumstances" the import of the 
disputed word is determined by the surrounding 
circumstances. 15 
The above classification is considerably more 
detailed than that adopted by most legal writers. For 
this reason Bryantts terminology also differs from that 
of many other writers. 16 The classification is valuable 
in that it provides some insight into the wide range of 
possible approaches to meaning. Both in theory and" in 
practice the ascertainment of meaning is far more complex 
than a simple application of one of the three traditional 
15. The above analysis of terms used comes from Bryant 
herself. See pp. 26-29. 
16. For example , .. hile most writers simply equate literal 
meaning with ordinarymeaning t Bryant seems to equate 
ordinary meaning with "common rneaning ll and distinguish-
es this from "literal meaning." 
9 
canons. 17 Any discussion of judicial approaches to 
meaning will be far from clear-cut. Tge sense in which 
'meaning' is referred to by the judic~ary must be left 
to emerge from the following chapters. It will be 
interesting to note whether judicial use of the term 
corresponds to that of the linguist. 
17. That is, application of'either the literal, golden 
or mischief 'rules'. 
10 
A study of meaning wouid be incomplete without 
sotTle pJ:"'elinJ:Ll1.ctr. ... y irr'ilGstig"c_t:io:'Cl :.Lnto t~}1.e geIle:cal tl1eories 
of meaning" SUCll ttteoY'ies llDdex"lie all Cl.1r tl'1.0"tlgl1.tS 
about the ascertainment of meaning. Reference to them 
explains many of the differences between legal comment-
ators on question of how statutory meaning is best 
ascertained. For illustration one need look no further 
, 
than the debate as to whether !clear' meaning can be 
determined irrespective of context and statutory purpose. 
Essentially this was the subject of dispute between 
H.L.A. Hart and L.L. Fuller in their well-known debate 
concerning t core ' and 'penumbra!. Whereas Hart appears 
to adopt a word-by-word approach to meaning, Fuller 
adopts a contextual approach. Until the unlikely event 
of agreement being reached on the nature of meaning, we 
cannot hope to see universal agreement on the means by 
which that meaning is to be ascertained. 
The relationship of the follm·dng theories to 
interpretation can be likened to that of the dominant 
paradigm to scientific research. ,,-. S IT h 2 L • • ~u_n has written 
1. See pp. 36-42. 
2. T.S. Kuhn, tThe Structure of Scientific Revolutions' 
reprinted in part in Bishin and Stone ~ I L3.lv, Language 
and Ethics: An Introduction to Law and Legal Method' 
at pp~ 62L:-6. 
1 1 
that such research takes place under the influence of 
dominant paradigms, or theories. Change in the dominant 
paradigm necessitates fundamental change in the approach 
to research. The same idea could arguably be applied to 
statutory interpretation. Perhaps as lawyers we should 
be prepared to adapt our attitudes and approaches to the 
,ascertainment of statutory meaning as the theories upon 
which those attitudes are based change and develop with 
the advance of linguistic science. 
The following discussion of some of the dominant 
. -.. • L.A-"""'-c-·t.;?.,...../Jo~:2-z-C::_/'-/, __ ""_ 
theories of meaning will not be . dre in any depth; this 
is not a thesis on philosophy or semantics. It is merely 
intended to give a general understanding of the theories 
and to make future references intelligible. 
II. WORDS AS SYMBOLS 
Most of us understand the things we read to have 
a more or less certain meaning. Few of us stop to think 
what the meaning consists of and how it is deduced •. 
Language clearly consists of something more than just 
lines drawn on paper; the physical substance of the text 
.ha~ no meaning in itself. 3 We, the readers, bestow 
meaning on the print by virtue of the symbolic function 
of language. Language is thus part of a general theory 
3. This assumption has not always been made. At times 
throughout history words have been thought to possess 
a 'magical' significance, .the very words themselves 
possessing some mysterious force. On this question 
of the magical significance of words and how it 
relates to law see 'Law As Fact' by K. Olivecrona pp. 
240,245; 'Language and the Law' by G. Williams 61 
L.Q.R. 71 at pp. 74-78. 
12 
of signs; s k'::;;' th e ge:rlu.s '1 As 
·Hi th 8...11 si S? 1-fords something other than 
.1 4 theulse ,res & 
The most useful classification of signs for present 
purposes is that which dist shes between natural 
signs and ols~ The distinction lies in the different 
relation each bears to its referent. Natural signs are 
correlated to their referents in some inevitable or 
'natural' way, i.e~ the correlation is based on the • J lncer·~ 
play of natural events. Their significance to the observer 
is based on the observer I s experience or knm-'ledge of 
this interplay of events. 5 The lvetness of the earth, 
for e, signifies a recent fall of rain. Experience 
has taught us that rain and wetness are correlated in a 
c~rtain way; that whenever rain falls the ground is left 
Symbols 9 on the other hand, are constituted signs 
merely by the fact that they are understood as such. No 
correlation need exist between sign and referent (except 
of course an indirect correlation in the sense that the 
sign is habitually used to refer to a particular referent)~ 
In this way 've interpret a traffic light showing red to mean 
·STOP'. This meaning results, not from any natural 
correlation between lights and sto , but because our 
society dictates that for purposes of safety we are to 
stop at red 1 s. 'I'he choice of' symbol is purely 
4. See C.S. Pierce, 'Collected t -"Tol. II para 223 -
llA sign. • is something that st2.:ads to somebody 
for some in some respect or capacity". 
S. A. Hoss, 'On Lal"'- and Justice', p. "112. 
13 
arbi trary. Likew'ise with language an artificial relation 
exists between a term and that to which it refers. A 
word has no 'natural' or 'inherent' meaning. Of course, 
once a pattern of usage has established itself, the need 
for consistency dictates that a particular term be used 
only in accordance with the established pattern. Success-
'ful communication depends on adherence to the established 
use-patterns. Indeed many would argue that words acquire 
meaning by reason of the linguistic rules in force in a 
particular speech community ~hich govern their use and 
determine that they be used in certain ways only.6 
The term 'conventional' is often used to describe 
this feature of the use of words. Unfortunately the 
term often carries unjustified and probably untrue 
assumptions about the origins of language. 7 Take for 
instance the following statement: 
" ••• A symbol such as a word designates a 
referent by agreement or convention. Human 
decisions are thus required in order to establish 
the meaning of symbols and such decisions are 
arbi trary ones • • • Names arise as a result of 
human agreements or stipulations." . 
This can be compared with the more careful comments of 
A. Ross.9 The description of symbols as 'conventional', 
he says, refers to the fact that l1the connection hetween 
the symbol and what it symbolises is brought about by 
human beings through agreement or usage (custom)Il. 10 
6. For example, see W.P. Alston,'Philosphy of Language', 
p. 58. 
7. Ibid. p.56. 
8. L. Ruby, 'Logic' p. 20 (see Alston ibid. p. 57). 
9. op cit. 
10. Ibid. pp. 112-115. 
14 
This reference to usage is more to the point. Language 
could not have been originated by having decisions adopted 
by common convention, for making agreements and conventions 
presupposes that people already have a language in Iv-hich 
th t · "t" 11 to carryon ese ac lVl les. Of course in cases of 
technical terminology such a process could well lead to 
an explicit proposal for a ne,,r sense of a word to be 
adopted, but such cases are the exception. What little 
is known about the origins and development of language 
indicates that the process is largely an unconscious 
affair with linguistic habits getting established without 
12 
any person or group of persons trying to establish them. 
13 Language'is often described as a IIsystem of symbols~ 
W.P. Alston14 gives a three-part elaboration of the sense 
in which a system is inherent in language. First, the 
elements of language, for example words, are combinable 
in some ways but not in others. The meaning of the 
combination is a determinate function of the meanings of 
the 'consti tuents and their mode of combination. Secondly, 
each constituent word of a sentence can be replaced by 
some lvords but not by others. And thirdly, a trans·formation 
of a sentence in a certain way can produce a new sentence, 
with a certain alteration in mean~ng attaching to a 
certain transformation. 
If we accept the above, then we must also accept 
that no symbol in the system is what it is independent 
of its involvement in the system, so that it could be 
11. W.P. Alston, Ope cit. p. 57. 
12. Ibid. p. 57. 
13. See for example, A. Ross OPe cit. p. 113. 
14. op • cit. p. 60. 
just the same symbol if it were in no system at all. 1; 
We will examine this proposition more fully below. 
III. REFERENTIAL. THEORIES OF NEANING 
The fact that words are symbols referring to 
something other than-themselves provides the basis for 
the referential theories of meaning. Such theories 
recognise an essential connection between language and 
16 
'the ,vorld'. Every meaningful expres sion is said to 
'name' something. 
John Stuart Mill provided one of the first 
influential discussions on the nature of meaning and 
himself adopted a referential approach. 17 His account 
15 
started with a consideration of sin~e words. It seemed 
natural to suppose that sentence meanings were the 
compounds of their components, the meanings of individual 
18 
words. In Mill's opinion all words 'name' something, 
whether it be a thing, a kind of thing, a quality, a 
relationship or something else. Names need not only be 
single words. Complex descriptive phrases can also name 
that to which they refer. 
Any theory which simply equated the meaning of an 
expression with its referent would be far from adequate. 
'The President of the U.S.A. in 1962' and 'The U.S. 
15. Ibid. p. 60. 
16. Ibid. p. 19. 
17. See J.S. Mill, 'System of Logic' (1843) 
18. See G. Ryle in 'The Theory of Heaning' from 'British 
Philosophy in the ~·1id...,Century' reprinted in part in 
Bishin and Stone, 'Law, Language and Ethics' at p.531. 
16 
President assassinated in Dallas' both obviously refer 
to John F. Kennedy, but their meaning is not the same. 
Likewise, an expression might refer to some non-existent 
person or thing, such as 'The first man to set foot on 
Mars'. Ivlill recognised this inadequacy and attempted to 
meet it with his famous theory of connotation and denotation. 
He realised that a word' need not always denote somebody 
or thing for it to have meaning. Meaning must consist 
of something more than mere identification of a referent. 
Mill's theory of connotation and denotation describes the 
two-fold functioning of most words and phrases. Not only 
do they denote the things that they are the 'names' of:,. 
but they also connote the simple or complex attributes by 
possessing which the thing denoted is fitted by the 
description. 19 'The President of the U.S.A. in 1962' 
and 'The U.S. President assassinated in Dallas' differ 
only in connotation. Their denotation remains the same. 
And while some words can be connectedwith distinguishable 
components in the world, others cannot. In the latter 
case meaning also takes the form of connotation. 
If in cases such as the above meaning is to 
be found not in denotation but in connotation, can we 
not conclude that the meaning of an expression is never 
the person or thing referred to by it? Any general 
account of meaning must be capable of consistent application 
to all meaningful expressions. A preferable version of 
the referential theory therefore identifies meaning with 
the relationship between the expression and its referent, 
i.e. with the referential connection itself. 
19. See G. Ryle Ibid. p.533. 
17 
Whatever approach is adopted,' it is questionable 
whether a referential theory can deal adequately lvi th 
words such as 'and', 'of~, 'the'. It seems extremely 
artificial to describe such words as 'names' of anything. 
Mill's treatment of such words as ancillaries to 'many-
worded names' is hardl:y satisfactory.. Indeed it is 
inconsistent with the r'est of his thesis that all words 
name things. Furthermore can we really describe language 
as consisting of a sequence of labels, whatever those 
labe'l·.s S1.' gn1.' fy?20 SId b' d' t t ure y wor scorn 1.ne 1.n 0 a sen ence 
do something jointly which is different from them 
severally naming whatever they do name. Language, 
remember, has been described as a system of symbols. 
This failure to account adequately for the relationship 
::).j)J~.d 
between words is one of the major dow~falls of the 
referential theory. The insight into the nature of 
language on which the theory is based seems to have been 
ruined by oversimplification. 21 
IV. IDEATIONAL THEORIES OF MEANING 
To a certain extent we express and communicate our 
thoughts when using language. Adherents to the ideational 
theory of meaning lv-ould c~rry this to the extent of 
saying, as John Locke did,that "the use of words . . . 
is to be sensible marks of ideas, and the ideas they 
stand for are their proper and immediate signification ." 22 
20. W.P. Alston, op. cit. p.19. 
21. Ibid. p. 19. 
22. John Locke in 'Essay Concerning Human Understanding' 
Book III Ch.s., section 1. 
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Such an assumption underlies all theories holding language 
to be an instrument for the communication of thought. 
As all thought is internal and unobservable, some external 
symbol capable of' being generally understood is necessary 
f'or its communication. Words provide the symbol and 
their meaning is derived f'rom their regular use in 
communication as 'marks" of particular ideas. But the 
ideas with which we do our thinking have an existence 
and function independent of' language. 23 To the extent 
that words s~nbolise or refer to ideas this theory can 
be compared with those already discussed above. It is 
also worth noting the possible conceptual overlap with 
the referential theory that holds the ref'erential 
connection itself' to comprise a word's meaning. 
W.P. Alston identif'ies three conditions that would 
24 have to apply for such a theory to work. Firstly, a 
particular idea must be present in the mind of the speaker •. 
The speaker must be using a particular linguistic 
expression to communicate the presence of' this idea in 
. his mind. And f'inally, if the communication is. to be 
successf'ul, the expression used would have to call up 
the same idea in the mind of' the hearer. In Alston's 
opinion these conditions are not ~atisf'ied. It is most 
unlikely, he says, that upon uttering a certain sentence 
the speaker could identif'y distinguishable ideas in his 
mind corresponding to each word of' the sentence. l{hat 
idea would he conjure up corresponding to 'if", 'when', 
23. For a f'ull statement of' this theory see J. Locke 
in the passage immediately preceding the sentence 
quoted above. 
24. W.P. Alston OPe cit. p.23. 
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~r 'the'? Even if he could do so, could he then identify 
and produce that same idea apart from the ,,,rord? The 
problem of course lies in our failure to identify the 
existence of a thought or idea out of context. But for the 
ideational theory to be successful, the presence or absence 
of an idea must be decidable independent of de~ermining 
in what sense a word is being used. Even words such as 
'dog', with an obvious connection with mental image;ry, 
pose problems. Insofar as these words do involve mental 
imagery, that image is by no means the same every time 
the word is used in the same sense. 
Other linguists, however, do not regard the above 
problems as insurmountable. In fact it would seem that 
the present fashion among linguists, in a movement led by 
N~ Chomsky, is to adopt 'mentalism' in preference to 
more contextual theories of meaning. 25 Our access to the 
,- facts of language', they believe, is through intuition. 
Chomsky's justification for rejecting the objectivity 
criterion provided by contextual theories is that it has 
got linguists no,vh.ere near an adequate -linguistic theory 
or description of language. Linguistics is still far 
from achieving a scientific status comparable to physics 
or chemistry. Therefore, 
" •• at the present stage of the study of 
language, it seems rather obvious that the 
attempt to gain some insight into the range of 
data we now have is likely to be far more fruit-
ful than the attempt to make this data more 
firm, e.g. by tests of synonymy, grammaticality, 
and the like. Operational criteria for these 
notions, were they available and correct, 
might soothe the scientific conscience; but 
25. See G. Leech, 'Semantics', p.81. 
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how, in fact, would they advance our under-26 
standing of the nature of language • • • 11 
It should be noted however, that resort to 
. t 't" d t t t b" t"' 27 1n U1 10n oes no mean resor 0 pure su Jec 1V1sm. 
Linguists see t~e need to control their resort to 
intuition and even to support intuitive analyses by 
,objective evidence. 28 Nor does it mean that the 
semanticists will continue indefinitely to base their 
analyses on a priori knowledge. 29 But 1"hile they continue 
to make progress on the basis of resting validation on 
intuition conceptual semanticists call for a "willing 
suspension of disbelief."30 
v. CONTEXTUAL THEORIES OF MEANING 
From about 1930 to 1960 linguists gave pre-eminence 
to the empirical or observational aspect of me~ning 
investigation. This resulted in an attempt to base 
meaning on context. Meaning as discussed in terms of 
ideas or concepts remained scientifically unobservable. 
In 1930 J.R. Firth wrote: 
II ••• if we regard language as 'expressive' 
or 'communicative' we imply that it is an 
instrument of inner mental states. And as 
we know so little of inner mental states, even 
by the most careful introsp'ection, the language 
problem becomes more mysterious the more we try 
to explain it by referring it to inner mental 
26. N. Chomsky, 'Current Issues in Linguistic Theory', 
p.8l. For fuller discussion of Chomsky's theory 
see G.Leech, 'Semantics', p. 81 onwards. 
27. G. Leech, 'Semantics', pp. 83-4. 
28. See for example the approach of G. Leech, ibid. p.84. 
29. Ibid. p. 83. 
30. Ibid. p. 94. 
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happenings which are not observable. By 
regarding words as acts, events, habits, we 
limit our inquiry to what is ob~lctive in the 
group or life or our fello"(-ls. II 
And so the study of meaning came to be based in terms of 
situation, use and context. Emphasis was put on the 
'system' of ~anguage. 'Language in action' and 'meaning 
as use' might be taken as twin slogans for this school 
of thought. 32 
Linguists drew their support for contextualism 
from several fields including anthropology, philosophy 
and psychology_ Leonard BIQomfield's behavioural theory 
of lartguage was based on the latter discipline. liThe mean-
ing of a linguistic form", he says, is "the situation 
in which the speaker utters it and the response which it 
calls forth from the hearer".33 Of course, "we must 
discriminate between the non-distinctive features of the 
situation • • and the distinctive, or linguistic meaning 
(the semantic features) which are common to all the 
situations that call forth the utterance of the linguistic 
form. ,,34 
Bloomfield's theory thus requires that there exist 
features common and peculiar to all the situations in 
which a given expression is uttered ina given sense. 
There must also be features common and peculiar to all 
the responses made to the utterance of a given expression 
in a given sense. 35 In practice, however, it is impossible 
31- J.R. Firth, 'Speech' , repro in 'The Tongues of Men 
and Speech' (1964) p. 173. 
32. G. Leech, 'Semantics', p. 71 • 
33. Bloomfield, 'Language I ( 1 935) , p. 139. 
34. Ibid. p.141. 
35. w.p. Alston, OPe cit. P. 26. 
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to identify features common to all utterances of a word 
or sentence that give that particular word or sentence 
its meaning. Similarly, it would be extremely difficult 
to find features common to the overt responses to the 
utterance such that'its meaning can be ascertained. The 
utterance of an imperative is perhaps the most likely 
case to call forth a uniform response from the hearer. 
But even here the standard compliance will often not be 
forthcoming in practice. A standard response would be 
even more difficult to ascertain \vhen the utterance takes 
the form of an assertion. 
A more sophisticated behavioural approach was 
devised by the philosopher Charles Morris. His theory 
tended to concentrate on the responses to linguistic 
utterances and say little of the situation in which the 
utterance was spoken. It attempted to define meaning in 
36 terms of a disposition to respond.. However it would 
seem that in many cases no such relevant disposition is 
in fact discernable. The statement "Mozart wrote 'Idomenc0 1 
at the age of twenty-five" produces no sBmantically 
important disposition in the mind of the hearer. 37 . 
Contextualism in its crudest form, i.e. meaning 
equals observable context is incapable of dealing with 
anything but the simplest cases of language use. 38 In 
most cases the observable context will tell us little 
about meaning. Speech may occur in the absence of the 
36. See C. Morris, 'Signs, Language and Behaviour 1 , 
especially Chapter 1. 
37. W.P. Alston, OPe cit. p. 30 For full discussion of 
criticisms see Alston, pp. 29-30. 
38. G. Leech, OPe cit. p. 74. 
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things being talked about and any1.,ray, many 1.,rords have no 
observable correlat e; for example words referring to 
states of mind. It is true that units of language some-
how get their meaning through being used by people involved 
in various types of behaviour. The do,.,rnfall of the 
behavioural theories is that they again oversimplify this 
behavioural i.nvoLvement. 39 .verbal behaviour cannot be 
defined in terms of a simple stimulus/response connection. 
In practice the behavioural theories resorted to 
a more indirect relationship between meaning and context. 
Whereas meanings are learned by reference to observable 
context, their use may be free from that context from 
. 40 
then on. Thus meaning is ultimately derivable from 
observable context. Some theories went even further in 
relaxing the equation of context ,.,ri th observable context. 
An extension to the contextual theories brought in 
linguistic context as well, or instead of, non-linguistic 
t · t 41 con ex • 
Ludwig Wittgenstein was another philosopher 
influenced by the fact that language is founded on 
speaking and responding to speaking and that these are 
things we do. 42 Language, in his view, was an activity. 
But Wittgenstein went a step further than other philos6phers. 
To him, meaning is not simply established by observing 
a word's use, meaning is its use. The influence of 
Wittgenstein's theory has been felt most strongly since 
39. W.P. Alston OPe cit. p. 31. 
40. G. Leech, OPe cit. p. 74. 
41. Ibid. p. 74. 
42. H.F. Pitkin, 'Wittgenstein and Justice', p. 36. 
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about 1960 follow'ing the posthumous pUblication of his 
tphilosophical Investigations' (1953)43 and other works. 
These later works embody a completely different vie,., of 
language from that expressed in his earlier 'Tractatus 
Logico - Philosophieus' (1921}44. The 'Tractatus' marked 
the culmination of Wittgenstein's first period of 
thought in which he favoured a referential approach to 
meaning. Words 'named t or 'referred' to things in the 
world. "A name mea.,ns an object. The object is the 
·meaning. 1I45 The function 01; language was to reppeEent 
the world to us, to provide "a picture of reality ll.46 
Language, he argued, had one purpose only; to make true 
or false statements, to assert facts. 47 
In his later works Wittgenstein repudiated almost 
every feature of the views expressed in the 'Tractatus'. 
Sentences were not just a,string of names. Rather, 
language involved knowing how to ~ words. "For a large 
class of cases • • • in which we employ the word 'meaning' 
it ~an be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its 
48 
use." The emphasis is on a word's function rather 
than its meaning. Different words perform differerit 
43. 
44. 
45. 
46. 
L. \{i ttgenstein, 'Philosphical Investigations' trans. 
by G.E.M.Anscombe, 3rd edition (Hew York, Macmillan 1968) 
L. Wittgenstein, 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus' 
transl. by D.F.Pears and B.F.McGuiness (N.York, 
Humanities Press, 1961). 
Ibid. para. 3.203. 
Ibid. para. 4.01. Wittgenstein is not saying that 
language is a picture of things • • he means that 
language depicts facts or states of affairs, such as 
Paris being the capital of France •• things as such 
cannot be pictured in language, they can only be named. 
(See H. Cranston's 'Philosophy and language', p.7.) 
See 1-1. Cranston, 'Philosophy and Language', pp. 7-8. 
L. Wittgenstein, 'Philosophical Investigations', 
para. 43. 
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functions. liTo understand a language", he says, IImeans 
to be master of a technique. 1I49 "Language is an instrument. 
Its concepts are instruments." 50 Thus the main themes 
of the 'Philosophical Investigations' can be identified 
as (i) definition of meaning in terms of use. 
(ii) the vari~ty of our uses of language, and 
(iii) the need.to consider utterances not in isolation 
5'1 but in their context. 
Throughout his work Wittgenstein makes use of 
analogy to explain his view of language andmeanin~. The 
tool-kit simile emphasises the variety of uses of words: 
"Think of tools in a tool kit, there is a hammer, 
pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a rule, a glue 
pot, glue, nails and screws. The function of 
words are as diverse as the functions of these 
objects. II 52 
Different words like different tools are used in different 
ways. Just as there is no one use which is the essential 
use of all tools, so there is no one use which is common 
to all words and sentences. 53 What is more, although 
not every tool can be used for every purpose, many can 
be used for a variety of purposes. 54 Similarly, words 
can be compared with pieces in a game. Both have specific 
functions to perform. While the function of some words 
(usually nouns) might be to label 'or 'name' things, it 
is wrong to suppose that words perform this function. 
As H.F. Pitkin says in her book 'Wittgenstein and Justice': 
49. Ibid. para 199 
50. Ibid. para 569. 
, 51. C. W .K. ~iundle ' A Critique of Linguistic Philos15Phy, p. 188. 
52. L. Wittgenstein, 'Philosophical Investigations, para 11. 
53. M. Cranston, 'Philosophy and Language', p. 39. 
54. H.F. Pitkin, op. cit. p. 36. 
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lilt is not that we never refer or describe, 
never make true or false assertions, never use 
words as labels. But these functions are not 
privileged or definitive. Just so, one can 
think of a label as a kind of tool, and 'ITe might 
keep some labels in our tool box; but anyone 
trying to generalise about tools using only 
labels as his example would be badly misled. .1155 
To know what an expression means is simply to 
- . . 56 know how it mayor may not be employed. Thus the 
'meanings t of words are generated by, changed by and 
given content by their use in various cases. 57 This does 
not mean that words cannot be defined. But any definitions 
we give 'viII be based on, and secondary to, cases of a 
word's use. The definition must hot be allowed, indeed 
will not be able, to stultify the "creative openness"58 
of ordinary language. Of course some words may be 
given rigid limits in the form of technical meanings, in 
the same way that mathematical terms have rigid limits. 
But this is not an ordinary use of language. "We do 
not know the boundaries (of ordinary concepts)", says 
Wittgenstein, "because none have been drawn. • we can 
draw a boundary - for a special purpose.,,59 But any 
such boundary,i.e. definition, "will never entirely 
coincide with the actual usage, as this usage has no 
60 
sharp boundary." Words are proj,ectable in the sense 
that they can be projected from a series of familiar 
61 paradigmatic cases into new and unprecedented ones. 
55. Ibid. p.43. 
56. M. Cranston, OPe cit. p. 39. 
57. R.F. Pitkin OPe cit. p.60. 
58. Ibid. p. 61. 
59. L. W"ittgenstein, 'Philosophical Investigations., 
para. 69. 
60. L. Wittgenstein, 'Blue and Brown Bookst (New York 
and Evanston, Harper and Ro,v,1964)" p. 19. 
61. R.F. Pitkin, OPe cit. p. 62. 
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But words are projectable in regularised ways only. 
Certain 'rules' govern a word1s use. These 'rules' are 
sometimes referred to as linguistic "conventions", "habits" 
or "customs ll • Wittgenstein compares these language 'rules' 
with rules of a game. Knowing the use of a word is like 
knowing the functions and powers of a chessman. Unfortun-
ately the analogy can leave us quite confused about the 
nature of linguistic conventions. Rules of a chess game 
are prescriptive and precise, but elsewhere Wittgenstein 
compares language 'rules' to the permissive and ·pliable 
62 
'rules' for using tools. Much of the confusion results 
from this fusion of the tool simile and the game simile. 63 
He assimilates using language to both these activities 
but without making it clear in which particular respects 
language is similar to each one and in which it is not. 
The game analogy gives rise to a further mistaken 
impression about language. While the rules of chess can 
be learnt before the game is played, this is not the 
case for words. These cannot be learned prior to speech. 64 
Nevertheless the analogy is useful in that it emphasises 
the importance Wittgenstein places on linguistic context. 
Just as a chessman has no significance outside a game of 
chess, so lfi ttgenstein argues, words have no significatioIl: 
outside their use in a particular language-game. 65 Each 
of these language-games is subject to different 'rules'. 
What then is the essential characteristic of 
language? If different words perform different functions 
62. C.W.K. Hundle, OPe cit. p. 194. 
63. Ibid. p. 194. 
64. M. Cranston, OPe cit. p. 39. 
65. Ibid. p. 40. 
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what common characteristic do they all have to enable 
them all to be called 'language'? Wittgenstein answers 
that there is no. one essential property common to all 
language (or "language-games" as he calls them). All 
they have in common.is a series of similarities he calls 
." family resemblances". 1'ihen different language games 
are compared, we find only Ita complicated network of 
·similarities overlapping and criss-crossing" as in the 
case of resemblances between different members of a 
family. We extend a concept "as in spinning a thread 
we twist fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread 
does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs 
through its whole length, but in the overlapping of 
, 66 
many fibres." 
10ii ttgenstein I s theory of family resemblances has 
greatly influenced contemporary thinking about the 
philosophy of language. It is subject to an important 
limitation however. The theory works only if the 
resemblances are important resemblances. Without this 
limitation almost anything could be said to be related 
to something else. 67 Wittgenstein relieves us of the 
task of looking for some essential feature common to all 
language but leaves us with that of determining wh~t are 
important resemblances. 68 . He provides no guidance. 
66. L. Wittgenstein, 'Philosophical Investigations', 
para. 67. 
67. See M. Cranston OPe cit. p. 37. For example, my 
shirt resembles the snm" on the Alps in colour, and 
the snow on the Alps resembles a frozen ox in temperature, 
and a frozen ox resembles a ton of coal in weight. 
68. M. Cranston, ibid. p. 37. 
29 
VI. IS RECONCILIATION POSSIBLE? 
All the theories discussed reveal some truth about 
words and how we use them to convey meaning. But taken 
individually none seems to provide a comprehensive 
account. At one extreme emphasis is put entirely on the 
sYn:!bolic nature of' language. Words name or ref'er to things. 
Little account is given of' the relationship between these 
individual word-names. At the other extreme emphas~s is 
entirely on the systematic nature of' language as revealed 
by its use. Individual words are held to mean nothing 
by themselves. In all probability the answer lies 
somewhere between the two. Language is a "system of' 
symbols"; both the symbolic aspect and the systematic 
aspect contribute to the final meaning. In general, words 
do refer to certain things and not to others. But the 
precise nature of that to which they refer cannot be 
determined until adequate consideration has been given to 
the context in which the word appears. The starting 
point for a consideration of meaning must always be a 
consideration of the entire utterance. It is now common-
place for judges to stress that interpretation must 
begin with a consideration of the entire Act read as a 
whole. Whether the relevant context also includes the 
statutory purpose is still a matter of dispute. 
Stephen Ullman69 is one writer who would agree 
that a middle-course can be taken between the competing 
theories. He does this by treating the ascertainment of 
69. S. Ullmann, 'Semantics'. 
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meaning as a two stage process. From this perspective 
the refer~ntial and contextual theories can be viewed 
as complements rather than alternatives. 70 The contextual 
theory makes it indisputable that the meaning of a word 
can be ascertained only by studying its use. "The 
investigator", he says, "must start by collecting an 
adequate sample of cont,exts and then approach them VIi th 
an open mind, allowing the meaning or meanings to emerge 
from the context themselves." 71 Once this is done the 
meaning or meanings so identified can be formulated. 
Stage one, then, consists of the identification of 
meaning through its use in context and stage'_ tWQ, , the 
":referential I stage, of formulating' those meanings. The 
distinction bet"t,reen the two stages, he argues, can be 
identified with the speech/language distinction. 
Ullmann's analysis of the meaning ascertainment process 
will be referred to again in the following chapter. 
70. Ibid. p.67. 
71. Ibid. p.67. 
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CHAPTER III 
CERTAINTY OF MEANING AND THE CLEAR CASE 
I. INTRODUCTION· 
Despite the fact that as lawyers we are predominant-
ly concerned with the problems and uncertainties of 
language, few would disagree that statutory language 
. 1 . tIt .p ·t 1· t· 1 1S C ear 1n a eas some o~ 1 s app 1ca 10ns. 
RInside, well on the inside, of the area of 
(a word's) meaning there will be little or no 
doubt or obscurity or even disagreement." 2 
'Wi thout such certainty communication as we kno\ ... it would 
break-down. In law, certainty about the rule of law to 
be applied gives rise to the 'clear' case. 3 In such a 
case, two necessary conditions must be met. The first 
concerns 'interpretation' of the rule. There must be a 
pre-existing rule which can be accurately discovered by 
the appropriate judicial methods. The form of words 
that symbolise the rule must be agreed upon and the meaning 
4 
of those words must be commonly understood. The second 
condition relates to the 'application' stage of decision-
making. The facts of the case must so clearly be instances 
of the generalised categories embodied in the rule as to 
be beyond question. 5 
1. R. Dickerson, 'The Interpretation and Application of 
Statutes', p.54. 
2. C. Curtis, 'It's Your Law', p. 62. 
3. See R.B. Seidman, 'The Judicial Process Reconsidered 
in the light of Role-Theorie s I , [1969] HLR 516 at 520. 
4. Ibid. p. 520. 
5. Ibid. p. 521. The validity of the interpretation/ 
application distinction will be discussed later. 
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l..-I 
This thesis primarily concerned ayout the 
resolution of' statutory. doubt. But as lithe character of' 
a specif'ic uncertainty of' meaning is shaped, at least in 
part, by the relevant certainties l1 ,6 it is a necessary 
preliminary to examine'the nature of' clear meaning. In 
particular, to examine the ef'f'ect of' context, including 
legislative purpose, on clear meaning. It will be 
submi tted tha t as the meaning of' a f'orm of' "lOrds can 
only be properly understood in light of' the statutory 
purpose, . the clear· case· depends on a com.aonunders"t~nding 
of the full contextual meaning of the words concerned. 
Such a submission will have important repercussions in 
our later assessment of' the traditional canons of 
interpretation. 
II. lfORDS AS UNITS OF MEANING 
If, as is submitted, the clear case depends upon 
a consideration of context, does this mean that there 
can be no element of certainty in individual words but 
only in the utterances of which those words form a part? 
Or is certainty as to the meaning of' an utterance still 
in some way dependent on an eleme~t of certainty in the 
individual words? As we noted in the previous chapter, 
answers to these questions are largely dependent upon 
adherence to a particular theory of meaning. An attempt 
will be made to clarify and, if' possible, to reconcile 
these dif'ferent points of view along similar lines to 
those adopted by S. Ullmann in the preceding chapter. 
6. R. Dickerson, ibid. p. 55. 
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At one extreme it is argued that "the ,.,ord exists 
only through the context and is nothing in itself,,7 ("Ie 
mot n'est que par Ie contexte e.t n'est rien par lui-m~me.") 
Likewise, A. Ross claims that "individual words have no 
independent meaning, only a meaning abstracted from the 
utterances in which_ they occur." 8 Thus the word 'cat' 
by itself means nothin~. Again ,.,e read "words are 
meaningless in isolation.,,9 At the other extreme, views 
such as those above are described as "inaccurate" and 
'''unrealistic'' • 1 0 To S. Ullmann, ",.,hile it is perfectly 
true • • that words are almost always found embedded 
in specific contexts, there are cases when a term stands 
entirely by itself without any contextual support and 
will make sense~ll Upon asking what the word 'X' means 
we expect, and in most cases get, a reply as to meaning 
without undue difficulty or hesitation. "There is no 
12 getting away from the fact", writes G. Stern, "that 
single words have more or less permanent meanings, that 
they actually do refer to certain referents and not to 
others, and that this characteristic is the indispensable 
'""-_. 
basis of all communication." 
In the previous chapter an attempt was made to 
identify two distinct stages in the meaning-ascertainment 
process. The same distinction can be used to reconcile 
many of the apparent differences above. \-Ie have seen 
7. A. Rosetti, 'Le Mot' 2nd ed. Copenhagen-Bucharest, 1947 
p. 38 (quoted and translated in S.Ullmann 'Semantics' p.48) 
8. A. Ross, 'On La,., and Justice', (Ch.4) p.113. 
9. C. Allen, 'Law in the Naking', p. 490(7th ed, 1964) 
10. S. Ullmann, 'Semantics', p. 48. 
11. Ibid. p.48. 
12. G. Stern, 'Meaning and Change of Meaning, with special 
Reference to the·English Language', p. 85. Cited by 
S. Ullmann, OPe cit. p. 49. 
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that language is a system of symbols ,.,hose significance 
we deduce from the 'rules' governing their use. These 
'rules' arise through the habitual use of particular 
symbols in particular ways. To determine meaning we must 
study the linguistic habits of the members of a particular 
speech community. This initial determination of the 
acceptabili ty of using words in a particular 1vay we called 
stage one. Viewed in relation to this initial stage, a 
word certainly has no intrinsic or independent meaning. 
Its only meaning is abstracted from the utterances in 
which it occurs. 
Sta~e two of this process is described by Ross 
himself: 
"The context will ShOH the reference with 
which each word has been used in each individual 
case. If each individual reference is then 
noted, there will emerge a field of reference 
corresponding to the word." 13 
This semantic reference he describes as having a "solid 
central zone where its application is prevalent and 
certain" and a "nebulous outer circle of uncertainty 
where its application is less usual, gradually becoming 
more doubtful 1.Thether the word can be applied or not." 14 
These "zones" of a word's reference are of course its 
'core' and 'penumbra', the subject of debate below. 
Having so stated the case, can Ross then deny that 
the "solid central zone" constitutes in some sense a 
word's meaning? Is this not the very concept of word 
13. A. Ross, ibid. p. 114. 
14. Ibid. p. 114. 
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meaning held by writers who insist that single words do 
have a more or less permanent meaning, and that they do 
refer to certain referents and not to others? Clarity 
of meaning arises from consistent and regular patterns 
of usage, originally arising from particular uses but 
persisting even beyond them. 15 J. Dewey1~escribes this 
as "potential ll meaning:' 
1\ • all familiar words' carry some meaning 
even i,Then uttered in isolation • • • Their 
meaning is potential rather than actual until 
they are linked to other words. If the words 
'sun', 'parabola', 'Julius Caesar', etc.; are 
uttered, a line of directions is given to 
observation or discourse. But the objective 
of the direction is indeterminate until it is 
distinguished from alternative possible termin~' 
ations, and is thus identified by means of 
relation to another term." 
Thus, context operates at two levels. Not only 
does it lead to the eventual formulation ofa word's 
'standard instance', it also operates to determine the 
scope of both vague and general words and to resolve 
ambiguities. It is impossible to say with certainty 
whether a particular referent falls within the permissible 
scope of a word when no regard is had for context. This 
is not to deny that a word has meaning of sorts (as' Ross 
would deny that the word 'cat' in isolation has meaning.) 
It is simply to say that the meaning of a -
particular word is determined by reference to context. 
To say that context clarifies meaning is quite different 
from saying 'that' it alone gives nfeaning. Ross's state-
ment that "individual words have no independent meaning" 
15. R. Dickserson, ibid. p. 59. 
16. J. Dewey, 'Logic: The Theory of Inquiry', p. 349, 
(1938) Emphasis is original. 
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can be viewed from a new perspective. 'Independent' is 
the key word. Individual words do have meaning in the 
sense that their field of reference has a central core 
of certainty. But inasmuch as these words may be 
ambiguous, overgeneral or vague, we can never give a 
sufficient definition to cover all possible contingencies 
without reference to context. In context a word's mean-
ing is refined by the other words around it. Language 
is a system of symbols, each symbol dependent to some 
extent on the others. The meaning of an utterance is 
more than the sum total of the meanings of the individual 
words making up that utterance. 17 The starting point 
of all interpretation ~ be a consideration of the 
whole utterance in its context. But it must also be 
borne in mind that the meaning of the utterance is to 
some extent dependent on an element of certainty in the 
individual words. 
III. 'CLEAR' HEANING,AND CONTEXT 
The most obvious way in which context clarifies 
meaning is through the resolution of ambiguity and the 
determination of 'borderline' cases. Less obviou~, but 
equally important, is the> influence of context on the 
~ndard instance or 'core' of meaning. The following 
debate between H.L.A. Hart 18 and L.L. Fuller19 investigates 
17. A. Ross, OPe cit. p. 113. 
18. H.L.A. Hart, 'Positivism and the Separation of La"'" 
and Morals', 71 Barv. L.R. 593. 
19. L.L. Fuller, 'Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A 
Reply to Professor Hart' 71 Barv. L.R. 630. 
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the extent of this influence in a specifically legal 
setting. 
Hart begins the debate ,,,i th his paper 'Posi ti vism 
and the Separation of Law and Horals'. The distinction 
, 
between core and penumbra is introduced as part of his 
general thesis that the law "that is" can be separated 
from the law "that ought to bell. In essence Hart argues 
that all general words have some settled core of meaning, 
some standard instance in which no doubts are felt about 
th d ' 1· t· 20 e wor s app lca lone This core meaning is impervious 
to the influence of context, including for present 
purposes the influence of legislative purpose. Without 
this element of certainty, argues Hart, communcation as 
we know it would be impossible. 21 The operation of core 
meaning is illustrated by the following situation: 
IIA legal rule forbids you to take a vehicle 
into the public park. Plainly this forbids 
an automobile, but what about bicycles, roller 
skates, toy automobiles? What about airplanes? 
••• If we are to communicate with each other 
at all, and if, as in the most elementary form 
of law", ,ve are to express our intentions that 
a certain type of behaviour be regulated by 
rules, then the general words we use - like 
"vehicle' in the case I consider - must have 
some standard instance in which no doubts are 
felt about its application. There must be a 
core of settled meaning, but there will be, 
as well, a penumbra of debatable cases in 
which words are neither obv'iously applicabl.e 
nor obviously ruled out." 22 
Such IIpenumbral!! cases 'viII each have some 
features in common with the standard case, but will lack 
others or be accompanied by features not present in the 
20. H.L.A. Hart ibid. p.607. 
21. Ibid. p.607. 
22. Ibid. p. 607. 
IIcore".23 The decision as to whether or not a particular 
case comes within the scope of a given word is a creative 
one largely dependent on context. The decision has 
nothing tO,do with 10 cal deduction. 24 As Hart puts it: 
"Fact situations do not await us neatly labelled, 
creased, and folded, nor is their legal class-
ification written on them to be simply read off 
by the judge. Instead, in applying legal 
rules, someone must take the responsibility 
of deciding that words do or do not cover some 
case in hand 'vi th all the practical consequences 
involved in that decision." 25 
Fuller criticises Hart's thesis on a number of 
grounds. Firstly he criticises his emphasis on individual 
word 'meanings. Problems of interpretation, Fuller 
argues, do not involve an ascertainment of the meanings 
of individual 1-lords but of entire sentences, paragraphs 
26 
or 1vhole pages of text. He argues:. 
IISure l y a paragraph does not have a l: s tandard 
instance I that remains constant whatever the 
context in which it appears. If a statute 
seems to have a kind of !; core meaning:' that 
we can apply without a too precise inquiry 
into its exact purpose, this is because we 
can see that, ho\,;ever one might formulate the 
precise objective of the statute, this case 
would still come within it,ll 27 
Basically, the disputeis'between two opposing 
views of the nature of meaning; between an essentially 
word-by-word approach and a conte~tual approach. In 
Fuller's opinion, Hart's theory fails to recognise the 
systematic quality of language. This system is reflected 
in the meaning of every statutory term. 28 But even if 
23. Ibid. p. 607. 
24. Ibid. p. 608. 
25. Ibid. p. 607. 
26. L.L. Fuller Ibid. p. 663. 
27. Ibid. p. 663. 
28. Ibid. p. 669. 
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Fuller could accept Hart's word-by-word approach, he 
would not accept his analysis of core meaning. In 
particular he denies that the core is settled and complete, 
impervious to the influence of context. A word cannot 
be interpreted ~ithout knowledge of the legislative 
purpose. Attacking Hart's analysis of a rule forbidding 
"vehicles" in a park, he argues as follmvs: 
"In his illustration of the 'vehicle', although 
he tells us this word has a core of meaning. 
that in all contexts defines unequivocally a 
range of objects embraced by it, he never tells 
us what these object~ might be. If the rule 
excluding vehicles from parks seems easy to 
apply in some cases, I submit this is because 
we can see clearly enough what the rule tis 
aiming at in general' so that we know there 
is no need to "lvorry about the difference bet'veen 
Fords and Cadillacs. If in some cases we 
seem to be able to apply the rule without asking 
what, its purpose is, this is not because we 
can treat a directive arrangement as if it had 
no purpose. It is rather because, for example, 
whether the rule be intended to preserve quiet 
in the park or to save carefree strollers from 
injury, we know, 'without thinking', that a 
noisy automobile must be excluded. 
What would Professor Hart say if some local 
patriots wanted to mount on a pedestal in the 
park a truck used in World War II, while other 
citizens, regarding the proposed memorial as 
an eye-sore, support their stand by the I no 
vehicle' rule? Does this truck, in perfect 
working order, fall within the core or the 
penumbra?" 29 
To illustrate his point further Fuller adopts 
another example; that of a rule forbidding persons to 
sleep in railway stations. The purpose of the rule is 
obvious. So too is the type of situation at which it is 
aimed. "l'le are li~ely at once n, says Fuller, II to call 
to mind the picture of a dishevelled tramp, spread out 
29. Ibid. p. 663. 
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in an ungainly fashion o~ one of the benches of the 
station, keeping ,yeary passengers on their feet and 
filling their ears with·raucous and alcoholic snores. 1I30 
This is the 'obvious. :instance' of the statute, but is 
now'he.re near the 'standard instance' of physiological 
sleep. The purpose of the rule reveals what cases should 
come within its ambit.· Fuller continues: 
"Suppose I am a judge, and that two men'are 
brought before me for violating this statute. 
The first is a passenger who was waiting at 
,3.a.m. for a delayed train. When he was arrested 
he was sitting upright in an orderly'fashion, 
but was heard by the arresting officer to be 
gently snoring. The second is a man who had 
brought a blanket and a pi~low to the station 
and had obviously settled himself down for the 
night. He 'vas arrested, however, before he 
had a chance to go to sleep. Which of these 
cases presents the 'standard instance of the 
word 'sleep'? If I disregard that question, 
and decide to fine the second man and set 
free the first, have I violated a duty of 
fidelity to law? Have I violated the duty 
if I interpret 'sleep' as used in this 
statute to mean something like 'to spread 
oneself out on a bench~or floor to spend the 
night, or as if to spend th'e night'? n 31 
Fuller is quite correct that a word's 'core' can 
only be understood properly in light of the context in 
which the word appears. Indeed, one of the major 
functions of context is to limit otherw'ise over-general 
language. 32 This has important consequences for our 
conception of 'clear' me~ning. If linguistic certainty 
is to be found in the 'core' or 'standard instance' of 
a word, and this 'core' is itself subject to the influence 
of context, then how can we justify any approach to 
30. Ibid. p. 664. 
31. Ibid. p. 664. 
32. R. Dickerson, Ibid. p. 65. 
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interpretation which has no resort to context (including 
statutory purpose) if the disputed terms py -themselves 
are considered 'clear and unambiguous'? 
Fuller goes further than simply emphasising the 
impprtance of c~ntext. He denies the existence of 
core meaning altogether. The word 'improvement', in an 
incomplete sentence, "is almost as devoid of meaning as 
.the symbol 'X' n, he says. 33 This conclusion is question-
able in light of preceding discussion. To say a '-lord 
. has a I core I meaning· is qui t·e consistent w'i th that word 
having more than one sense. t~ere these senses are 
related the 'core' meaning would attach to the common 
general referent. lvhere unrelated, it would consist of 
. 34 
the aggregate of 'core' meanings of the separate senses. 
Thus the core meaning of a word out of context has been 
likened to a quiver of individually unique arrows each 
of which shares some element of similarity with one or 
more of the others. 35 
While denying the existence of an element of 
certainty in individual words, Fuller admits that he can 
sometimes see without thinking what a rule !lis aiming 
at in general ll • 36 But is this certainty as to purpose 
unrelated to some element of certainty in the individual 
words?37 Insofar as purp6se is revealed by the enacted 
33. Ibid. p. 665. 
34. See R. Dickerson, Ibid. p~-61.· 
35. R. Dickerson, ibid. pp. 61-62. 
36. L.L. Fuller, ibid. p. 663. 
37. R. Dickerson, ibid. p. 58. 
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words it can only be as certain as those words. 
Similarly, where purpose is revealed other than by the 
enacted words, those words cannot be extended further 
than their 'rules of usage' permit. Some notion of 
standard instance is implicit in the assumption that 
there is a practical limit to the meaning a word is 
capable of bearing. 38 
38. R. Dickerson, ibid. p. 63. 
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CHAPTER IV 
UNCERTAINTY·OF JvIEANING AND THE PROBLEM CASE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
"La\yyers have been telling each other for so 
many years that language of the law is precise 
that they have ,come to believe it, even though 
long preoccupation with litigation cflused by 
their language should by this time have made 
them at least sceptical • • • " 1 
As Mellinkoff recognises, statuto:ry language'-'fill 
always be susceptible to the limitations and deficiencies 
of language in general." In ~ddition it will be subj ect 
to the draftsman's technique and to the influence of 
parliamentary procedure. The present chapter is concerned 
with drafting only insofar as it is capable of reducing 
statutory uncertainty. The opposing pressures to which 
the draftsman is subject, i.e. brevity and precision, 
will of course greatly influence his or her effectiveness 
in producing a clear and unambiguous text. As far as 
parliamentary procedure is concerned, let it suffice to 
note that text validation can sometimes lead to distortion 
of the legislative text thereby creating undue uncertainty.2 
The main concern of this chapter :fs to investigate. the 
primary sources of linguistic uncertainty. 
will be di?ded 
t* I?ce_/'~ 
u~~er three_hea~gs; ambiguity, vague-
ness and generality. Each will be discussed in terms of 
-1. D. r-Iellinkoff, 'The Language of the Law', p. 290. 
2. For further discussion of uncertainty caused by, text 
validation and drafting techniques see F. Bennion, 
'Statute Law', Chapters 11-14 and Chapters 16,17 and 
18 on drafting errors. 
its potential for giving rise to a problem case of 
interpretatione 3 
Such a case arises because either of the two 
conditions necessary for a clear case are miSsing. 4 
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Firstly, there may be disagreement about the formulation 
of the rule, ei ther.iwith respect to the form of '-lords to 
be used or the meanint of those ~ords. Secondly, even 
if the rule and its meaning are agreed, the particular 
facts may arguably, but not necessarily, fall within 
. . . 
its terms. In such a case the court exercises a creative 
role. 5 Where no clear rule is applicable, it must 
determine \vhat the appropriate form and content of the 
rule is to be. lfuere the fac ts of the case before it 
do not clearly fall within the terms of the rule it must 
decide \vhether or not to extend the operation of the rule 
to those facts. In effect, the court redefines the 
rule, clarifying its future operation with respect to 
similar cases. It should be noted, that there is no 
clear dividing line between clear and problem cases. 
As N. MacCorm~ck puts it: 6 
"There is a spectrum (of cases) which ranges 
from the obviously simple to the highly 
contestable, and across that spectrum it could 
never be judged more than vaguely at what 
point some doubt as to the 'relevancy' or 
'interpretation' or 'classification' could 
be raised • • • " t 
Differences of judicial style, approach and even 
3. Also called a 'hard' case: see N. MacCormick, 'Legal 
Reasoning and Legal Theory', p. 195. 
'4. See R.B. Seidman OPe cit. p. 521 and discussion on P.31 
above concerning the clear case. 
5. R.B. Seidman,Ibid. p. 521. 
6. OPe cit. 
7. Ibid. p. 198. 
8 temperament range alongside the nature of language 
itself as reasons for this vagueness • 
. II. AMBIGUITY 
The type of linguistic uncertainty i..;rhich most 
readily springs to mind is probably ambiguity. Ambiguous 
expressions are defined by the Oxford Dictionary as 
being those capable of more than one meaning. For 
present purposes we shall treat this as including words 
or phrases with potential for giving rise to uncertainty. 
Ambiguity may arise in a number of ways and may take one 
of a number of different forms. We shall call these 
'lexical',9 'syntactic' and 'contextual' ambiguities. 
While we shall be including in our discussion 
words and phrases ,dth a potential for giving rise to 
uncertainty, a distinction must be made between potential, 
t d t 1 b * *t 10 apparen an ac ua am 19U1 y. The lexical and 
syntactic ambiguities we will look at are characterised 
as such by their potential for giving rise to uncertainty. 
Once placed in a specific context the intended meaning 
may become clear. An actual ambiguity exists where the 
-admissible context as a whole does not resolve the 
uncertainty. The legislative draftsman must seek to avoid 
a11 ambiguities that will not be resolved by the admissible 
8. Ibid. p. 198. 
9. This form of ambiguity is sometimes also described 
as 'semantic ambiguity'. See, for example, R. Dickerson, 
ibid. p.46. Used in this way the word 'semantic' is 
obviously used in its most narrow sense. 
10. See R. Dickerson, 'The Interpretation and Application 
of Statutes.' 
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context. Where poss~ble he must also avoid the use of 
apparent ambiguitY.'At.best the resolution of such ambiguous 
'vords and phrases involves unnecessary time and expense 0 11 
(1) Lexical Ambiguitx 
Perhaps the most obvious form of ambiguity is that 
where the uncertainty is due to factors relating to the 
signification and appl;ication of-individual words. In 
numerous cases more ·than one sense is connected with the 
same name. This.linguistic feature is commented upon 
by Glanville Ifilliams who noted a "most remarkable 
maldistribution of words, a great unevenness of density; 
for some ideas are expressible in a dozen different words 
and others have to be lumped together under one." 12 
Lexical ambigu~ty may be sub-d~vided into two 
separate (but not always distinct) categories. These 
categories warrant separate discussion due to their 
differing potential for confusion once placed in context. 
(a) Polxsemx. 'Polysemy' arises when one word 
has many senses regularly attaching to it. 13 Words such 
as 'get', 'make' and 'put' need lengthy dictionary entries 
to cover the wide variety of senses they cover. Take 
for instance the verb 'to make'. Inter alia this can 
mean 'to construct"" 'to compose', I to prepare', 'to 
resul t in', 'to establish', 'to enact', 'to gain I • 
Not ,all agree on whether this multiplicity of 
senses is in fact a defect of language. Some regard it 
11. Ibid. p. 48. 
12. G. lHlliams, 'Language and the Lm</ I, 61 LQR 71 at 
179. 
13. }1. Black, 'Labyrinth of Language', p. 171. 
as an essential condition of its efficiency.14 The 
answer depends on the extent to which context clarifies 
the intended meaning of a polysemous word. If only one 
sense is appropriatei~ a given context then no problem 
arises and polysemy could certainly be regarded as "an 
invaluable factor 'of economy and flexibility in language. II 15 
If, on the other hand, context fails to indicate the 
intended sense, then a true equivocation exists. To a 
lawyer this can orlly be regarded as a defect. 
·A good example of the undesirable use of polysemy 
is provided Jy the word 'residence' as it occurs in the 
sentence "his rights ·depend onhi~ residence".16 The 
immediate context fails to indicate which of the two 
alternative senses of the word 'residence' is intended. 
Is it the place where a person has his abode for an 
extended period, or the place that the law considers to 
be his permanent home, whether or not it is his place of 
abode? Of course it is possible that reference to a wider 
context may resolve this uncertainty. But as we shall 
see evidence of extended context, even though relevant, 
is not always admissible as evidence. Having adopted 
this narrow attitude tm;yards context, we must regard all 
, 
but a few polysemous 'vords as potentially capable of 
producing confusion or misunderstanding. The example 
above illustrates a further example of ambiguity. The 
14. See for example the attitude of S. Ullmann in 'Semantics' 
p. 168 and compare it with that of R. Dickerson in 
'The Interpretation and Application of Statutes' p.44. 
Note that while one deals with the general topic of 
semantics the other is specifically concerned with 
le slative uncertainty. 
15. S. Ullmann ibid. p. 168. 
16. See R. Dickerson, OPe cit. p. 44. 
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concept of a 'right' is fundamental to our legal system. 
But despite attempts by Hohfield to distinguish between 
the several different cbncepts expressed by this word, 
its use is often totally indiscriminate. 
On the whole lawyers recognise the dangers 
arising from such ambiguity. They have taken pains in 
their attempt to construct and preserve a moderately 
, 17 precise technical language.~ The success of these 
efforts has been li~ited. It is interesting to speculate 
whether this quest.for a legal language devpid of all 
ambiguity could ever be entirely successful. It is our 
most commonly used words that have the widest range of 
meanings. Research has in fact shown a direct relation-
ship between the frequency of occurrence of a word and 
18 the number of different senses it is likely to have. 
Lawyers may search for a more precise form of legal 
expression by use of technical words but they could never 
eliminate the English language altogether. 
(b) Homonymy. 'Homonymy' arises when one a:Q,d the 
same word-sound has tiV'O quite distinct meanings. 19 
Examples are words such as 'seal', name of an animal, 
and 'seal', piece of wax fixed on a letter; 'bore', 
tiresome person, and 'bore', diameter of a gun ba~rel. 
Of these two forms of ambiguity polysemy is by 
far the more widespread. This does not mean that homonyms 
17. G. i1illiams,op. cit. at p.79. 
18. See discussion of research by G.K. Zipf and J. Wbatmough 
in S. Ullmann, 'Semantics', p. 169. 
19. f.1. Black, OPe cit. p. 171 .. 
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occur only infrequently in the English language. Howe,ver, 
unlike polysemy, the vast majority of cases involving 
homonyms cause no embarrassment or confusion in practice. 
The intended sense of a homonymous word in most cases is 
revealed by use. Thus context provides the prime safe-
d . t f' 20 guar aga1ns con US1on. For this reason lawyers are 
rarely concerned with homonymy as a form of ambiguity. 
In his discussion of semantic ambiguities,21 Dickerson 
goes so far as to actually distinguish between homonymous 
words and ambiguous lvords. The difference is one of 
definition only. Whereas the present discussion includes 
words with a potential for giving rise to uncertainty, 
Dickerson limits his discussion to words whi~hiih 
J>ractice give rise to uncertainty. In his opinion, lithe 
homonym,ls capacity for sense shifting is built in and 
automatic. 1122 Surely by j:;his he means that once employed 
in context we automatically know what meaning is intended 
by a homonymous word. In fact "we do not even 'have to 
exclude the other meanings of the word: these meanings 
do not arise for us, they do not cross the threshold of 
our consciousness.,,23 Since this is,the case with the 
great majority of homonymous words this particular form 
of ambiguity presents no significant danger to clear 
legal expression and will- receive only brief mention. 
20. The intended meaning of a homonymous word is in 
most cases revealed by its immediate context. 
21. R. Dickerson, op. cit. p. 46. Note that by 'semantic 
ambiguity' he refers to what we have called 'lexical' 
ambiguity. 
22. Ibid. p. 44. 
23. Br6al, tEssai de semantique. Science des significations' 
(5th ed., Paris, 1921), p. 145. Transl. in S. Ullmann, 
OPe cit. p. 168. 
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(2) Synt,a.c t ic Ambigui ty 
Syntactic ambiguities are uncertainties of 
modification or reference within the particular statute. 24 
Unlike lexical ambiguity l",hich arises from the range of 
meanings of individual words, syntactic ambi ty arises 
from the actual use of words in sentences. The uncertainty 
concerns the relationship between the different words 
in a sentence. 25 The present discussion is not intended 
to be a comprehensive account of syntactic ambiguity, 
but will be limited to an illustration of some of the 
problems that may arise. 
An obvious source of ambiguity is the use of 
a modifier in a conjoint sentence. The question is, 
does the modifier qualify one or more of the several 
limbs of the sentence? In some cases no real problem 
arises for the interpreter. Some meanings are clearly 
more reasonable than others. The meaning of the sentence 
'Young men and ,,,omen who attained the necessary qualific-
ations are eligible' is reasonably clear. But in other 
cases more serious doubts can arise. In the sentence 
'charitable corporations -or institutions performing 
educational functions' two interpre:tative-·problems arise; 
does 'charitable' modify 'institutions' as well as 
'c?rporations I, and does ", performing educational functions' 
modify I corporations'? Another sour.~e of ambiguity is 
the use of squinting modifiers~ In the sentence 'the 
trustee shall requi~e him promptly to rep~y the loan' 
does 'promptlyl modify 'require
' 
or 'repay'? 
24. R. Dickerson, OPe cit. p. 46. 
25. J.L. Nontrose 'Syntactic (Formerl.y Amphibolous) 
Ambiguity', N.U.L.L. June 1962. p. 65. 
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The above examples can be made more explicit by 
the use of diagrams. 26 Depending on the nature of the 
ambiguity either a circuit diagram or an isomer diagram 
t-lill be appropriate. F,or example in Crowe v. Lloyd I s 
British Testing c'o.27 confusion arose about the definition 
of non-industrial buildings in the U.K. Rating Act 1957. 
Section 22(4) referred,to IIbuildings of any description 
with the exception of factories, mills and other premises 
of a similar character~ used wholly or mainly for 
industrial purposes. 1I The alternative meanings are 
made clear by the following circuit diagram: 
1 • factories 
used for 
...:...:.:.... industrial ~ with the exception of I rl mills purposes I 
other premisest 
2. factories i 
I with the exception of r- mills I 
used for 
industrial 
other premises I- purposes 
The court I s decision lvas in favour of (1). 
26. See J.L. Nontrose OPe cit. for full discussion of 
the diagrammatic explanation of syntactic ambiguity. 
The above examples are taken from this article. 
27. [I 960J 1 All E.R. 411. 
---7 
1-
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And in Re Watertube Boilermakers Association28 
the U.K. Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1956 Section 
21(1)(f) provided that a restriction is valid if "the 
removal of the restriction would be likely to cause a 
reduction in the volume or earnings of the export 
business which is substantial either in relation to the 
whole export business af the United Kingdom or in 
relation to the whole business (includ~ng export 
business) of the said trade or industry." 
The ambiguity differs in syntactic function from 
that above and cannot be explained by means of a circuit 
diagram. J.L. Montrose 29 draws an analogy from the 
description of chemical compounds and clarifies the 
ambiguity by the following isomer diagrams: 
1 .1( reduction) --- (which is:. l (in- the vo1:ume L-' substantial--~ --of the business) 
2. '(reduction) ~-~n the volume (which is l 
~f the business)- substantiallj 
The court's decision favoured (1). 
Al though the above diagrams cla,r..ify the nature 
of the ambiguity, they do not resolve it. In devising 
their solution the judges' will not be guided solely by 
rules of grammar. In fact it is doubtful whether there 
are any relevant rules of grammar. 30 Syntactic 
connective forms have no unequivocal function. 31 Context, 
28. [1959J3 All E.R. 257. 
29. op. cit. p. 67. 
30. Ibid. p. 69. 
31. A. ~oss, 'On Law and Justice', p. 127. 
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statutory purpose and judicial policy must remain the 
principal guiding factors in a decision. 
In conclusion it is interesting to note the 
comments of A. Ross3 2 that reference to a Iclear or 
. unambiguous .1 statutory text can only properly refer to 
its syntactic interpretation. As far as individual word 
meanings go, the text will always be subject to the 
indeterminacy of vagueness,33 and can never be entirely 
.. 1 clear or unambiguous 1 • This would certainly appear to 
be true of a word taken in isolation. It is however 
consistent with Ross's theme and with this thesis that, 
considered in context (including statutory purpose), 
an expression may clearly be intended to cover the 
relevant fact situation. 
(3) Contextual Ambiguity 
Contextuai ambiguities are those concerning the 
relationship of one utterance to others within a 
context. 34 A. Ross calls this I1logic?-1 amb tyll, not 
because it can be solved with the aid of logic or 
mechancial principles of interpretation, but because it 
is ascertained by a logical analysis of the substance 
of the statute. 35 Contextual ambiguities can be internal 
or external; that is, a provision can bear an ambiguous 
relationship to another provision within the same 
statute or with another statute. The uncertainty can 
arise for a number of reasons. Dickerson suggests that 
32. Ibid. p. 128. 
33. see pp. 57-69. 
34. A. Ross, OPe cit. p.128. 
35. Ibid. p. 134. 
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the most troublesome contextual ambiguity, and perhaps 
the most frequent, is the uncertainty as to whether a 
particular implication arises. 36 It is often unclear, 
for example, whether the maxim texpressio unius est 
exclusio alterius t applies in particular contexts so as 
to impose a tnegative t implication. 37 Inconsistency is 
another common source of ambiguity. Ross identifies 
three types of inconsistency which he calls total 
inconsistency (or absolute incompatibility), total-
partial inconsistency (or inconsistency between the 
general and the particular rule) and partial inconsist-
ency (or overlapping of rules).3 8 The way such inconsist~ 
encies are resolved depends largely on ' .... hether they are 
internal or external. 
Within a statute total and total-partial in-
consistencies are rare. 39 . Relationships between general 
and particular rules do not normally cause difficulty; 
if no syntactic link exists beb .... een the two, as is 
cornm'on in statutes, the particular rule is still viewed 
as a specific.limitation on the general rule. This 
could be regarded either as a case of implied synta~tic 
. t' 40 I ~ th t" ~ th conJunc 10n or as an examp e O.1.e opera 10n 0.1. e 
maxim t generalia specialibus non d'erogant 1 which will 
be discussed short'ly. On· the other hand partial 
inconsistency will frequertly occur in a statute. Such 
inconsistency cannot be resolved by lin.guistic interpret-
ation or logical constru~tion.41 The decision rests 
36. R. Dickerson OPe cit. p. 47. 
37. Ibid. p. 47. 
38. A. Ross, OPe cit. p.129. 
39. Ibid. pp. 129,130. 
40. Ibid. p. 130. 
41. Ibid. p. 131. 
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on factors other than the statutory text itself, for 
example, on admissible evidence of statutory purpose, 
or on discretion. 
Inconsistencies between different statutes are 
sometimes resolved by application of the maxim 'generalia 
specialibus non derogant' or by the doctrine of implied 
repeal. . The principle 'of 'generalia specialibus I is 
as follows: 
" • Where there are general words in a 
later Act capable of reasonable and sens~ble 
application without extending them to subjects 
specifically dealt with by earlier Ie slation, 
you are not to hold that earlier and special 
legislation indirectly repealed, altered or 
derogated from merely by force of such general 
words without any indication of a particular 
intention to do SO." 42 
Thus it involves the engrafting of an exception onto 
general words which taken in their natural signification, 
apart from any consideration of a more specific provision 
on the same subject matter, would readily extend to the 
matter in hand. 43 The second method by which inconsist-
encies may be resolved is by the doctrine of implied 
repeal; the last in time prevails. 
"If • • • the provisions of a later enactment 
are so inconsistent with or repugnant to the 
provisions of an earlier one that the two 
cannot stand together, the .earlier is abrogated 
by the later." 44 
This doctrine has been described as a last resort device 
to be applied only if the 'generalia specialibus' 
princi e fails to resolve the uncertainty.45 
42. 
43. 
44. 
45. 
Seward v. Vera Cruz (Owners) (1884) 10 App. Cas. 59, 
68. 
Professor J.F. Burrows, 'Inconsistent Statutes' 
[1976] 3 Otago L.R. 601. 
Kutner v. Phillips (1891] 2 Q. B. 267. 
Professor J.F. Burrows, op. cit. p. 607. 
Generalia specialibus is applied most often when 
a specific provision in one Act has preceded a general 
one in another Act. In this case the maxim prevails 
over the doctrine of implied repeal. If the specific 
provision is later in time than the general one the 
result will be the same; the specific provision will 
J)revail and an exception 1·dll be grafted onto the 
general rule. But in this case, the result is due not 
to an application of the generalia specialibus princ e, 
but. to the doctrine of implied repeal. However, , .. hile 
a later specific provision will always prevail over an 
earlier general one, a later general provision will not 
always be subject to a preceding specific provision. 
The generalia specialibus maxim is not a rule of law 
and will not be unconditionally adhered to where it is 
clear that Parliament intended the general provision 
to prevail. Similarly with the doctrine of implied 
repeal uhere the inconsistency arises other than as a 
result of general and specific provisions. The doctrine 
applies only insofar as the legislature 'intended' to 
supersede the earlier law. 46 Its intention may have 
been to supplement the already existing law. The court 
will base its decision either on evidence of intention 
found outside the statutory text or on its own discretion. 
46. A. Ross, OPe cit. p. 131. 
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III. VAGUENESS 
(1) Description and Illustration of Vagueness 
Ambiguity is a relatively easy factor of 
semantic uncertainty.of which to take account. 
Clarification is provided by separate specifications 
of the various meanings of a ,vord or phrase and some 
analysis of tr:e conditions in which one sense will be 
used in preference to another. 47 A more difficult 
semantic feature to deal with is vagueness. 
A term is vague when there are borderline cases 
where there is no definite answer as to whether the 
48 term applies or not. These are the cases which fall 
within a word's 'penumbra' of uncertainty or its 'fringe' 
of application. The word 'penumbra' is well-chosen. 
It is defined as a partial shade bordering on a fuller 
or darker one; a tWilight. 49 The difficulties of defining 
the precise point at which day becomes night are known 
to us all. 
The term 'elderly' is one subject to this type 
of indeterminacy. Do we apply it to a person aged 58? 
Aged 60? Aged 70? The fact that we can give no definite 
answer as to what delimits 'elderliness' is due to an 
aspect of the term itself. It has nothing to do with 
the current state of our kno1dedge about the conditions 
necessary for its application and whether or not these 
have been fulfilled. 
47. See IV.P. Alston, 'Philosophy of Language', p.84. 
48. Ibid. p. 84. 
49. See F. Bennion, 'Statute Law', p. 123. 
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"A proposition is vague 1"hen there are possible 
states of' things concerning which it is 
intrinsically uncertain whether had they been 
contemplated by the speaker, he would have 
regarded them as excluded or allo,,red by the 
proposition. By intrinsically uncertain we 
mean not uncertain in consequence of' any 
ignoranc.e of the interpreter, but because the 
speaker's habits of language are indeterminate." 50 
It has been claimed that all words whose application 
involves use of the senses are vague. 51 One can easily 
find borderline cases where it is uncertain if the 
class name applies. An obvious example is colour names • 
. As with the illustration of' twilight, defining colour 
provides a useful analogy to the nature of vagueness 
itself. 
liThe changes of colour in the spectrum are 
throughout so continuous that it is not 
possible to find the exact point at which 
'the chap.ges of direction begin.". 52 
A useful discussion of the nature of vagueness 
is provided by Hax Black in his book 'Language and 
Philosophy'. The discussion is centred around the 
word 'chair', a w~rd that applies to an incredible 
variety of objects. 53 However it is important to 
distinguish between the.vagueness of the word 'chair' 
and the variety of the word's application to objects of 
differing size, shape and material .• 54 The variety of 
application arises from i~s definition in terms of the 
50. Peirce in Baldwin's 'Dictionary of Philosophy and 
Psychology' 2 (1902) p. 748. 
51. N. Black, 'Language and Philosophy', p.33. 
52. G.F. Stout, '1>1anual of Psychology, p.160. 
53. From arm chairs to settees to opera stalls. See the 
description of 'chair' in H.G.Wells's 'First and 
Last Things', p. 16. 
54. See discussion of distinction between generality 
and vagueness in M.Black op.cit. p.31 and below 
pp.60-61. 
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need to be satisfied. "A separate seat for one' is 
compatible ,,,i th great variation in form. The 
vagueness of the word relates to the fact that border-
line cases exist where the acceptability or otherw·ise 
into the class of 1 chairs , is inherently doubtful. 
"It is the indeterminacy of the usage, not its 
extension which is important for the purpose of 
the argument. The finite area of the field of 
application of the word is a sign of its 
generality while its vagueness is indicated 
by the finite area and lack of specification 
of its boundary.1I 55 
Because small variations in·character are unimportant 
in serving the purpose required by a chair, it is possible 
by successive small variations ultimately to produce 
borderline cases. 56 
So far we have looked at vagueness arising 
through the lack of a precise cut-off point. This is 
fairly easy to discern. A more complex source of 
indeterminacy can be found in the way in which some 
words have a number of independent conditions of 
appl·ication. 57 Where a plurality of relevant conditions 
exist, vagueness stems from indeterminacy as to-what 
combination of conditions is sufficient or necessary 
for the application of the term. Take for example the 
term lreligion1.58 We encounter difficulties as soon 
as we try to specify the characteristic features, or 
combination of features, which provide a sufficient 
condition for ~ts application. And even if we could 
55. M. Black, ibid. p. 31. 
56. Ibid. p. 31. 
57. W.P. Alston, op. cit. p.87. 
58. For full discussion of the vagueness of terms such 
as 'religion
' 
see W.P. Alston, ibid. pp. 87-90. 
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say exactly which or hO\.r many of the various religion-
making characteristics an entity must have to be a 
'religion' , could ,.,e say to exactly what degree it must 
possess them? W.P. Alston describes this as a 
'double' vagueness. 59 
(2) Distinctions Between Vagueness and Other 
Forms of Linguistic Uncertainty 
The term 'vague' is often used very loosely to 
apply to any kind of uncertainty of meaning. However, 
there is no inherent reason 'why the term should be so 
used. A clear distinction can be made between vagueness 
and other forms of uncertainty. By now the distinction 
betwe~n ambiguity and vagueness should be obvious. Yet 
many legal writers frequently confuse the two. 60 Let 
it suffice to say that whereas the uncertainty of 
ambiguity involves a central either/or choice between 
a finite number of distinct or related core meanings, 
the uncertainty of vagueness lies in marginal questions 
- 61 
of degree. 
Further confusion exists between vagueness and 
generali ty, or , ... ha t Alston calls 1I1ack of specificity. 11 62 
As an example of the latter he gives the sentence "we 
, 63 
must take steps to meet the emergency". This sentence 
may commonly be called vague. But the uncertainty lies 
not in the vagueness of the word 'steps', in that there 
59. 
60. 
61. 
62. 
Ibid. pp 87-90. 
For example, see A.S.Hiller, 'Statutory Language and 
the Purposive Use of Ambiguity' 42 Va.L.Rev.23 (1956). 
Miller seems to use his terms indiscriminately. Pres-
umably he intends to advocate vagueness rather than 
ambiguity as a desirable feature of legal language. 
Employment of vague terms leaves the court an element 
discretion. /of 
R. Dickerson, op.cit.p.49. 
W.P.Alston,op.cit.p.85. 6l. Ibid. p.S5. 
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are cases where it is nO.t clear wh,ether something should 
or should not be calred a 'step', but in the lack of 
specificity resulting from use of the Reneral term 
'steps'. Clarification "\vould involve stating what 
specific steps ,'>'ere " intended. This does not mean that 
the word 'steps' .:t;s not vague to some extent ; it merely 
means that the indeterminacy in question is not due to 
this vagueness. 
The previous example of the word 'chair' also 
clearly illustrates the 'distinction be en. vagueness 
and generality. As Black puts it: 
"generality is constituted'by the application 
of a symbol to a multiplicity of objects in 
the field of reference • • • like,vis e ambiguity 
is constituted by the association of a finite 
number of alternative meanings having the same 
phonetic form. • but it is characteristic 
of the vague symbol that there are no alternative 
symbols in the language, and its vagueness is a 
feature of the boundary of its extension and 
is not constituted by the extension itself.1I 64 
(3) Vagueness as a Desirable Feature of' 
Legal Language 
Our first inclination might be to attempt t,o 
eliminate all vague words from statutory language. 
After all, vagueness, like ambiguity, gives rise to 
uncertainty. Unlike ambiguity, ho'vever, the uncertainty 
due to vagueness is often a constructive uncertainty. 
Qui te apart from the question of 'tV'hether it is possible 
to completely eliminate vagueness (which ,'>'e wJLll 
consider later) ,we must consider ,,,hether in fact it 
64. M. Black op. cit. p.29. 
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would be desirable to do so. As 11ittgenstein65 asks: 
"Is it even al\"rays an advantage to replace an 
indistinct picture by a sharp one? Isn't 
the indistinct one often exactly what we need?1! 
In numerous cases the legislature wishes to 
maintain flexibility in a legislative provision. It 
could be that it realises its m .. n inability to legislate 
for all possible future contingencies it would wish to 
be covered. Or it could be that the legislature simply 
considers the judiciary the best equipped body to control 
legal development .. in certain fields. F. Bennion notes 
the use of politic uncertainty,66 For reasons noted by 
him Parliament may sometimes consider it politic to 
obscure the legislative text. 
The desirabil:L:±y of statutory vagueness will 
depend on the extent to which it is believed desirable 
to leave the resolution of uncertainties to those who 
administer am enforce the statute. 67 By careful use of 
terms, the legislative draftsman should be able· to 
control the degree of vagueness to the level required 
by the above considerations. Should he be unable to 
avoid the use of vagueness when not needed, he should 
at least be able to reduce it to such a degree that it 
·11 t .&-.p t th 1 . 1 t· . 68 R d D· k W1 no aiiec e eg1s a 1ve purpose. ee ~c erson 
is quite correct ,,,hen he describes the linguistic disease as 
tover~vagueness'. For similar reasons over-precision 
65. IH ttgenstein, 'Philosophical Investigations: p. 71. 
66. F. Bennion, 'Statute Law', p.132. 
67. R. Dickerson, op.cit.p.50. 
68. ibid. p.50. 
will be undesirable where the legislature intends to 
leave a wide discre~{on to the courts. 69 
If the use of vague terms is to give rise to 
discretion, then :vague~ess must be a subjective feature 
o:f language. That is, 'the categorisation of the 
boundaries of a vagtfe term must relate to the observer 
rather than being an objective feature of the term 
itself. With this in mind the research and opinions of 
Max Black70 become highly relevant. Blacks holds the 
view that vagueness is an objective feat;.1re·of lann;uage. 
It can be defined, he says, by a statistical analysis 
of the frequency of deviations from strict uniformity 
by the 'users' of a vague symbol. It is therefore 
possible to define a 'consistency profile' 71 corresponding 
to each vague symbol and thus to classify, or even 
theoretically to measure, degrees of vagueness. The 
fringe of any vague term could thus be located and 
measured. 
What are the implications of Black's theory for 
the judges who decide cases falling within marginal 
areas of uncertainty? Is it of any practical use to them? 
Does it eliminate the exercise of their discretion? 
Obviously Black's analysis requir~s an enormous amount 
of time and info'1"mation. - '{hile it may be possible to 
69. Ibid. p.50. 
70. M. Black, OPe cit. Chapter on 'Vagueness'. 
71. Being based on the existence of a group of users 
of a language whose linguistic habi ts are suf:ficiently 
stable and intercorrelated to permit of limiting 
assertions concerning frequencies of deviation 
from a standard: See M. Black, ibid. pp. 42-58. 
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measure the limits of a \ford t s' penumbra in theory, in 
practice it is unlikely that this would ever be .done 
consistently for all vague words. Black's findings are 
of little practical value to the judge who could never 
achieve the degree of objectivity required. The 
necessary information is simply not available. 
Consequently the limits, of vagueness will remain the 
range of his own uncertainty, subjectively determined. 
Of course some \,yould deny·:'that.;itjis.±he-bu5:tneSs 
of a judge to consider such theoretical issues at all. 
As Chitty, J. has said: 72 
"Courts of Justice ought not to be puzzled by such 
old scholastic questions as to where a horse's 
tail begins and where it ceases. You are 
obliged to say 'This is a horse's tail' at 
some time ". 
HO\feVer, any dec is ion as to whether a particular fact 
si tuation falls wi thin the scope of a vague ,,yord involves 
some comprehension of the limits of that vagueness. 
Even if it be unconscious, a judge must first have some 
idea of the extent of a word's permissible range of 
meaning. 
(4) Is Absolute Precision Possible: Definition 
and The Possibility of Vagueness 
Lawyers are obsessed with the need for precision. 
In statute law this is one of the draftsman's prime 
objectives. We have seen that by careful drafting 
ambiguous words can be avoided. So too can over-
general words. -In the9ry vagueness can he reduced to 
a point where it does not affect the legislative purpose. 
72. Laverv v. Pursell (1888) 39 Ch.D. 508 at 517. 
65 
But can it be avoided altogether and'absolute precision 
obtained? It would seem not. 
In attempting to make a statute as precise as 
possible \v-e may redefine a term. But qui te often the 
terms employed to remove the vagueness are themselves 
vague, though perhaps to a lesser degree and/or in 
different respects. 73 Alston gives as an example the 
attempt to remove the vagueness of the word 'citY',74 
By stipulating that a community is a 'city' if, and only 
if,it has at least 50,000 inhabitants we remove the 
indeterminacy as to the minimum number of inhabitants 
required. But what of the term 'inhabitant'? When is 
a person to be counted as an inhabitant of a community? 
l-lhat of the person ,v-ho owns a residence in the community 
that he occupies only during the summer, renting it out 
and living else,v-here during the rest of the year? The 
number of doubtful 'inhabitants' is endless. Even 
when a dec is ion is made as to just 'vha t conditions are 
necessary and sufficient for application of the term, no 
doubt these conditions would themselves be vague in 
some respect or other. 
It would be wrong to suppose that we are making 
no progress in clarifying the example above but merely 
replacing one vagueness with another. By removing one 
element of vagueness we have not introduced any ~ 
_.vagueness. Rather '\Ve have made visible other vaguenesses 
that were there all along. It is not until '\Ve remove 
the more obvious vagueness, for example the indeterminacy 
73. W.P. Alston op. cit. p.90. 
74. Ibid. p.90. 
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as to the number of inhabitants f that ,ve become a\.,;rare of 
the problem of defining the inhabitants themselves. 75 
As long as we seek precision by means of defining 
conditions of application, we will repeatedly end up 
with terms that are'themselves vague. \IJhat then if we 
adopted a more scientific approach and replaced qualitative 
terms with quantitative ones? As we have seen from the 
above example our problems are by no means eliminated. 
The introduction of a quantitative limit did not remove 
all vagueness. There still ,existed the problem of 
identifying the units to be counted. The application 
of any term of measurement "\ViII exhibi t l"ha tever vague-
ness attaches to the term used to describe the thing 
being measured. Even the description of such things as 
length, temperature, ,,,eight and size 76 by means of 
quantification fails to achieve absolute precision. 77 
For example fa large park' could be defined as fa park 
containing 20,000 square feet'. Disregarding for a 
moment the problems of defining 'park', the description 
of its size is still not absolutely precise. Any 
measurement will be subject to a margin of error. The 
indeterminacy of vagueness is not peculiar to everyday 
language but is also present in all scientific measurement. 78 
75. Ibid. p.91. 
76. particular instances of which are positions along a 
continuum. 
77. W.P. Alston, op.cit.p.92. 
78. M. Black op.cit.p.27. Cf this with W.P. Alston, ibid. 
p.93, who argues that the margin of error in measure-
ment is an indeterminacy due to the inherent limitations 
on our powers of measurement i.e. due to insufficiency 
in the data rather than to a semantic feature of the 
terms used. Thus he thinks it best not to treat this 
margin of error as a kind of vagueness. 
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.Qui te apart from .the difficulties discussed above, 
all definition of empirical terms will be subject to 
the possibility of vagueness. Friedrich Waismann has 
called this the ':open texture' of terms. 79 It arises 
because of the 'essential incompleteness' of all 
. . I d . t·· . 80 emp1r1ca escr1p 10n. Ivhile the actual use of a term 
may not be vague,it may be of open texture in that we 
can never fill up all the possible gaps through 1vhich 
doubt may creep in. Thus the term 'gold' is not vague 
in the sense we understand but it is subject to the 
possibility Jf vagueness in liaismann's sense. The 
following passage from Waismann's'paper describes this 
linguistic feature and the difficulties of definition 
to which it gives rise! 
"A term is defined 1vhen the sort of situation 
is described in which it is to be used. Suppose 
for a moment that we were able to describe.~ 
si tua tions completely 1\ri thout omitting any-
thing (as in chess), then we could produce an 
exhaustive list of all the circumstances in 
which the term is to be used so that nothing 
is left to doubt; in other words, we could 
construct a complete definition, i.e., a 
thought model 'vhich anticipates and settles 
once and for all every possible question of 
usage. As, in fact, we can never eliminate the 
possibility of some unforeseen factor emerging, 
we can never be quite sure that we have 
included in our definition everything that 
should be included, and thus a process of 
defining and refining an idea will go on with-
out ever reaching a final stage. other words, 
every definition stretches into an open horizon. 
Try as we may, the situation will always remain 
the same: no definition of an empirical term 
will cover all possibilities. ." 81 
79. F. Waismann, 'Verifiability', second paper in a . 
symposium from 'Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society' SupP. Vol.19 (1945) pp.119-50. reprinted in 
'The Theory of Meaning' ed.by G.B.R.Parkinson, Oxford 
Readings in Philosophy. 
80. F. Waismann, ibid. p.J9. 
81. Ibid. p. 40. 
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A good example is provided by. Glanville 
1Hlliams82 of the discovery of black S1...rans in Australia. 
So imbued were zoologists with the idea that whiteness 
was a property of swans that when black swans were 
discovered it was at first decided to allot them to the 
genus 'Chenopis' and not 'Cygnus'. Difficulty arises 
when we attempt to apply general names of any sort to 
concrete instances. Similarities and differences abound 
in nature but any attempt to place static boundaries 
around them in the form of definitions is bound 'to cause 
problems since the non-linguistic world displays a 
remarkable ~ of such boundaries. 83 
Waismann distinguishes bet1veen the open 
84 texture of empirical concepts and the closed _ texture 
of mathematical concepts: 
"If' I had to describe the right hand of mine 
••• 'I may say different things of it: I'may 
state its size, its shape, its colour, its 
tissue, the chemical compound of its bones, its 
cells, and perhaps add some more particulars; 
but however far I go, I shall never reach a 
point 'vhere my description 1vill be completed: 
logically speaking, it is always possible to 
extend the description by adding some detail 
or other. • Contrast this case with others 
in which completeness is attainable. If in 
geometry I describe a 'triangle' e.g. by 
giving its three sides, the description is 
complete: nothing can be added to it that is 
not included in, or at variance with the data! 
Again, there is a sense in which it may be 
said that a melody' is described completely 
in the musical notation (disregarding,for the 
moment, the question of its interpretation); 
a figure on a carpet, vie1.ved as an ornament, 
82. op.cit. p.190. 
83. Ibid. p.190. See discussion below concerning classifi-
cation and the concept of a class. pp. 71-73. 
84. F. Waismann op.cit. p.41. Waismann uses the same 
terminology and distinction between 'open' and 'closed' 
terms as Aristotle. See Aristotle's 'Categories and 
de Interpretatione l para. lOa. 116. translated by 
J.L. Ackrill. 
may be described in some geometrical notation; 
in this case, ,too, there is a sense in which 
the description may be called complete. (I 
do not mean the physical carpet, but its pattern.) 
The same applies. to a game of chess : it can be 
described .move by move from beginning to end. 
Such cases serve to set off the nature of an 
empirical description by the contrast: there 
is no such thing as a completeness in the case 
in '-lhich I de.scribe my right hand, or the 
characterof,a person; I can never exhaust 
all the deta,ils nor foresee all possible 
circumstances which • .,ould make me modify or 
re'tract my statement. II 85 
The open texture of terms leads A. Ross to 
conclude that there is no point in asking what a word 
'really ~s,.86 We could never give a definitive 
answer; no definition of meaning that we could provide 
would ever be absolutely watertight. 
IV • GENERALITY 
The distinction between ambiguity, vagueness and 
generality has already been touched upon. 87 A word is 
88 general ,.,hen it denotes more than one referent. This 
definition has obvious similarities to that of ambiguity 
and confusion often arises between the two. The 
difference is that while generality permits, simultaneous 
reference, ambiguity permits only alternative reference. 89 
Take, for example, the '-lord 'grandmother'. Its 
generality permits reference to both maternal and paternal 
grandmothers, but does not necessarily result in ambiguity. 
Ambiguity only arises if the general word is intended 
to denote one referent only but the context fails to 
85. F. Waismann, ibid. pp. J9-~O 
86. A. Ross op.cit. p.114. 
87. see pp. 
88. R. Dickerson, op.cit. p.51. 
89. Ibid. p.51. 
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indicate ,..rhich one is intended. The· sentence 'My 
grandmother is on holiday' would be ambiguous if both 
grandmothers were living and the context failed to 
reveal l..rhich one '\-las being referred to. 
Similarly, generality is often confused with 
vagueness. This is understandable since most general 
,,'ords are also vague i:ri their application. Our discussion 
of the word 'chair' in the preceding section illustrates 
this point. Its generality arises from its capacity to 
simultaneously cover dentist chairs, arm chairs, even 
church pews. Its vagueness is illustrated by the 
uncertainty as to whether it also covers an old, upturned 
wooden box. 90 
Like vagueness, generality is not necessarily a 
defect of language. Problems arise only when the words 
used denote classes broader or narrower than is indicated 
. 91 by the statutory purpose. The problems are thus over-
generality or under-generality. Unlike vagueness and 
ambiguity, mere generality does not give rise to an 
uncertainty of meaning. Inasmuch as a court has discretion 
to choose between the various possible referents of a 
general word, its choice is based on factors other than 
those governing the ascertainment of meaning. 92 
90. See the discussion of the distinction between 
vagueness, ambiguity and generality in IvIax Black, 
op.cit. p.29. (quoted above at p.61.) 
91. R. Dickerson op.cit. p.52. 
92. Ibid. p.5J. 
CHAPTER V 
14EANING AND CLASSIFICATION 
I. INTRODUCTION: CLASSIFICATION AND THE 
CONCEPT OF 'CLASS' 
The concept of meaning is linRed very closely 
with that of classification. Although 'meaning' is 
71 
often thought of as referring to the sense of a word, 
it can also be thought of as referring to its scope. 
Indeed a distinction between the two is largely artificial. 
As we saw in our study of vaguenes.s, interpretative 
problems often centre around the question of whether it 
is permissible or possible to include a particular fact 
situation within the scope of an expression. Much 
interpretation can be thought of as a classificatory 
process; do the relevant facts fall within the statutory 
terms? Is a bicycle a 'carriage'? Is an album-a 'book'? 
Is sandstone a 'mineral'? These are all familiar types 
of question to the lawyer involved in interpreting statutes. 
As with all classification the issue ultimately resolves 
,itself to one of inclusion and exclusion. The class of 
thing into which something is incl~ded or from which it 
is excluded may be indicat,ed by a statutory phrase or by 
a single word. Class words or 'names' form a major part 
of our vocabulary. An investigation of their formulation 
and nature reveals the very problems to which any attempt 
at classification is subject. 
All class-names are arrived at by a process of 
72 
abstraction. This process has been de"scribed as the 
imaginative selection of some characteristic so that it 
may be attended to in isolation.' We perceive similarities 
in the things about us and group these similar features 
together under the one 'nrune'. This process is vital 
to both thinking and communication. But such abstraction 
is for linguistic convenience alone. Qualities and 
relations such as 'redness', 'justice', 'peace' may 
seem to be objectified in language but nmvadays both 
semanticists and philosophers agree that they are not 
2 to be found by themselves anytvhere. Such classes are 
a characteristic of language, not of reality. This was 
not a~ways thought to be the case. The medieval 
philosophical dispute as to the reality of 'universals' 
was on just this point; do classes exist in nature 
outside the mind or are they merely a linguistic invention 
devised for ease of communication? Those philosophers 
who argued for the objective reality of universals were 
called Realists; those who considered the only reality 
consisted of individuals possessing certain attributes 
were called Nominalists. 3 On the whole the nominalist 
position attracted the greatest support. Certainly very 
few modern philosophers or semanticists would supp6rt 
the view that concepts of quality or relation exist in 
the world quite independently of their concrete 
-
manifestations. 4 
1. Stebbings, IJI!odern Introduction to Logic ~ 2nd ed. p.7. 
2. G. Williams, I Language and the Law' 61 LQR 71 at p.83; 
3. See G. Williams ibid. pp 81-2 for fuller discussion 
of this controversy. 
4. Ibid. p. 82. 
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The creation of linguistic classes may be vital 
to communication but it is also the cause of much 
uncertainty. It is impossible to define the scope of 
class words with anything nearing absolute precision. 
The reason is simple. ifords cannot be accurately defined 
if the concepts they denote are themselves incapable of 
precise definition. Classes do not exist in nature 
ready-made with clear-cut edges. 5 Our attempt to draw 
boundaries around them is a linguistic contrivance 
having nothing to do with reality. Part of the 'problem 
arises from the static nature of class 'vords and the 
dynamic nature of the things they refer to and part' 
arises from the process of abstraction itself; the 
perception of similarities in spite of the differences, 
it has been called. 6 Agreement is required as to the 
qualities to be regarded as essential for membership to 
the class. But what if a new potential member appears 
with certain additional qualities not previously catered 
for, or minus some of those qualities previously regarded 
as essential for membership to a class? The black swan 
illustration was just such a case. Indeed this problem 
of dealing with the differences between members and 
potential members of a class is the very problem at the 
heart of vagueness itself~ As G. Williams says: 
"There are no words for a class, quality o:r 
relation the application of which to concrete 
instances is not capable of giving rise to 
difficulty. It is not that similarities and 
differences do not exist in nature; they abound 
in nature. The difficulty is in drawing firm 
lines around or between them." 7 
5. Ibid. p. 189. 
6. Ibid. p. 82. 
7. Ibid. p. 190. 
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II. TYPES OF CLASSIFICATION 
(1) Logical Classification 
first 
Logical classification into genus and species was 
systematically discussed by Aristotle8 who 
regarded it a~ tbe one 'true' method of definition. The 
method can be loosely described in terms' of classes as 
follow·s. The members of any class may be divided into 
subclasses. The term 'genus' and 'species' can be used 
106sely to name the class and subclasses. But the terms 
are relative. One particular class may be a genus in 
respect of its own subclasses and a species in relation 
to some larger class of which it itself is a member. 
Thus the class of all animals is a genus relative to 
the species 'man', and a species relative to the genus 
'all living creatures'. 
Just as a class is a collection of entities with 
some common property, so all members of a given genus 
will have some property in common. 9 Thus genus is 
divided into different species and all the members of 
each species have some incidental property in common 
which is not shared by the other species. This incidental 
property is what distinguishes one species from all the 
other species in the same genus. A classification 
may then be made on the basis of genus and difference. 
'Man' may be defined as a 'rational animal'. The 
species 'man' is subsumed under the genus 'animal' and 
the difference between it and other species is its 
8. See Aristotle's 'Categories'. 
9. See I.M. Copi 'Introduction to Logic' 4th Edition 
p. 134. 
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'rationality'. Logical classification thus involves 
identification of a member of a class and the distribution 
to that member of the essential attributes of that class. 
(2) Analogical Classification 
'Analogy' is· commonly understood to mean a 
resemblance or like~es;s of any nature or degree and 
argument by analogy is; an inference based on such 
. 10 
resemblance or likeness. Analogical reasoning is 
thus based on equivalence; from. the basis of one 
Similarity the probability of another is inferred. The 
number of p(lIints of resemblance i~ immaterial; what 
matters is the 'importance' of the resemblance. This 
'importance' is relative to what is sought to be inferred 
11 from the analogy. Points of difference are also 
relevant as these may tend to weaken the acceptability 
of the analogy. 
In scientific argument analogy does not prove 
the conclusion but simply makes it more or less 
12 probable. Scientific conclusions drawn from; analogy 
therefore should always be tested or sustained by other 
methods. Analogical reasoning as applied to statute law 
probably resembles this scientific, approach more closely 
than it does analogical reasoning in case law. In the 
latter case analogy is regarded as the basis of an 
10. See for example P. Coffey, 'The Science of Logic' 
(Longmans, Green and Co., London, Ne'vYork, 1912) 
reprinted in part in 'Readings in Jurisprudence' 
edited by J. Hall at p.561. Also see J. Austin 
'Excursus on Analogy: Analogical Reasoning and 
Syllogism' also reprinted in part in 'Readings in 
Jurisprudence' at p. 564. 
11. p. Coffey ibid. p. 564. 
12. Ibid. p.562. 
, ht' t . d . . " 13 oug "s ep 1n eC1S1ons. In interpretation the 
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relationship between similar terms is a much looser one 
and usually needs some additional form of 
" 1:4 
I corrobora tion' ." :for example, this may be from 
compliance with the." supposed legislat1.:ve intent or 
public interest. Unlike logical classification, 
analogical classification proceeds from instance to 
instance with no clear and conclusive premis connecting 
each instance. F~iiure to support a proposed conclusion 
"" " 
by evidence oth~r than mere analogy could easily lead 
to the situation where a case brought under the law by 
one analogy is employed to bring in yet another by a 
. 15 
new and unrelated analogy. 
III. DERINITION 
Classification presupposes definition insofar as 
definition is taken to mean identification of the 
essential characteristics of a class. By now it will be 
becoming clear that the two overlap to a great extent. 
Indeed, classification and definition are largely one 
and the same thing. The present distinction between them 
is artificial and solely for convenience of discussion. 
(1) General Theory 
Words have no single 'true' definition • Different 
definitions are 'proper' or appropriate for different 
13. See J. Austin, 'Lectures on Jurisprudence', vol.2. 
14. See W.G. Hammond, 'On Analogy and the Ratio Legis' 
reprinted in part in 'Readings on Jurisprudence' 
at p. 569. 
"15. Ibid. p.569. 
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16 purposes. I.M. Copi has identified five such 
purposes: 17 
1. To increase vocabulary. Sometimes we require a 
deliberate explanation of the meaning of unfamiliar 
terms. A definition provides this explanation. 
2. To eliminate ambiguity. Many words have more than 
one sense attaching to them and the intended sense 
may not always be revealed by the relevant context. 
Definitions explain the different meaning of ambiguous 
terms and so clearly identify, and hopefully eliminate, 
the ambiguity. 
3. To reduce vagueness. The purpose of definition here 
is to clarify the meaning of a term known to us. 
A definition is given to allow decisions to be made 
about the word's applicability in a given 'borderline' 
case. In the case of interpretation if no existing 
defiritipn is sufficiently precise to determine the 
question, then the court in making a decision is in 
fact promulgating a new legal definition which will 
clarify the scope of the vague term to a greater 
degree than before. 
4. To explain theoretically. Definition is sometimes 
, 
used to formulate a theoretically adequate or 
,scientifically useful ciharacterisation of the objects 
to which it is applied. The scientists' definition 
of fforce' as the product of mass and acceleration 
is one such definition. 
5. To influence attitudes. Finally, a word may be defined 
16. G. Williams, OPe cit. p. 388 
17. I.M. Copi,op~ cit. pp. 108-112. 
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so that attitudes may be influenced by emotive means. 
Such a definition is expressive rather than informative. 
The lawyer will obviously be concerned princ ly 
"Ivi th 1), 2) and JJ. The ~ of definition he resorts 
,/~ -, 
to will have a direct bearing (on) the deficiency giving 
.,-<// 
rise to the need for definition. Some types are clearly 
of more relevance to him than others. 
The definition given to a new term when first 
. t d d' 11 d t . 1 t' d . f . . t . 1 8 I ln ro uce lS ca e a s ·lpU a lve e lnl 10n. n 
effect it is a propo~al or ~esolution that all future 
use of a term be in the manner indicated. Specially 
assigned meanings fall under this category. In law, 
new technical terms are introduced for a variety of 
reasons, princi among them being the desire for 
precision and abbreviation. 
Lexical definitions1~rise where the purpose of 
definition is to eliminate ambiguity or to explain the 
meaning of unfamiliar terms. Unlike a stipulative 
definition, the term being defined already has an 
established usage. Its correctness or otherw'ise depends 
on its degree or correspondence to that established usage. 
Hany words are used differently by different groups of 
people, and the usage of any sizable group of speakers 
should be reflected in the lexical definition~ It should 
be noted that literary and academic vocabularies tend 
to lag behind everyday use of words. Definitions which 
restrict themselves to usage by theffi particular groups 
are likely to be a misleading indication of ordinary 
meaning. 
18. Ibid. p. 118. 
19. Ibid. p. 120. 
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Neither stipulative nor lexical definitions can 
reduce a term's vagueness. Reference to ordinary usage 
is of no assistance since ordinary usage is itself not 
sufficiently clear. 'If it were the term would not be 
vague. A definition capable or resolving borderline 
cases must go beyond established usage but must never-
theless remain true' to' that usag~_. Such a definition can 
b 11 d .. d f' ' . t' 20 e ca e a preclslng e lnl 10n. The exfent to which 
the definition goes beyond established usage is partly 
a matter of stipulation but not completely so. Judicial 
clarification of statutory terms to include or e:X:.clude 
the case at hand involves precising definition. The 
very fact that arguments are heard from both sides 
indicates that the resulting definition is not mere 
stipulation. The judge seeks to be guided partly by 
what he supposes to be the legislative intention and 
partly by his conception of the public interest. The 
definition can be described as 'true' or 'false' only 
insofar as it conforms, or fails to conform, to established 
usage. Where that usage is unclear the matter simply 
becomes one of convenience or inconvenience. 
A theoretical definition21 is one that attempts 
to formu2ate a theoretically adequate characterisation 
of the objects to which it is applied. In effect it 
amounts to proposing the acceptance of a theory. As the 
basic theory changes so does the definition. Such 
definitions are the concern principally of scientists 
20. Ibid. p.121. 
21. Ibid. p. 122. 
80 
and philosophers. Examples ,vould be . the scientist's 
definition of 'force' and the philosopher's attempt to 
define the essential characteristics of words such as 
'good', "true' and 'justice'. 
The final type of definition is persuasive 
d f o "to 22 the f hO hOt . fl e 1n1 10n, purpose 0 W 1C 1S 0 1n uence 
attitudes. 
Various techniques may be used to produce the 
above types of definition. Basically these .can be 
divided into two groups; those concerned with a word's 
denotation and those with its connotation. 23 
(a) Denotative definitions: The most obvious way 
to define the denotation of a term is to give examples 
of the items denoted by it. This method of definition 
can often be useful but it has limitations. It is 
inadequate to specify completely the meaning of any term. 
This inadequacy arises from the failure of denotation to 
determine connotation. The sentences 'The U.S. President 
assassinated in Dallas' and 'The President of the U.S.A. 
in 1962' both denote the same man but their connotation 
is quite different. Likewise, defining a word by 
identifying the items denoted by it will fail to distinguish 
that word from another term denoting the same objects, 
even though the two may not be synonymous. The difficulties 
increase where the enumeration of examples is partial 
only. Any item has many properties and could equally 
well be included in the denotation of many different terms. 
22. Ibid. p. 123. 
23. The follolving discussion of denotative and connotative 
definitions is based largely on discussion in 
I.M. Copi, ibid. pp. 129-135. 
A brief mention should be made of ostensive 
definition, a special' kind of definition by example. 
Instead of naming ol:"describing the object denoted, 
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definition is by means of painting or some other gesture. 
It has been claimed by some writers 24 that such ostensive 
defini tions are 'primary' definitions upon 'vhich all 
! 
other definitions ultimately rely. Modern philosophers 
. •. ; 25 
and linguists tend to disagree. A child's ,initial 
comprehension of language, they argue, relies not on 
definition but on observation and imitation .. 
(b) Connotative Definitions: On the whole this 
is by far the more satisfactory method of defining. 
Synonymous definition is one method falling under this 
head. A single word is defined by giving another word 
or phrase with the same meaning. Dictionaries use this 
method extensively;26 'injustice' is defined as 'want 
of equity, unfairness'; 'delete' as 'strike out, obliterate' 
and so on. Definition by synonyms is easy and often 
effective but it too has limitations. lvlany words have 
no exact synonyms. Nor can this method be used in the 
construction. of either precising or theoretical definitions. 
Definition by genus and species can often be used 
where synonymous definition is unavailable or inadequate. 
24. For example Augustine who considered th~ ostensive 
definition was the basis of a child's initial under-
standing of language. See Augustine 'Confessions', I.B. 
25. See for example the views of Wittgenstein in 
'Philosophical Investigations' and I.H. Copi op.cit. 
p.131 who argue that pointing is itself a sign whose 
meaning must first be understood before it can be 
used to indicate language use. 
26. For fuller discussion of definition by dictionaries 
see ppS4-87 below. 
This method has alr been discussed 27 8.bo\re c ""'! 
Aristotle's claim that definition per genus at differentiam 
is the one 'true! definition for every unamb s 
word is no longer ace ed sts~ 28 Differen_t 
definitions are now re as proper for different 
purposes~ The genus/ species di:f:fer(~ntiatiol1 is not an 
I 
objective and ordering of nature but a classification 
made for subjective ca'nvenience. 29 Nevertheless it is 
certainly an important classification and possibly of 
more· general application than any other definitional 
technique", 
(2) Definition Sections 
• e _ 5 
Definition sections seek to clarify a statute by 
assigning statutory meanings to certain words or phrases 
arising within the statute. The ivords defined are those 
considered likely to give rise to uncertainty or whose 
statutory meaning is different from their ordinary meaning. 
E.A~ Driedger30 has identified a number of different uses 
of definition provisions: 
(a) To Delimit. Many definitions are intended to 
set the limits of meaning without altering the ordinary 
meaning .. 
Ipropertyl means real or personal property. 
'advertise' means to make known by the publication 
27. See pp. 
28. See G. Williams op. cit. p.388. 
29. Ibid. p. 388. 
30. This section on statutory definition sections is based 
largely on Chapter VI of E.A. Driedger's IThe 
Composition of Legislation: Legislative Forms and 
Precedents 'and J.F. Burrows 'Interpretation Sections l (1978)8 N.Z.U.L: 
p.33. 
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or distribution of any advert~sement, circular 
or other notice. 
(b) To Narrow. A definition may narrow the 
ordinary meaning of a word. Things normally included 
are excluded either expressly or by defining limits to 
a word's application. 
'grain' means wheat, oats, barley and rye. 
'rank' means substantive rank or appointment, but 
does not include acting rank. 
(c) To Particularise General Descriptions. A 
definition may restrict a word to a particular thing 
without altering its ordinary meaning. 
'contract' means a contract m,ade before the 
first day of January, 1970. 
(d) To Enlarge. A definition may retain the 
ordinary meaning of a word but add to it a meaning not 
normally covered. 
'lease' includes an agreement for a lease. 
(e) To Settle Doubts. Sometimes a definition uses 
the form 'A includes B' not to add to the ordinary meaning 
of a term, but to settle doubts about its applicability 
to a certain item. 
'child' includes a natural child, stepchild or 
adopted child. 
(f) To Abbreviate or to Shorten and Simplifx 
Composition. 
'Minister' may be defined to mean 'Minister of 
Public i·jorks'. 
'recipient' means a person to whom payment of an 
allowance has been authorised under this Act. 
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Statutory definitions usually take one of two 
forms; A means B, or A include~ B. 'Means' is used to 
restrict the ordinary meaning of a term, while 'includes' 
enlarges upon that meaning. 31 It is therefore nonsense 
to say that 'A means and includes B.' It is ho"\vever 
possible to say that 'A means B and includes C.' In 
the latter case, the first part of the definition 
particularises the word being defined and the second 
part removes potential doubt as to the applicability of 
certain items. 
Although statutory definitions often remove 
doubt, they should not be inserted unless they are needed. 32 
Where an expression is incapable of exact definition the 
presence of an inadequate statutory definition may 
cause more problems than it solves. In such a case 
dictionary definitions are an adequate guide to meaning 
and exact interpretation can be left to the courts. 33 
(3) Dictionary Definitions 
Where the meaning of a doubtful word or phrase 
is not indicated in a definition section, and where no 
existing 'legal' defini~ion34 provides assistance, a 
court will sometimes refer to dictionary definitions. 
But a meaning indicated by the statutory context must 
always prevail over an isolated dictionary definition~ 
A court failing to give adequate consideration and 
weight to the relevant statutory context falls into the 
31. E.A. Driedger, ibid. p. 49. 
32. Ibid. p. 51. 
33. Ibid. p. 51. 
34. That is, definition by judicial precedent. 
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35 
trap of extreme literalism. This is not to say that 
dictionary definitions are immune from the influence of 
context. On the contrary t the ve.ry method employed by 
lexicographers involves an .extraction of meaning from 
the wide range of contexts in vhich a word appears. The 
proliferation of senses of anyone word is a reflection 
of its use in different contexts. In this respect a 
dictionary definition is not 'isolated'. But th±s is a 
general regard for context. Dictionaries demarcate 
. 36 between standard senses but are often of little help 
in resolv~ng certain other types of uncertainty, for 
example contextual ambiguity. Relevant statutory context 
must always be the final guide to meaning. As F.C.S. 
Schiller puts it: 
35. 
36. 
37. 
"It is the desire to communicate meaning which 
dictates the choice of the words used, and 
ultimately control.s their meaning. For the 
original compilers of dictionaries get the word's 
meaning from an examination of the passages in 
which it has been used in print. Nevertheless, 
the meaning (or meanings) as formulated in a 
dictionary never can be an absolute and infallible 
guide to actual usage. It represents merely an 
average meaning, "vi th which the word has been 
used in the past, and the probable meaning, 
with which it will be used in the future; but it 
cannot prohibit its modification. To understand 
any particular sentence, we may have (as every 
school-boy translator has painfully to discover) 
to go beyond anything ""e find in our dictionaries, 
and in any case we have to select the 'right' 
meaning from those given, and to adjust their 
dicta to our special problem. No critic of a 
bad translation would allm.]' the excuse that 
the wrong meanings given to the mistranslated 
words had been found in a dictionary." 37 
See critique of the literal approach to interpretation, 
p. 130 below. 
M. Black 'The Labyrinth of Language', p. 179. 
F.C.S. Schiller, 'Formal Logic', p. 17. 
86 
Dictionary defini·tions are most often provided 
by mans of synonyms or se" 
then, the definition does not 19ive the sense of l a word, 
but provides another expression which has the same sense 
as the "rord be 
. . 38 
defined. If the definition is to be 
useful, the words it contains 
I 
must be more wide used 
~o 
and understood than the head,vord. j;;t Un:fortuna tely this 
is not always possible. As Dr. Johnson noted as early 
as 1755~ 
H:£I1any words cannot be ained synon,imes, 
because the idea signified by them has not more 
than one appellation; nor by paraphrase, because 
simple ideas cannot be described~li 40 
Words denoting colours would be an e e of the former 
and simple relations such as tif • .. ~ then' and lcauee' 
of the latter. The result is a tendency to define many 
terms by means of scientific or technical definition. 
This in turn has led to the unfortunate tendency to 
assume that the Ireal' or 'proper l meaning of a word is 
its scientific explanation. In comparison the everydaY9 
ordinary meaning is often considered as somehm-l Ivague' 
, . ., 41 
or :tnaccurate" This vie,v runs counter to modern 
linguistic theory and to the approach adopted in this 
thesis. We have seen above that the only 'proper' 
meaning a word has is its ordinary meaning or, in some 
. 11 . d .. 42 0 th 1 cases, a specla y asslgne meanlng. n· e who e 
dictionaries provide a reliable guide to ordinary meaning. 
38. G. Leech t 'Semanticsf~ p. 205~ 
39. Ibid. p.205. 
40. Preface to Dr. Johnson's Dictionary 1755. 
41. G. Leech op. cit. p. 207. 
42. See p~ 6 above. 
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Since courts profess to determine the ordinary meaning 
of statutory expressions, one might expect them to have 
frequent resort to dictionaries as evidence of this 
meaning. In practice this is not necessarily the case. 43 
A 'legal' and very far from 'ordinary' meaning is often 
preferred. This practice will be commented on later. 
It remains to be said that where reference is had to a 
dictionary it must be with caution and with full under-
provided. 
standing of the limitations of the evidence!- This evidence 
must always be subordinate to that provided by the 
specific statutory context. It must also be remembered 
that no definition (apart from stipulative definitions) 
will fully explain all possible uses of a word. All 
expressions are subject to the indeterminacy of open 
texture. As G. Williams says: 
"No definition ever states the sum total of the 
qualities that seem to go to the being of'a 
thing; it always involves a selection from those 
qualities, and the exact selection made depends 
very much upon the purpose of the definition." 44 
Resort to a dictionary must never ov-erride judicial 
common sense and policy. 
IV. CLASSIFICATION AND STATUTES 
Some statutory rules are expressed partly in 
terms of universal description; they apply to all persons 
and things. 45 By far the majority are more restricted 
in their application. They are confined by means of 
43. See Pp. 178-179 below. 
44. G. Williams OPe cit. p. 389. 
45. See E.A. Driedger OPe cit. p. 19. 
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class descriptions. The law is uniV'ersal only insofar 
as it relates to the described class. As an essential 
feature of language, class descriptions are embodied 
in some form or other in all legal rules. Legal drafting 
of these rules is done against a background of logical 
reasoning and guided by logical consistency. Inconsistency 
arises where the drafts'man has failed to meet this 
standard. 
Judicial application of the legal rule also 
involves elements of classification. Just as the 
interpretative process is sometimes said to be divisible 
into two distinct stages, interpretation and application, 
so a distinction can be made between two stages of 
classification. 46 Firstly, a judge determines the 
characteristics of a class; he defines the class. 47 
Where, for example, a court must decide whether X is an 
employee within the terms of a particular statutory 
provision, the judge will in theory first decide what 
is an lemployee'. Definition may be by any of the methods 
discussed or by the formulation of a test to govern the 
application of the class. Certain linguistic principles 
may be of help in determining the meaning of statutory 
terms. Of particular re le,vance to the present topic is 
46. Compare this with the approach of N. J.lacCormick(' Legal 
Reasoning and Legal Theory' p.203) who distinguishes 
between"problems of interpretation" and I1 problems 
of classification". MacCormick obviously limits 
classification to the application stage of a decision. 
It is submitted that this is too narrow a view of 
classification. Reasons for this submission are 
set out above. 
47. This comment concerning judicial definition must be 
read subject to the qualification contained in 
Cozens v. Brutus [1973J A.C. 854 which will be discussed 
shortly. 
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the ejusdem generis principle. E.A. Driedger48 has 
formulated the principle as fol101-1S: 
"Where general words are found, following an 
enumeration of persons or things all susceptible 
of being regarded as specimens of a single genus 
or category, but not exhaustive thereof, their 
construction-should be restricted to things of 
that class or category, unless it is reasonably 
clear from the context or the general scope 
and purview of the Act that Parliament intended 
that they should be given a broader signification." 
It is assumed that the draftsman inserted the general 
words in case something that should have been included 
in the specific enumeration of items has been omitted. 49 
In effect the enumeration of the species amounts to a 
denotative definition of the genus. For the rule to apply 
this genus must be able to be construed from the 
specific , .. ords. 
The recent House of Lords decision in Cozens v 
Brutus 50 is of relevance to the process of judicial 
definition and must in theory be taken as a quali~ication 
to what has been said above. This case has been analysed 
fully elsewhere 51 and only brief' mention of it will be 
made here. In the course of' their jUdgements their 
Lordships examined the status of a determination as to 
the meaning of' I' an ordinary word of the English language:'. 
Lord Reid's judgement is generally taken as authoritative 
of' the proposition that such a determination is a question 
48. in 'The Construction of Statutes' p. 92. 
49. R. Cross, 'Statutory Interpretation', p. 116. 
50. 1973 A.C. 854. 
51. For full discussion of the case se.e Prof. J.F. Burrows 
'Some Reflections on Cozens v Brutus (197 5J 4 Anglo-
American LR p.J66. The following discussion of 
the case is based primarily upon this article. 
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of fact and not of law. Accordingly·, there is no need 
for a court to lay down any definition of the words in 
dispute or tests for determining their application. 52 
On its positiye side, the Cozens v Brutus doctrine 
seeks to reverse the tendency to give more attention to 
judicial statements about the meaning of statutory 
language than to the language itself. But the doctrine 
is subject to many difficulties. Firstly, while 
attempting to mark off a category of words "'Ivhich do not 
need judicial definition, the doctrine fails to clarify 
the limits of this category. Professor J.F. Burrows 
identifies three criteria for the application of the 
doctrine; the word must be one tin common use!, it 
must be one that 'everyone understands in much the same 
way!, it must be used in its 'ordinary! sense and not 
in 'some special or particular meaning,.53 All three 
criteria fail to provide an adequately precise categoris-
ation for the effective operation of the doctrine. We 
have already discussed some of the problems associated 
with the concept of common usage and will discuss below 
the complexity of 'ordi~ary meaning i • 54 But even 
assuming that such a category of words could be clearly 
identified, the consequences of the Cozens v Brutus 
doctrine remain unclear. The same problems that hinder 
precise categorisation also operate to cause doubt about 
particular applications of 'ordinary' words. It is not 
52. Ibid. p. 370. 
53, Ibid. pp. 372~376. 
54. See pp. 120-125. 
inconceivable that in the absence of any other clear 
on 
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guidance, the final decision might turn/a value judgement 
as to the merits of the case. 55 This is especially 
so where the issue falls to be determined by a jury. 
The high regard our" legal system has for consistency 
of decisions would necessitate the judiciary giving at 
least some idea of a word's limits. Thus we see cas.'es 
defining ,vha t a word does not mean. 56 A mu1 tip1ica tion 
of ' negative t definitions 1,ri11 in time determine ,vi th 
reasonable precision the 1:imi ts of a ,.ford' s application. 
Such a method of clarification may not be binding, but 
it most certainly is an act of definition. A1ternative1y~ 
courts may provide useful 'guides' to meaning such as 
those provided for the exercise of judicial discretion. 57 
In the final analysis: then, the Cozens v Brutus doctrine 
will probably make little-difference to the practice, 
in some form or other, of judicial definition. Its effect 
will most likely be felt in the attitude towards such 
definition. It is interesting to note the attitudes 
reflected in the survey in Partc "of this thesis. 
Between 1958 and 1978 (the latter being shortly after 
the decision in Cozens v Brutus) there was a notable 
reduction in cases decided solely' or primarily on the 
basis of a judicial definition given in a previous case. 
While the 1978 cases continued to formulate or make 
reference to definitions, a decision in terms of that 
55. Prof. J.F. Burrows, op. cit. p. 380 
56.see Ibid. p. 380-381 for examples. 
57. Ibid. p. 382. 
definition was generally supported by evidence other 
than the definition itself. 
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The second stage of interpretation involves 
application. At :this point classification involves a 
determination of the actual members of a class. Is X 
in fact an 'employe~' i.e. is he included or excluded 
from the·statutory rule? It is submitted that this 
two-stage classification distinction is largely artificial. 
The actual decision as to a rule's application in a 
partictil~r case often i~self provides the definiti~n. 
For this very reason the interpretation/application 
distinction is also an artificial 'one in many cases. 
This vielv is borne out by judicial practice as we shall 
see in Part C. 
If X clearly possesses all the characteristics 
of an I employee , he will immediately be included within 
that class by a process of logical deduction. More 
likely however, he will possess only some of those 
characteristics. The very fact that the case is being 
adjudicated indicates that it is a 'borderline' one and 
not certain. The issue therefore is whether the similar-
ities between X and other members of the class of 
'employees' are of sufficient importance to warrant his 
inclusion into that class'. And, of course, lvhether the 
differences between them are of insufficient importance 
to veto such inclusion. The reasoning in borderline 
cases is analogical. 
This conclusion bears an interesting relationship 
to the general issue of analogical reasoning with statutes. 
93 
The general as sumpt:::Lon -ella t alJ_ Ie slative categories 
are Tclosedl catego es has led ~co a bition on 
extending these categories by a;1.alogy in the way that 
case law can be extend 
by the courts to do so is a usurpation of Ie slative 
authority and a bre of the separation of powers. 
No court could ever extend the operation of a statutory 
provision to cover cases not provided for by the 
Ie slature but which the court's opinion to 
have been included o But it can and does use analoGY to 
clar the meaning of a statutory provision. It \ViII, 
for instance, often determine the meaning of a icular 
word or phrase by ref~rence to the meaning given to a 
similar ';-ford or phrase in another statutee Such a 
decision will usually also re support from other 
sources. And again~ as indicated above, decisions 
involving the interpretation of vague terns will involve 
analo cal reasoning. Inasmuch as all words are vague 
in their application to some extent and all are open-
textured in nature, legislative categories cannot ahvays 
be regarded as 'closed'. It is the daily bUsiness of 
the courts to determine 'borderline' cases; cases not 
expressly provided for by the enacting words. The 
rationale of permitting analogical reasoning in some cases 
but not others is traditionally expressed in terms of a 
distinction between legislating and interpreting. But 
any such distinction is a very grey one indeed. For ",,"hat 
is a court do 
a rule 'vi th re 
58 
existed before? 
in such 'borderline' cases if not creat 
to the particular case where no rule 
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PJI..RT B: JUDICIAL APPHOACHES TO MEANING - THE THEORY 
INTRODUCTION 
In Part A we examined semantic and philosophical 
approaches to meaning. In Part B we will examine the 
approach of judges, la'\.vyers and jurists and the extent 
to which there is any relationship with those in Part A. 
In particular we will examine the traditional division 
of common law' approaches into so-called I canons' and 
'presumptions'. These have developed over a long period, 
their logical and legal status is obscure and their 
effects sometimes contradictory. Attempts have been 
made by at least two modern jurists to achieve a rational 
reconstruction into a single integrated approach. These 
attempts have achieved only modest success. There is 
however a modern judicial trend towards the adoption 
of a-more purposive approach to interpretation. In 
New Zealand, such an approach h~ received statutory 
recognition from as early as 1888 but with questionable 
results. In Britain, recent attempts to enact a similar 
provision have failed. This failure was primarily due 
to the rejection of relate~ proposals to relax the 
law relating to the admissibility of extrinsic materials. 
These and other proposed reforms will be reviewed. 
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CHAPTER VI 
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF BASIC CONCEPTS 
By an 'analysis of basic concepts' is meant an 
analysis of the logical character of the various legal 
approaches to statutory interpretation. The modern 
tendency until recently has been to say that these 
approaches consist of certain 'canons' and 'presumptions'. 
In the past,however, they were often referred to as 
'rules' or 'principles'. The very recent tendency has 
been to refer to them as 'pointers' to ~he legislative 
intention. Is it possible to make analytical sense out 
qf this terminolo cal confusion and does it matter 
what we call the various approaches? 
Rules and principles are often regarded as species 
1 
of standards, taking 'standard' to be the broad genus. 
Roscoe Pound defined a rule as "a precept attaching a 
definite detailed consequence to a definite detailed 
state of facts" and gave a number of examples from early 
2 la",s. In his book, 'The Concept of La",', H.L.A. Hart 
equivocated over the meaning of 'rule' but was thought 
by Ronald Dworkin to take the vie~ that a rule ",as 
something which bound in an all or nothing fashion. 3 
Dworkin is quite , ... rong in this since Hart did not tie 
himself down to any precise definition of 'rule'. It 
1. See e.g. Raz(1972JYale Lmy Journal, But compare 
this definition of 'standard' , ... i th that given by 
Julius Stone in 'From Principles to Principles' 
97 LQR 224. 
2. See R. Pound 'Social Control Through La, ... ', p.45. 
3. See R. Dworkin, 'Taking Rights Seriously' p.22. 
may be that Dworkin was attributing to Hart the definition 
of Pound. Be that a~ it may, our statute books are 
full of 'rules' prescribing precise legal consequences 
for detailed sets of~facts. The Crimes Act 1961 is an 
obvious source of examples. 
Both Pound a~d Dworkin distinguish between rules 
and principles. Pound' takes the Aristotelian meaning 
of an authoritative st,arting point for legal 'reasoning .. 4 , 
Dworkin thinks of principles as having a looser character 
tha~rules and having an ethical content. Jrtlius Ston~ 
takes a similar view and regards principles as being 
of more general form than rules and containing value 
components or 'standards' ,such as good faith and reason-
ableness; for example, 'no man shall profit from his own 
wrong' • Standards are thus defined by Stone as "those 
elements which are found embodied at a particular time 
in existing principles but are also available for 
embodiment in new principles which may yet emerge to 
cover new or changed circumstances as these present 
themselves for decision. u5 An alternative view, of 
principles, ho,,,ever, is that they are similar in form 
to rules but simply of more generalised expression .. 
They will often have, but need not have, an ethical 
6 
content. In this latter'sense they can perhaps be 
equated with canons and maxims. Etymologically 'canon t 
4. 
6. 
See Aristotle's 'Metaphysics' and R.Pound's 'Social 
Control Through La,,,' p.45. 
See J. Stone, 'From Principles to Principles' 97 LQR 
224 at 229. Compare this definition of 'standard' 
with that adopted by Raz097~Yale Law Journal. 
See J.H. Farrar, 'Introduction to Legal Method', 
Chapter 1. 
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comes from the Greek word meaning 'rule' but in modern 
usage it usually refers to something more general than 
a rule (the term 'rule' being used in the narrower sense 
of Pound) .. Canons have a technical meaning in eccles-
iastical law but that need not concern us here .. 
Presumptions are indicators of intention.. Their 
precise j-r.nidi-cal nature' is often unclear however. 
F. Bennion7 identifies three views as to their nature. 
Firstly, the Law Commissions call them 'presumptions 
of intentl~ It is presumed that Parliament does not 
intend to do certain things. Where statutory language 
is doubtful, the presumption forms part of the evidence 
as to what the intent actually was. Alternatively, 
Hart and SaCk,s have called presumptions 'policies of 
clear statement' - announcements to the legislature that 
certain meanings will not be assumed unless stated with 
special clarity'. 9 Thirdly, presumptions can be regarded 
as an aspect of the court's function of administering 
justice. Regardless of parliament's intention, it is 
unjust to burden the citizen without telling him clearly 
what you are doing. If meaning is doubtful, he should 
be allowed to remain in his previous condition. These 
three views, says Bennion, can be 'amalgamated: Parliament 
is presumed to intend to act fairly. If it wishes to 
act unfairly, the court will not aid it unless the 
intention is made abundantly plain. In evidence there 
are two species of presumption - rebuttable and irrebuttable. 
7. F. Bennion, 'Statute Law' p. 86. 
8. See Law. Com. No. 21, p.21. 
9. See Law Comm. No. 21, p.21. 
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When used in relation to interpretation of' statutes 
the presumptions are rebuttable by ref'erence to the words 
of' the statute i.e. the presumed meaning of' part of' the 
Act can be rebutted by ref'erence to another part of' the 
Act. This is not usually discussed in terms of' rebutting 
presumptions but in terms of' ambiguity. 
There has been a' recent tendency amongst some of' 
the judiciary to regard all the approaches to statutory 
interpretation as capable of' being described as 'pointers' 
t "t t" 10 o 1n en 10n. This is a nebulous term which adds little 
to the elucidation of' the subject. 
But what is the signif'icance of' this analysis? 
It has been argued by Ronald Dworkin, although not with 
any great degree of' clarity, that the dif'f'erence 
between rules, principles and standards has logical 
eff'ects in the sense that reasoning with rules is 
dif'ferent from reasoning with principles and standards. 
Clearly insof'ar as 'rule' is capable of' a narrow def'inition, 
either in Pound's sense or Dworkin1s sense, reasoning 
with it can be more of' the character of' a logical 
syllogism. Reasoning with a principle, in the sense of' 
that term used by Dworkin and Stone, not only results 
in a looser-knit type of' reasoning but also involves 
elements of' evaluation. Unlike rules which are predicated 
solely on f'acts, principles, 1 1 says Stone, are predicated 
on f'acts evaluated by standards such as reasonableness 
10. For example, see Lord Reid in Naunsell v Olins 
(197S]AC 373, 382. 
11. IFrom Principles to Principles' op. cit. p.228. 
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and good :faith .. The application of' a principle-does 
not there:fore necessitate the making of' one decision 
onlYt as the standards on which the principle "is based 
are not verif'iable by mere empirical observation;2 
Application of' a principle involves an evaluation of' 
the circumstances'of the particular case in terms of' the 
given standard or valu'e. Hence an element of' discretion 
is involved. The dsci.sion-maker will still of' course 
be bound -- not to one 'correct' decision 9 but to give 
e:ff'ect to the embodied standard or value in the 
circumstances of' the case. 13 However, as we have seen, 
an alternative view is that principles and canons need 
not n~cessarily have an ethical content. Decisions 
involving principles under this vie"!,," will still involve 
an element o:f discretion; discretion arising :from the 
more generalised nature of' the principle, the expression 
o:f which of'ten omits any detailed description o:f 
consequence .. 
In the interpretation of' statutes it would seem 
14 
that the so-called 'canons' are too loose in their 
expression to be rules. Inconsistency in their content 
also eliminates them :from this category. Probably they 
are very generalised principles although an attempt has 
been made to express them in the :form of' presumptions. 15 
One o:f them,the literal 'rule', has no ethical content, 
12. Ibid. p. 229. 
-13. Ibid. p. 229. 
14. Being used here to cover the literal, golden, and 
mischie:f approaches. 
15. See F. Bennion, op. cit. p. 84. 
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whereas another, the so-called golden 'rule', does 
have some value elements. So too, but to a lesser 
extent, does the mischief 'rule'. The looseness of 
their expression due to their level of generality means 
that they will never necessitate a decision. The 
presence of value elements in two of them will also 
lead to ad hoc choice. Presumptions, as such, are not 
a device for logical reasoning at all. They indicate 
intention rather than necessitate firm conclusions. 
Although the canons are clearly not rules in 
the strict sense, it has been so much the convention 
to refer to them as such in the past that to refer to 
them as anything else seems artificial. Therefore, on 
occasion, the canons shall be referred to as rules 
simply to conform with conventional practice. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE CANONS; HISTORY 
The early medieval period ,-vas marked by a great 
freedom in the interpretation of statutes. 1 There are 
a variety of reasons why this was so. Firstly, the judges 
were members of the Curia Regis and took a part in the 
formulation of Ie slative policy and often in the 
drafting of particular Acts. It posed little p~oblem 
to determine the real intention of an Act, for the judge 
law-maker 'vas simply explaining his O1\'n policie s. 2 as 
As members of both the legislature and the judiciary, 
it was natural that the judges should be allowed 
considerable latitude in the interpretation of statutes. 
Secondly, early statutes themselves bore little 
resemblance to modern legislation. As T. Plucknett says: 
"~ritten statute~ were not essential in our 
earlier history. The King could legislate • 
• without parchment, ink or wax. Even when 
a written text was drawn up, it was merely 
evidence, and by no means the best evidence, 
of what had been done. We therefore find 
that the wording of a statute is not at first 
taken very seriously. Copies used by the 
prbfessi6n were only approximately accurate; 
even government departments and the courts 
were no better off; the recording of statutes 
in the national archives was by no means 
regular. 
Interpretation in thi~ early period could 
not be precise. There was no sacrosanct 
text, but only a traditional one whose meaning 
was restricted to general policy, details 
be left to be filled in as required by the 
legislator, or by the councilor the courts • 
1. See T. Plucknett 'A Concise History of the Common 
Law' (5th ed) p. 331-332. 
2. Ibid. p. 331. 
3. Ibid. p.J40. 
• • 
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By the middJ:.e o'f' the f'ou.rteenth century this f'reedom 
of' interpretation begins to disappear and judges begin 
to interpret statutes strictly.4 The judiciary now 
f'orm a separate body:and perf'orm a separate f'unction 
f'rom the Council. ~heintention of' the law-makers is 
to be ascertained f'rom the words of' the statute itself'. 
Also of' signif'icance to the new attitude to interpretation 
was the emergence .of' the Chancery as a court exercising 
the Councilts disdreti~n. Statutes are now regarded as 
texts to be interpr~ted exactly as they sta~d.5 But 
this new strict approach to interpretation is not to be 
conf'used with a literal approach. The strict approach 
manif'ested seems merely to be a reverse of' the earlier 
liberal approach. This is emphasised in Shareshulle's 
speech in \{aghan v. Anon6 where he said, "Nous ne poms 
prendre Ie statut plus avant qe les paroles en yca.le ne 
parle". (we cannot take the statute f'urther than the 
words themselves provide). 
Throughout the f'if'teenth and into the sixteenth 
century the courts developed an elaborate and complex 
system f'or the interpretation of' statutes. 7 There 
developed what Plucknett calls "a muJ.tiplicity of' rules" 
available f'or the interpretation of' any particular 
statute; rules so diverse and various that almost any 
conclusion might be reached merely by selecting the 
aIPropriate one. Probably Plucknett has in mind something 
more of' the nature of' a complex of' presumptions rather 
4. Ibid. p.333. 
5. Ibid. p.333. 
6. YB 20 Edw. III, II 198. 
7. T. Plucknett, OPe cit. p. 334. 
than rules. As a general theoretical justification 
for the liberty enjoyed by the courts in construing 
statutes la,,,yers adopted the word t equity t&8 Equity 
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of the statute, in the sense of the term used by Plucknett, 
is a continental notion imported to explain the situation 
that had grown up in England. Equity was tithe correction 
of that wherein the law' (by reason of its universality) 
is deficient. ,,9 This is the wider sense in 'vhich the 
concept of equity of the statute is used. For the 
narrower sense see the definition of Coke in his 
Institutes:-
IIEquity is a construction made by judges that 
cases out of the letter or the statute, yet 
being within the same mischief, or cause of 
the making of the same, shall be within the 
same remedy that the statute provideth, and 
the reason hereof is, for that the Im,ymakers 
could not possibly set down all cases in 
express terms." 1b 
In practice, application of this principle had even 
more far-reaching effects. Cases within the letter but 
outside the mischief of an Act were sometimes ignored 
by the courts. This narrmver sense of equity of the 
statute is also manifest in Plowden's note to Eyston v. 
Studd 11 and 'tvas based on Aristotle I s discussion of 
equity in his Ethics Book V. 
About the same time as the equity of the statute 
approach was gaining recognition in England, the Barons 
of the Exchequer laid down what 'tvas really the earliest 
fully articulated canon of construction, the so-called 
8. For this definition of the term 'equity' see T. Plucknett 
ibid. p.336. 
9. Blackstone, 'Commentaries', i. 61. 
10. I Inst. 24(6). 
11. (1574) Plow. 459, 465. 
. h" f 1 12 mlSC le ru e. Courts were enjoined to make such 
construction as would suppress the mischief at which 
the act was aimed and advance the remedy provided by 
the Act. The reasons for an enactment thus became a 
relevant consideration in its interpretation. 13 
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It is fashionable to regard this mischief approach 
as the most liberal of the canons although to comment on 
the fac~ that it reflects an archaic constitutional 
Position. 14 In fact a better view is that the mischief 
approach represented a compromise between the early 
strict approach and the more recent and very liberal 
equity of the statute approach. The rule laid down in 
Heydon's Case was in fact far more restrictive than 
the latter. 
Heydon's Case was decided in a period before 
Parliamentary sovereignty-had been completely established. 15 
The 1688 Revolution firmly established Parliament and 
the judiciary as separate bodies performing distinct 
functions. At the same time we see an increasing lip-
service being paid to a second canon known as the literal 
'rule'. 
The traditional view has been that the literal 
approach represents an attempt by the cour~ to cutdown 
the scope of legislation. This view is questionable for 
12. For the Barons' formulation of the mischief rule see 
p. 114.below. 
13. A parallel approach to statutes is to be found in 
Scottish decisions. See for example the cases of 
Campbell v. Grierson (1848) 10 D. 361 and Magistrates 
and To"n Council of' Glas 01 .. v. Commissioners of Police 
of Hillhead 1885) 12 R. 364. 
14. See LaI~ Com. No. 21 p. 1 9. 
15. See R. Cross, 'Statutory Interpretation' p.9. 
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tw·o reasons. First, it could equally be regarded as 
self-restraint by the courts. Interpretation represents 
potential law-making by the courts. A very liberal 
interpretation is' capable of extending the scope of a 
statute. After the ~e~olution of 1688 (with its 
recognition of separation of powers) the courts were 
more likely to feel the need for self-restraint. On 
the other hand, by the. same doctrine they were obliged 
to give effect to the manifest will of Parliament. If 
the li~eral approach is expressed in terms of adopting 
the ordinary meaning of words and an attempt is made to 
interpret the ,.;rill of Parliament through the ordinary 
meaning of the language used, this arguably represented 
a reasonable compromise between a liberal and a strict 
approach. It was not perfect in all respects and hence 
the later formulation of the golden rule which allowed 
an ad hoc solution to the problem. 
It has never been hitherto mentioned, but it is 
interesting to note that this literal approach developed 
with the beginning of systematic lexicography. True, 
England had failed to set up an Academy similar to those 
·of France and Italy to act inter alia as an authoratative 
body in respect of the language but, by the time of 
Dr. Johnson's dictionary in 1755, English lexicography 
had made considerable advances. 16 Dr. Johnson's 
dictionary was the first English dictionary systematically 
to give contexts from literature. Armed with such 
16. See'Dr. Johnson's Dictionary' by J.H. Sledd and 
G.J. Kolb. Also generally on the history of 
dictionaries see 'Caught in the 1veb of Words' 
by K.M. Elisabeth Murray. 
106 
dictionaries the judges ~ere more able to ascertain with 
con:fidence the ordina'ry meaning o:f ",fords. 
It has already been noted that when taken too 
far the literal rule ~an lead to injustice. Hence the 
need for some :form of m'odification to take account of 
those situations where application of the rule led to 
a repugnance, absurdity or inconsistency. The so-called 
golden rule began to make its appearance about: the middle 
of the eighteenth century and is essentially the literal 
rule with a qualification to cover such situations. 
Although they did not disappear completely, 
cases adopt a mischief approach for a time were out-
numbe~ed by those adopting an essentially literal 
approach. Despite statutory embodiment of a direction 
to adopt a purposive construction in section 5(j) of 
the New Zealand Acts Interpretation Act 1924,17 statutes 
continued to receive a literal construction in a large 
number of cases. More recently, judicial attitudes in 
New Zealand appear to have changed yet again. A return 
to a more purposive approach is generally apparent and 
seems to be the dominant trend in current judicial 
interpretation. In Britain the literal approach, tempered 
by the qualification contained in the golden rule, . 
continued to dominate interpretation well into this 
century. As late as the late 1950 l s T. Plucknett felt 
able to write that Hin the last two or three generations 
[the courts] have accepted the theory of their absolute 
submission to the word and the letter of the legislature. 1I18 
17. For discussion of this section see p~ 167-170.' 
18. T. Plucknett, OPe cit. p.J40. 
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Then in 1969 the English and Scottish LaW' Commissions 
published their Report on the Interpretation of Statutes 19 
.which favoured a· new Interpretation Act w"hich would 
contain a general provision mandating the courts to 
take a more purposiv'e approach to interpretation. The 
influence of this Report can be detected in cases 
following, especially those of Lords Diplock and Simon 
of Glaisdale, who through case la,,, have sought to 
introduce the purposive approach favoured by the 
Commissions. It is interesting to note that both Lords 
Diplock and Simon have been Chairman of the U.K. Statute 
Law Committee and have consequently taken a special 
interest in legislation. This ne,.,r purposive approach 
to interpretation is essentially a modern expression of 
the old mischief approach. As Viscount Dilhorne said 
in Stock v. Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd:_20 
"It is now fashionable to talk of a purposive 
construction of a statute, but it has been 
recognised since the seventeenth century that 
it has been the task of the judiciary in 
interpreting an Act to seek to interpret it 
'according to the intent of them that made it' 
(Coke 4 Inst. 330).11 
Despite recent attempts by Lord Scarman to have his 
21 Interpretation Bill made law, there has been as yet 
no statutory e.nactment of a purposive approach in 
Britain. 
19. For a full discussion of this Report see pp. 213-21~elow. 
20. [1978] 1 I{LR 231 ; [1978J 1 All E.R. 948 at p.951. 
21. For a full discussion of this Bill and its progress 
through Parliament so far see pn.218-22below. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
·THE CANONS: TRADITIONAL AND MODERN JUDICIAL FORHULATIONS 
I. THE LITERAL RULE 
We have seenho1v a distinction is dra1vn between 
strict and liberal interpretations. This distinction 
was drawn by commentators on the medieval period and still 
holds true today. Indeed the distinction between strict 
and liberal interpretation is a common one in Roman 
and modern civilian systems. The strict approach is 
often equated with the literal approach although this 
can often be misleading. A strict approach can be 
narrower than the literal approach. 
It has been said'that the first and most 
e1~mentary rule of construction' is that words should 
be interpreted in accordance with their ordinary meaning 
1 
or their technical meaning if they have acquired one. 
This ,vas expressed by Bayley J. in R v. Inhabitants of 
Ramsgate 2 in these terms:-
" It is very desirable in all cases to adhere 
to the words of an Act of Parliament, giving 
to them that sense which is their natural import 
in the order in which they are placed." 
A more extreme formulation was expressed by Lord 
Atkinson in Vacher & Sons Ltd. v. London Society of 
Compositor~.3 He said:-
1. See 'Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes' (12th 
ed.) p. 28. 
2. (1827) 6 B & C 712. 
3. (j 9 13J AC 107. 
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If If the language of a statute be plain, 
admitting of only one meaning, the legislature 
must be taken to have meant and intended 
what it has plainly expressed, and 1-rhatever 
it has in clear terms enacted must be enforced 
though it ?hould lead to absurd or mischievous 
results. If the language of this sub-section 
be not controlled by some of the other provisions 
of the statute,it must, since its language 
is plain and unambiguous, be enforced, and 
your Lords~ips' House sitt judicially is 
not concerned ,.,ith the question whether the 
policy it embodies is wise or unwise, or whether 
it leads to consequences just or unjust; 
beneficial or mischievous o ll 4 
More recently, Lord Diplock expressed similar 
sentiments in Duport Steels Ltd. v. Sirs: 5 
"At a time when more and more cases involve 
the application of legislation which gives 
effect to policies that are the subject of 
bitter public and parliamentary controversy, 
it cannot be too strongly emphasised that the 
British constitution, though largely unwritten, 
is firmly based upon the separation of powers; 
Parliament makes the laws, the judiciary 
interprets them. Wben Parliament legislates 
to remedy what the majority of its members at 
the time perceive to be a defect or a lacuna 
in the existing law (1.rhether it be the written 
law enacted by exist statutes or the 
unwritten common law as it has been expounded 
by the judges in decided cases) the role of 
the judiciary is confined to ascertaining from 
the words that Parliament has approved as 
expressing its intention what the intention 
was, and to giving effect to it. Where the 
meaning of the statutory words is plain and 
unambiguous it is not for the judges to invent 
fancied ambiguities as an excuse for failing to 
give effect to its plain meaning because they 
themselves consider that the consequences of 
doing so would be inexpedient, or even unjust 
or immoral. In controversial matters such as are 
involved in industrial relations there is room 
for differences of opinlon as to what is 
expedient, what is just and lvha t is morally 
justifiable. Under our constitution it is 
Parliament's opinion on these matters that 
is paramount." 
4. At PP. 121-2. 
5. (1980] 1 All ER 529. 
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In the cases, different formulations have some-
times been adopted. The judges have referred to 
ordinary meaning,6 natural meaning,7 plain meaning,8 
. d . 9 I . 10 d . 11 rece1ve mean1ng, popu ar mean1ng, every ay mean1ng, 
. 12 13 
approved mean1ng, recognised meaning and straight-
forward meaning. 14 Recently, Lord Simon of Glaisdale 
has commented:-
"Nowadays we should add to 'natural and 
ordinary meaning' the words 'in their context 
and according to the appropriate linguistic 
register. 11I 15 
The justification of the rule is the presumed 
intention of the legislature. The literal rule or 
approach appears to be a presumption as to the legislative 
intent'. In other lvords, Parliament is presumed to have 
used ",ords in their commonly accepted meaning unless 
there is a technical meaning or contrary intention. 
Sometimes the literal approach has been expressed in 
terms of a "prima facie preference".16 A further aspect 
of' this justification is that people may have relied on 
Parliament using ,-fords in accordance with their ordinary 
meaning. In all fairness their reasonable expectations 
6. e.g. S",tock v Fran~ __ Jones (Tipton) Ltd.0 978] 1 AlL If.R. 
,948. Also Pearson v IRC 0 980J 2 1<lLR 872, 876. . 
7. See e.g o United states v Cooper Corp. 312 US 600; 
Also Pearson v IRC [1980J 2 W'LR 872,876. 
8. See e.g. Hutton v Phillips (1949) 45 Del 156, 160. 
Also ~'vnne v Burnell 7 CL & Finn. 696. 
9. See e.g. Deputy v DuPont 308 US 488, 84 L Ed 416, 60 
S Cr 363. 
10. See e.g. Deputy v DuPont loc.cit. 
11. See e.g. Crane v Commissioner 331 US 1,91 L Ed 1307, 
67 S Cr 1047. 
12. See e.g. Evans v Kroh(Ky) 284 Sw 2d 329, 58 ALR 2d 1446. 
'13. See e.g. Victory Cable Co v Charlotte 234 NC 572, 68 
S E 2d 433. 
14. See Stock v Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd. loco cit. 
15. Ibid. p. 952. 
16. See American Jurisprudence Vol. 73 p. 403. 
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from such a construction should be upheld. 17 
We have seen above how Lord Atkinson in Vacher's 
Case ,,,as prepared to recognise the literal approach 
even when it led to absurd results. Fortunately 
that approach has no"t completely prevailed. The 
literal approach has yielded on occasion to the golden 
'rule, to which we must now turn. 
II.. THE GOLDEN RULE 
An early expression of the golden rule is 
contained in the Irish case of Warburton v Loveland 
dIvie,18 subsequently affirmed by the House of Lords, 
,,,here 'Burton J. said: 
"It is a rule in the construction of statutes, 
that, in the first instance, the grammatical 
sense of the words is to be adhered to. If 
that is contrary to~ or inconsistent with any 
expressed intention, or any declared purpose 
of the statute; or if it 1¥Quld involve any 
absurdity, repugnance, or inconsistency in its 
different provisions, the grammatical sense 
must then be modified, extended, or abridged, 
so far as to avoid such inconvenience, but 
no farther.1I 19 
20 In Rv Banbury, Parke, B., later Lord i{ensley-
dale, said: 
18. 
19. 
20. 
lithe rule of construction is to intend the 
legislature to have meant what they have 
actually expressed uhless a manifest incongruity 
would result from doing SO.1f 
See Black-CIa '{-lson International Ltd v Papierwerke 
Wa.lahof-Ascha'ffenburg AC [1975J 1 All E.R. 810 at 
836 per Lord Diplock. 
(1828) 1 Hud & B 623. 
Ibid. p. 648. 
(1834) 1 A & E 136. 
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In 1836 21 he put it in more elaborate terms in the 
following famous passage:-
"It is a very useful rule, in the construction 
of a statute, to adhere to the ordinary meaning 
of the words used, and to the grammatical 
vonstruction, unless that is at variance with 
the intention of the Legislature, to be 
collected from the statute itself, or leads to 
any manifest absurdity or repugnancy, in 
which case the language may be varied or 
modified so as to avoid such inconvenience, 
but no further." 22 
Later, as Lord Wensleydale, 23 in <rey v Pearson he 
expressed the rule as follows:-
"in construing statutes • • • the grammatical 
and ordinary sense of the words is to be 
adhered to, unless that would lead to some 
absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency 
with the rest of the instrument, in which 
case the grammatical and ordinary sense of 
the words may be modified, so as to avoid 24 
the absurdity and inconsistency, but no farther." 
It can be seen from the above that the first 
thing to do is to apply the literal approach. If the 
, .. ords of the s ta tute are unequivocal that is the end of 
the matter. If, however, a secondary meaning is possible 
which would avoid an incongruity, absurdity, repugnance 
or inconsistenc~ then this is to be adopted. The 
difficult question is what degree of absurdity etc. is 
necessary before the primary meaning can be departed from. 
On occasion, some of the judges have said that there 
must be a great or manifest absurdity.2 5 Recently the 
House of Lords in Stock v Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd26 
have laid down an 'anomalies· test. Lord Simon of 
21. Becke v Smith (1836) 2 M & W 191. 
22. Ibid. p. 195. 
23. (1857) 6 B.L.C. 61. 
24. Ibid. p. 106. 
25. See for example Becke v Smith (1836) 2 M & W 191. 
Also see Lord Esher MR in R v City of London Court 
Judge [1892J 1 QB 273 at 290. 
26. loco cit. 
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Glaisdale expresses this. test as follows:-
lilt court ,,,ould only be justified in departing 
from the plain wdrds of the statute where it 
is satisfied that 
1) there isa clear and gross balance of anomaly. 
2) Parliament,' the 1 slative promoters and 
the draftsmen could not have envisaged such 
anomaly and could not have been prepared to 
accept it in the interest of supervening 
legislative objective. 
3) the anomaly can be obviated without 
detriment to such Ie slative objective. 
4) the language of the statute is susceptible 
of the modification required to obviate the 
anomaly." 27 
It is clear that in any analysis of this kind 
the court is not simply construing the statutory rule in 
its immediate context but .also in the broader context 
of its consequences. It is not clear ,,,hether the 
English cases go so far as to recognise a rule that the 
golden approach is to be adopted where the literal rule 
will lead to unfai:rness or injustice. In America, the 
cases are more various and it seems that in the 
construction of a statute considerations of what causes 
. . t· 28 ld h t t·.pl 29 A . lnJUS lce cou . ave a po en ln~ uence. galn, 
the courts will assume an intention not to discriminate 
unjustly between different classes of the same kind.30 
There is even a doctrine expressed in the language of 
presumption that the legislature is to be presumed not 
t h . t d d 1 t t d d . th . . 3 1 o ave ln en e a ru e a en e Wl lnconvenlence, 
hardship,3 2 or oppression. 33 In some respects these 
27. Ibid. p. 955c. . 
28. See e.g. Denver v Holmes 156 Colo 586, 400 P 2d 907. 
29. For American approach generally see American Juris-
prudence Vol. 73 p. 429. 
30. See e.g. Kellum v Johnson 237 Miss 580, 115 So 2d 147. 
31. See e.g. Randall v Richmond & DR Co. 107 NC 748 12 SE 
605. 
32. See e.g. People v Frank G. Heilman Co. 263 III App 514. 
33. State v Standard Oil Co. 188 La 978, 178 So 601. 
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American cases seem to go further than the golden rule. 
It can be argued that they have the advantage of being 
more explicit. The l,anguage of Lord Wensleydale is 
very vague and it:is ~ifficult to tell in advance whether 
a particular court ~iilfind the particular characteristics 
which he lists presertt. That is quite apart from his 
equivocation in the des,cription of these characteristics. 
III. THE HISCHIEJf RULE 
Whereas there'is'an interlocking symmetry between 
the literal and golden rules there is an unfortunate 
confusion behveen the ,literal and mischief rules. ive 
will now deal with the old and new formulations of the 
mischief rule .. 
As we have seen, this is the earliest articulated 
approach, although not necessarily the earliest approach. 
It was laid down by the Barons of the Exchequer in 
Heydon's Case. 34 Their resolution as contained in Coke's 
Reports reads as follows:-
"And it \,jas resolved by them, that for the sure 
and true interpretation of all statutes in 
general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive 
or enl of the Common Law), four things 
are to be discerned and considered: 
1 st, Wha t 1vas the Common La,v before the making of 
the Act. 
2nd,lfhat was the mischief and defect for '\vhich 
the Common Law did not provide. 
3rd, ln~at remedy the Parliament hath resolved and 
appointed to cure the disease of the Common-
wealth, 
And,4th t The true reason of the remedy; and then the 
office of all the judges is always to make 
such construction as shall suppress the 
340 (1584) 3 Co. Rep. 7a. 
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mischief, and advance the remedy, and to 
suppress subtle inventioni and evasions for 
continuance of the mischief, and pro privato 
commodo, and to add force and life to the 
cure and remedy according to the true intent 
of the makers of the Act, pro· bono publico.!! 
We have already discussed the relationship between 
this and the earlier strict and free approaches to 
interpretation of the medieval judges. We have also 
discussed the relationship between the rule and the 
equity of the statute approach. The mischief approach 
was the dominant approach of the seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries. It is interesting to note that 
it is the only approach mentioned by Blackstone in 
his Commentaries. 35 
. The courts have continued to make reference to 
the mischief approach although it lost favour as the 
dominant approach in the late eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. Recently the mischief approach has been 
revived as the dominant approach. In his dissenting 
speech in Maunsell v 01ins,36 Lord Simon of Glaisdale 
engaged in an elaborate explanation of the mischief 
approach in the following terms: 
liThe rule in Heydon's Case itself is sometimes 
stated as a primary canon of construction, 
sometimes as secondary (i.e. available in the 
case of an ambiguity): cf. Maxwell pp 40, 96, 
with Craies on statute la1v-, 7th Ed.(1971), 
pp 94,96. 1ve think that the explanation of 
this is that the rule is available at two 
stages. The first task of a court of 
construction is to put itself in the shoes of 
the draftsman - to consider 1-Fha t kno,v-ledge he 
had and, importantly, what statutory objective 
he had - if only as a guide "to that linguistic 
register. Here is the first consideration of 
the mischief. Being thus placed in the shoes 
of the draftsman, the court proceeds to ascertain 
35. See Blackstone 'Commentaries' Vol. 1. 
36. [1975JAC 373. 
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the meaning of the statutory language. In 
this task the first and most elementary rule 
of construction is to consider the plain and 
primary meaning, in their appropriate register, 
of the words used. If there is no such plain 
meaning (i.e. if there is an ambiguity), a 
number of secondary canons are available to 
resolve it. Of these one of the most important 
is the rule in Heydon's Case. Here, then, 
may be a second consideration of the mischief. 1I 37 
In its abbreviated formulation as the purposive 
approach the rule has found favour with several Common-
wealth jurisdictions. Some, like New Zealand, have 
enacted it in statutory form. Others regard it as the 
"better practice of the courts ll • 38 In Britain, the 
purposive approach appeared in Lord Scarman's Interpret-
ation Bill, although Clause 2 of that Bill seems to be 
intended to co-exist with the traditional formulation 
of the mischief and other approaches. 
The mischief approach bears some resemblance 
to two rnstinct continental approaches to interpretation 
- the historical and teleological approaches. 39 The 
first is interpretation by reference to the legislative 
history and the second is an interpretation by reference 
to the end or purpose or social goal of the I slation. 
37. Ibid. p. 395 A-C. 
38. per Lord Simon of Glaisdale Hou~e of Lords Deb. 9 
Harch 1981 Col. 78. For present UK attitude to the 
purposive approach also see for example Lord Diplock 
in Jones v Secretary of State for Social Services 
[1972J AC 944. 
39. See J.H. Farrar 'Introduction to Legal Method' pp 
76-77. 
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CHAPTER IX 
THE CANONS: DETAILED 
I. THE LITERAL RULE 
_i'--
The literal rule. is also known by the names 
'ordinary-meaning rule', and 'plain-meaning rule I • 1 By 
whatever name, this approach to interpretation has come 
under heavy attack in recent years. In introducing his 
1980 Interpretation Bill, Lord Scarman said the rule lIis 
still lurking in the back corridors of the legal system 
and must be exterminatedo,,2 This approach, the argument 
goes, ~s based on an oversimple view of language and the 
judicial function. The aim of this section will be to 
analyse the content of the literal approach and to discuss 
the validity of the above criticisms in relation to that 
content. Unfortunately, is is made difficult by 
fundamental differences as to the criteria for determining 
the IIi teral l or 'ordinary' :-n: .1 plain i meaning of "Yords. Judi-
cial and academic analysis of the canon is often confused. 
We must therefore b with an examination of these 
fundamental terms. 
'Literal' meaning has been defined by R. Dickerson 
as "the meaning carried by langUage when it is read in 
its dictionary sense unaffected by considerations of 
particular context. 1I3 The same sense is presumably adopted 
1. See R. Dickerson, 'The Interpretation and Application 
of Statutes' pp 229-233. 
2. House of Lords Deb. 13th Feb. 1980 Col. 279. 
3. R. Dickerson op. cit. p. 38. 
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by M. Zander when he criticises the rule as being based 
on the false premise thai words have plain ordinary 
4 
meanings apart from the~r context. Elsewhere he criticises 
the equation of o:rdinary meaning with 'dictionary meaning', 
saying "those '-lho 1 apply the literal approach often talk 
of using the dictionary meaning of the words in question, 
but dictionaries normally provide a number of alternative 
meanings. uS Obviously .context plays no part in his 
analysis of 'literal' or 'ordinary' meaning. Consider-
ation of context would amost invariably resolve doubt 
as to which particular dictionary definition was intended e 
R. Cross points out that 'literal' is often used as a 
synonym for 'natural' or 'ordinary' meaning,but that when 
,applied to the construction of statutes it is often used 
pejoratively. Then it is the meaning which results from 
giving to each '-lord an ordinary meaning without much 
reference to the context or the statutory Object. 6 
'Ordinary' or 'natural' meaning he describes as lithe 
meaning ,.,.hich would .be attached to those words and phrases 
by the normal speaker of English at the time when the 
statute ivas passed." Other writers, such as 1". T. ~1urphy 
and R.W. Rawlings,7 also recognise a distinction between 
"literal' and 'ordinary' meaning; ordinary meaning being 
adhered to to relieve extreme literalism by an application 
of common sense exercised through the medium of the 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
N. Zander, 'The Law-Making Process', p.49. 
Ibid. p. 50. 
R. Cross 'Statutory Interpretation', p.59. 
In 'After the Ancien Regime: The lll'ri ting of Judgements 
in the. House of Lords 1979/80'44 (1981) MLR 617. 
8 
ordinary man. 
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On the other hand, E.A. Driedger9 considers that 
context is an integral part of determining the literal 
meaning of words. Supporting him in this opinion we 
find judicial statements of the approach such as that of 
Lord Simon of Glai$d~le in Stock v Frank"Jones (Tipton) 
Ltd. 10 where he said: 
"Now'adays we sh~uld add to 'natural' and 
'ordinary' meaning the words 'in their 
context and,according to the appropriate 
linguistic register. '" 11 
Driedger goes on to discuss ordinary meaning, again 
emphasising the role played by context. To him, 
Ita meaning may be said to be ordinary if it is 
to be found in the dictionary. But there may 
be many meanings. Compilers of dictionaries 
usually place first in the list of meanings of 
a 1-J'ord the meaning most commonly used. This 
meaning is various~y called the ordinary, 
common, popular or primary meaning. And there 
may be different ordinary meanings of a word 
for different subject matters ••• it is the 
ordinary meaning as applied to the subject 
matter that must normally be taken. But 
this is not an absolute rule, for in the end 12 
the meaning of a word is governed by the context • 
The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines a literal 
interpretation as "taking words in their usual or primary 
sense and applying ordinary rulEs of grammar" to them. 
"It thus seems to equate 'literal' meaning with 'ordinary' 
meaning (the latter term being defined as "normal, 
customary or usual") but begs the question of the extent 
to which context is to be considered in the determination 
of either. 
8. Ibid. p. 625. 
9. In 'The Construction of Statutes'. 
10. 0978J 1 All E.R. 948. 
11. Ibid. at p. 952 
12. E.A. Driedger 'The Construction of Statutes' pp6-7. 
II 
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To summaris e, lie see that different commentators 
understand different things by the description 'literal 
construction I. Some equate literal meaning with ordinary 
meaning. Others distinguish bet,.,reen the two on the 
basis that context no part in a determination of 
the former. It is submitted that two quite distinct 
formulations of the 'literal' rule are also apparent 
from the cases. The difference between them depends on 
the extent to which context is considered an integral 
part, not only of determining what constitutes 'cle~r 
and unambiguous' language,1 3 but of determining the very 
meaning of that language. These alternative formulations 
will be considered iri more detail below. First, a closer 
examination must be made of ordinary meaning itself, for 
it is criticism of this concept that lies at the heart 
of much criticism of the literal rule. 14 Broadly 
speaking, arguments against ordinary meaning are aimed 
1) at its very existence as a unitary concept and 
2) at its adoption as the dominant standard in the 
construction of statutes. 
'Ordinary' meaning is often equated with 'core' 
meaning but the comments of L.L. Fuller and his criticisms 
of H.L.~. Hart's analysis of core meaning are used to 
argue that no such thing as ordinary meaning exists. 
Ho'vever, insofar as ordinary meaning can be equated 'vi th 
13. 
14. 
For a discussion of the role o~ context, including 
statutory purpose, in the ascertainment of 'clear' 
meaning see the Hart/Fuller debate PP. 36-42 above. 
For example, see criticisms of M. Zander, op.cit.p.49. 
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established and customary usage, the concept is a valid 
one. For there to be communication at all language must 
have some element of objectivitYe 15 Some commonly under-
stood meaning does attach to most words. However, this 
is not to say that any \yord will have only one ordinary 
meaning, nor that the decision as to \>'"hat constitutes 
,ordinary meaning in a particular case will necessarily 
be without dispute. 16 To fulfil their purpose of 
regulat society,statutes too must possess some element 
of objectivity .. Arguably, this is best provided by an 
interpretation in accordance with ordinary meaning; the 
meaning in ,..rhich language is understood by the average 
member of society. The constitutional implications of 
such an interpretation are considered by Lord Diplock 
in the Black-Clawson case: 
liThe acceptance of the rule of law as a 
constitutional principle requires that a 
citizen, before committing himself to any course 
of action, should be able to kno\v in advance 
what are the legal consequences that will 
flow from it. Where those consequences are 
regulated by a statute the source of that 
knowledge is what the statute says. In 
construing it the court must give effect to 
what the words of the statute would be reasonably 
understood to mean by those whose conduct 
it regulates. 1I 17 
Also related to the idea of ordinary meaning is 
that of primary and secondary meaning. The clearest 
analysis of this distinction is given by Sir Rupert Cross 
15. See A.J. Ayer ':Metaphysics and Common Sense,' p. 27. 
16. See pp. 123-124. 
17. Black-Clmvson Interna tional Ltd v Papierwerke 
Haldhof-Aschaffenburg AG [I 975J 1 All ER 810, 836. 
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. t f 1 d 1 l' 18 1n erms 0 usua_ an ess usua mean1ngs. Hany w"ords 
and phrases have more" th,an one usual meaning, he says, 
since allowance has to be made for a lot of different 
contexts. The ch~:>ice a~ to ,,rhich of those 'ordinary t 
meanings is the appr?priate one in the circumstances 
has been discussed apove. There comes a time however 
when although a 1,rord is capable of bearing a particular 
meaning, that meaning is an unusual one, that is, a 
secondary one. According to Cross, to say that IIX 
acquired a fortune by accident of his birth" is to use 
the word 'accident' in its secondary meaning of l chance'. 
A court will sometimes opt for such secondary meanings 
on account of the inconvenience, injustice o,r absurdity 
which would arise from an application of any of the more 
usual meanings. Such a situation is that envisaged by 
the so-called golden rule. It is submitted however that 
the distinction between primary and secondary meaning is 
largely one devised for judicial convenience and is not 
necessarily reflected in our everyday use of language. 
In the field of statutory interpretation the distinction 
becomes necessary to justify the adoption of ""hat may 
18. R. Cross. OPe cit. p.58. Compare this with the some-
what confused analysis of G. IHlliams in 'The Neaning 
of Literal Interpretation - Part 1', New Law Journal, 
November 5th 1981, p.1128. His analysis is based on a 
distinction between "the most obvious or central 
meaning" and "a meaning that can be coaxed out of 
the 1vords by argument." However whereas Cross consist-
ently recognises the role of context Williams seems 
only to regard context as significant for resort to a 
secondary meaning which is less obvious. It is 
submitted that Williams fails to make clear that 
the determination of primary meaning is itself arrived 
at only after a consideration of context. 
123 
appear a somewhat strained interpretation so as to avoid 
the undesirable effects of an excessively narrow interpret-
ation:· However the distinction is not without conceptual 
difficulties as is to be expected when an attempt is 
made to superimpose a clear-cut distinction on less than 
clear-cut data .. 
The concept of ordinary meaning then is perhaps 
the fairest guide to statutory meaning. But it is not 
as cut and dried as some judicial statements would have 
us imagine. It is a complex. idea and as such its 
app1ication gives rise to a number of problems. Criticism 
of the literal approach should perhaps be directed not 
to the fact that it embodies the concept of ordinary 
meaning but that it directs one to adopt ordinary 
meaning of words. Such a direction belies the complexity 
of the phrase 'ordinary meaning' and of language generally. 
For a start, it is not always clear "\vhat in fact 
constitutes a word's ordinary or usual meaning. Ive have 
already noted that ordinary meaning is often equated 
with a word's 'core'. But due to the element of vagueness 
present in most words, there is often no clearly defined 
boundary between a 'vord' s core and its penumbra of 
fringe meanings. There will inevitably be occasional 
disagreement as to what the ordinary meaning of a word 
actually is. It is unfortunate that the phrase 'ordinary 
meaning t implies a simple either/or choice; either some-
thing is an ordinary meaning or it is not. For this 
reason some writers19 prefer to talk of 'obvious' meaning. 
19. For example see Glanville Williams op.cit.p.1128. Also 
see N. MacCormick 'Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory' 
p.203. (footnote 7). 
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The latter term readily lends itself to description 
in terms of degrees of obviousness •. Similarly, when 
equating ordinary meaning with core meaning it must be 
remembered that words will frequently have more than one 
ordinary meaning as "the 'core' itself will often consist 
of several different senses. 20 To simply equate ordinary 
'meaning with I the dictionary meaning~ of a word makes 
no sense. As Zander21 points out, dictionaries usually 
give more than one definition for every headword. 
Driedger's view that the definition listed first is 
usually the 'ordinary meaning,22'would be simplistic but 
for his recognition that context is ~e final determiner 
of ordinary meaning. But variations within dictionary 
definitions should not b~ regarded as an obstacle to 
the determination of ordinary meaning. Such variations 
arise from the habitual use of a word in different 
contexts and in relation to different subject matters. 
Through these variations context has already been accounted 
for in a general way. The specific statutory context 
will almost invariably clarify which particular sense 
of the word was intended~ The point is not that only 
one ordinary meaning exists, but that only one may be 
approp~iate given the parti6ular statutory context and 
the circumstances of the case. In most dases there will 
be general t if not universal, agreement about , .... hich meaning 
is . 23 the one to be applied. .. Consideration of relevant 
20. See p. 41 above. 
21. M. Zander OPe cit. p.SO. 
22. See p. 119 above. 
23. See R. Cross. OPe cit. 
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statutory context is thus indispensabJ..e to an accurate 
ascertainment of' the legislative meaning~ 
, ' 
A second point to note is that in certain cases 
the disputed words may have no 'ordinary' meaning. 
Technical terms, f'or instance, are to be interpreted 
in accordance with their assigned, technical meanings. 
Such ""ords in most c'ases are readily recognised by the 
, , 
court and dealt with appropriately. Of' more problem 
are 'terms of' art'. According to Blackstone these must 
be "taken according to the acceptat,ion of. ,the learned 
in each art, trade and science.,,24 
To summarise, statutes are a f'orm of' communication 
and as such need the element of' objecti vi ty 1,fhich the 
ordinary meaning standard provides. But it must also 
be recognised that statutes are a special form of' 
communication. To a large extent theirs is not an 
ordinary use of' language but an extraordinary one. 
Firstly, language is not ordinarily used to circu~scribe 
things so precisely. Statutes are continually def'ining; 
def'ining concepts, def'ining relationships, def'ining 
authority. Their concern is largely with the scope'of' 
these def'initions, with their application to potential 
caseE? Secondly, there is nQ simple relationship between 
an individual communicator and audience. The legislativ.e 
process combines a large numbE:r of' communicators with 
the largest audience in the particular jurisdiction. 
The size of' the communicator raises all sorts of' problems 
24. Blackstone's 'Commentaries' Vol.1. 
about the nature of' the Ie sia ti-'.re in tent. 
,., 
I') t"'..;: 
lems have been dealt with elsewhere.~J OI 
the audience raises problems cone 
Ord TI1 is the m bestowed on a word 
habitual or customary usage by a icular speech 
community. But saaie is composed o:f a number of 
different speech communities each be composed of 
different socia1 9 professional, educational, racial 
and age types G Where legislation has fairly universal 
application, for example criminal legislation, '\<Jhich 
speech community, if any, is to be regarded as represent-
ative of the 1 slative audience as a "rhole? The 
chosen standard of speech shorild not correspond to 'slang l 
usage, nor should it correspond solely to the customary 
usage of the judicial community. The judiciary represents 
a minute proportion of the entire popUlation and, as 
a group, their language use tends to lag behind that of 
society as a whole o Once again it may well be that 
an appropriate dictionary definition is the best guide 
to a word' 5 I etmdard sense I. Evidence of meaning so 
derived will of course be subject to contrary indications 
in the relevant statutory context. The purpose of a 
statute may require a broader interpretation than is 
to be drawn from a dictionary definition. A word may 
have an established meaning in a community and be 
50 used in a statute before such meaning is adopted 
25. See MacCullum 'Legislative Intent' in Essays in LeGal 
Philosophy edited by R.S. Summers discussed infra e 
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by lexicOgraphers. 26 Where legislation is aimed at 
one particular group in society, for example legislation 
dealing specifically ld th the regulation of one 
professional group, theri obviously the ordina~y-meaning 
of the statutory language should be taken as the ordinary 
. . . 
meaning of that particular speech community. This has 
not always been don~. :It is only within the last few 
years that certain members of the judiciary have shown 
an awareness of th~ need to account for linguistic 
register. In the case of :f'.1aunsell v OlirJ.s 27 Lord.' Simon 
of Glaisdale displayed a more relative approach to 
ordinary meaning. He ~aid: 
"Statutory language, like all language, is 
capable of an almost infinite gradation of 
'register' - i.e. it will be used at the 
semantic level appropriate to the subject 
matter and to the audience addressed (the man 
in the street, lawyers, merchants, etc.). 
It is the duty of a court of construction to 
tune in to such re ster and so to 
interpret the statutory language as to give to 
it the primary meaning which is appropriate 
in that register (unless it is clear that 
some other meaning must be given in order to 
carry out the statutory purpose or to avoid 
injustice, anomaly, absurdity or contradiction). 
In other words, statutory language must always 
be given presumptively the most natural and 
ordinary meaning ,,,hich is appropriate in the' 
circumstances. II 
This point ,vas emphasised yet again by Lord Simon in 
28 the passage already quoted from the recent case of 
Stock v Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd. 29 
26. See American Jurisprudence Vol. 73 p.142 (2nd ed.) 
Also see comments on dictionary definitions in 
Part A pp. 84-87. 
27. [t975JA.C~ 373, 391E. 
28. See p. 119 above. 
29.[1978] 1 All E.R. 948. 
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The above recognition that ordinary meaning 
differs with audience and subject matter may fundamentally 
affect the ascertainment of ordinary meaning in many 
cases. Indeed, such recognition is vital if ordinary 
meaning is to be justified as a fair and accurate guide 
to meaning. But there are necessary limits to the 
application of a doctrine of semantic levels where a 
statute speaks with one voice to an audience consisting 
of all possible types. Lord SimonIs recognition of 
"the man in the street" presumably contemplates some 
middle-of-the-road standard to be applied universally. 
The doctrine runs the risk of being potentially subversive 
if this is not accepted. At its most extreme it could 
arguably justify different sections of the community 
saying that the particular words used meant particular 
things to them. Closely related to such a notion of 
semantic levels is the notion of ordinary meaning consisting 
of various codes. A theory based on this notion is 
sometimes put fo~vard by educationalists to justify th~ 
poor performance of working-class children in English 
schools. 30 The argument is that education is carried 
through a medium of middle-class English and that 
children are assessed by their proficiency in this. 
on 
medium. 'forking-class children however may be used to 
a different code of speech and are thus disadvantaged 
educationally. Such a theory has obvious similarities tc 
one of semantic levels. Ho,-{ever whereas Lord Simonseemr: 
to have co~emplated judicial recognition of register 
30. See Bernstein, 'Class,Codes and Control.' 
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in cases involving legislation clearly aimed at one 
professional or commercial group, the educationalists' 
theory extends this .consideration of register to class 
differences. 1,./hi1e theirs may be a fair criticism of 
educational technique,it would be a mistake to extend 
this idea of linguis;tic codes too far ,vi th regard to 
statutes. From a practical application point of view 
the problems involved ,vould be tremendous e Besides 
which even the educational findings are far from being 
scien·tific data. It'must also be remembered that 
statutory construction is circumscribed by maxims and 
presumptions which play no part in' the everyday use of 
language. One such maxim is that ignorance of the la,v 
is no defence. Everyone is deemed to know the content 
of the law. Even if a statute is not addressed specifically 
to a particular person or group of persons they are on 
notice of it and subject to it. Such a maxim could 
prove difficult to reconcile with a full-blown theory 
of interpretation according to semantic levels. 
Special problems then relate to the application 
of ordinary meaning as ~standard of statutory interpret-
ation. Statutes, we have seen, are a special form of 
communication with special functions to perform. 
This is not to deny that ordinary meaning is an appropriate 
starting point for interpretation. On the contrary, it 
is submitted that ordinary meaning provides the fairest 
guide to legislative meaning. We must not'however expect 
simple straightfoT'\vard results from a concept which does 
not itself possess these qualities. In practice, most 
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of these difficulties can be overcome by a proper 
consideration of statutory context. 
The extent to which context is considered (or 
disregarded) as an integral part of the literal rule 
will be our next 'consideration. We have already discussed 
the need to consider context, including statutory purpose, 
in determining what is 'clear and unambiguous 1.3 1 l'le 
must nmV' consider the extent to 1.lThich context is in fact 
considered in the determination of ordinary meaning o 
This was touched upon at the_beg~nning of this section. 
It is not difficult to find cases adopt an excessively 
narrow and isolationi~t approach to meaning. 32 No 
semantic justification exists for such an approach. 
Context alone clarifies meaning. But not all cases adopt 
such a restrictive line. Context is not always disregarded. 
Numerous modern cases reiterate that meaning is to be 
found only after a consideration of context; that statutes 
are to be read as a whole and meaning en to disputed-
passages only after such a reading. In America, a modern 
formulation of the 'plain-meaning rule' was stated in 
the case of Hutton v Phillips.33 
11 • interpretation involves far more than 
picking out dictionary definitions of words or 
expressions used. Considerations of the context 
and the setting is indispensable properly to 
ascertain meaning. In saying that a verbal 
expression is plain or unambiguous, we mean 
little more than that we are convinced that 
virtually anyone competent to understand it, and 
desiring flairly and impartially to ascertain its 
31. See pP. 36-42. 
32. See for ex.ample Hhiteley v Chappell (1868-9) 4 LRQB 147; 
Fisher v Bell Q 961] 1 QB 394; and Bourne v Norwich 
Crematorium Ltd [1967J 2 All ER 576. 
33. 45 Del. 156, 160, 70 A 2d. 15,17 (1949). 
signification 9 would attributa to the 
expression in its context a meaning such as 
the one we derive rather than any other; 
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and loJould consider any different meaning by 
comparison strained, or far-fetched, or unusual. 
or unlikely. • Implicit in the finding of 
a plain, clear meaning of an expression in its 
cont.~!'=-t:. (emphasis in original) is a finding 
that such a meaning is rational and Il makes senseI! 
in that context." 
What then is a literal construction? lie have 
already noted the wide diversity of opinion on this point. 34 
On the one hand is the excessively restrictive view that 
words are to be considered in isolation and given their 
'dictionary definition.' On the other hand are views 
such as that held by E.A. Driedger to the effect that 
literal meaning becomes apparent only after a consideration 
of context, use in context being that which gives a 
word its primary and usual sense. 35 Perhaps we must 
conclude that there are two quite distinct forms of literal 
approach. A formulation which includes context as an 
integral part in the determination of ordinary meaning 
would avoid many of the criticisms aimed at the more 
restrictive formulation. Whether it could avoid that 
criticism completely '·,]Quld depend on whetheri t gave 
sufficient regard to context • 
. The current recognition of context is seen by many 
as a modern development of the literal rule. In fact 
it would seem that context ayed a part in even its 
earliest formulations. We have seen that a strict 
approach to statutes was adopted as early as the fourteenth 
century. The concern of these early cases was primarily 
34. See pp. 117-119 above. 
35. E.A. Driedger op.cit. p.2. 
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to stress the limits of the judicial interpretative 
function. Such cases 'advocated a strict approach rather 
than a literal one and, not surprisingly, no mention is 
made of the part played by context in determining what 
the statute said. However as early as 1388 in a case 
involving construction of the '<lord 'distress .36 it ,-las 
agreed that the general '-lords at the end of the statute 
must be limited by' the 'particular words at the beginningo' 
The present day doctrine of ejusdem generis can be 
traced back to this fourteenth century case.' Admittedly 
the argument ,vas in a.dvance of its time. Nevertheles s 
the case does illustrate an early awareness of the 
importance of context in de,termining :the meaning ,of a 
particular statutory word. 
It is unclear whether Tindal C.J. in the Sussex 
Peerage Case intended individual words to be considered 
independently of other words in the section or other 
section of the Act. 37 Certainly E.A. Driedger38 argues 
that 'this was never his intention. In the Sussex Peerage 
Case itself, Tindal C.J. went on to say that lithe words 
of the second section throw light upon and confirm the 
interpretation to be given to the first." And later in 
1892, Lord Esher, M.R. in The Queeri v The Judge of the 
City of London Court,39 in referring to a previous case40 
36. Anon YB 12 7 13 Edw. III 51 (see T. Plucknett op.cit. 
p.41). 
37. Compare on this point the comments of E.A. Driedger 
op.cit. pp.2-4 with those of R.Cross op.cit. p.44. 
38. Ibid. 
39. D 89 2J 1 QB 273. Ship 
40. Brow'n and Sons v The Russian/Alina (1880) 42 L.T. 517. 
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which had based its conclusion on the reading of one 
section of an Act alo~e,said: 
"If the learned judge meant to say that, ,.,hen 
the meaning of general words is (if you look 
at them by themselves) clear, that determines 
their construction at once, even though from 
the context - from other parts of the same Act 
- you can see, that they were intended to have a 
different meaning, if he meant to say that you 
cannot look at the context - at another part of 
the Act - to ,see ,.,hat is the real meaning, then 
again I say he has laid down a new rule of 
interpretation, ,which, unless we are obliged 
to follow in the particular case, I would not 
follow." 41 
Modern development of ' the literal rule lies not 
so much in the fact that context will be considered at 
all, but in the frequency and exte~t of that consideration~ 
Early cases rarely went beyond a consideration of the 
Act i t'self. On the whole, modern cases adopting a literal 
approach also stop at a consideration of the Act as a 
whole. A few go further and consider "all the surround-
ing circumstances II, including the statutory obj ect. 
The decisions of Viscount Simonds and Lord Somervell in 
- ~,2 
A.G.v Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover are significant 
for their recognition that a statute's object is to be 
considered in an initial determination of the ordinary 
meaning of a provision. The following often-cited 
passage is from Viscount Simonds' speech: 
II • ,.,ords and particularly general words, 
cannot be read in isolation, their colour and 
content are derived from their context. So 
it is that Iconceive it to be my right and 
duty to examine every word of a statute in 
its context, and I use 'context' in its 
widest sense, which I have already indicated 
41 • (1 892J 1 QB 273 at 290. 
42. [1957J AC 436. 
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as including not only other enacting 
provisions of the same statute but its preamble, 
the existing state of the law, other statutes 
in pari materia, and the mischief which I can, 
by these and other legitimate means discern 
the statute was intended to remedy.1I 43 
At this point the boundaries between the various 
'rules' or approaches become blurred and the inadequacy 
of their traditional categorisation is emphasised. The 
reason for Driedger's lIone rule of statutory interpretation ll 
becomes clear. 
If one major criticism of the literal rule is 
that it is based on an oversimple view of language, 
another is that it is based on an oversimple view of the 
judicial function. This criticism can be taken in one 
of two' '\ .. ays. Firstly, it is arguable that some courts 
regard their function as too narrowly bound by the 
statutory words. The criticism is aimed at interpretation 
without regard for, or contrary to, the statutory purpose. 
Nowadays courts will usually interpret in accordance with 
statutory purpose where that purpose is discernible from 
the statute itself. Dispute arises where the purpose is 
not discernible from the statute. Hhile some judges. will 
go beyond the statute to discover th~ intention of 
Parliament, others consider their t.ask as limited by the 
four corners of the act. The distinction between a 
narrow and a more liberal formulation of the literal rule 
is relevant here. ,,({hile the critic ism is valid '-lith 
regard to the former, is it valid with regard to the 
latter? 
43. Ibid. p. 461. 
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I the criticism can be taken to mean 
that the literal rule'does not ve sufficient 
acknO\vledgement to tr18 creative act 0:[ the j S e 
Such activi is ~n inescapable part of the interpretation 
1.[·1.1· process It is difficult to ana e the validity of 
this criticism with ~e to the broader formulation 
of the literal rule.' This certai adopts a more 
liberal approach to interpretation; the question is, 
does it adopt a more creative one? More often than not f 
consideration of context stops at a consideration of 
the Act as a whole. Basically the courts regard their 
tasle as f "t' 1 t" 45 one 0 cognl lve exp ora lanD But cognition 
does not necessarily solve problems of the vague word 
or the borderline case. Sometimes the courts will go 
further and consider the statutory purpose as part of 
the overall context. When such a move is made beyond 
the statutory document to an articulation of policy, 
especially non- ici t po licy t the court is mO~Ting more 
into ~he realm of creativity inasmuch as it provides a 
rational reconstruction of what that policy is. The 
extrinsic evidence exclusion rules limit the range of 
data available to the court in determining the true 
statutory purpose. With what little data they do have 
the courts rationally reconstruct the policy behind the 
act and impute this policy to Parliament. Their decision 
44. See p.242 below. 
45. The terminology of R. Dickerson op.cit., has been 
adopted here. The judges! 'cognitive! function refers 
to the ascertainment of meanings their Icreative' 
function refers to the assignment of meaning, or 
judicial lalvmaking by analogy "lith the statute. 
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is then made according to this imputed intention. 
Inasmuch as the court reconstructs the legislative policy 
and makes a decision on the basis of this policy, it 
acts creativelyo But for reasons that will be discussed 
h6 later the courts rarely acknowledge that they do in 
fact make Icn·,T~ indeed policy. Criticisms concerning 
acknowledgement of judicial creativity are not limited 
to the literal rule. 
46. See pp.242-J below. 
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II. THE GOLDEN RULE 
As we have seen, the golden rule presupposes an 
initial application of the literal rule. tiThe golden 
rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie 
be given their ordinary meaning."l Departure from the 
latter will only be allowed in certain circumstances. 
There is however no consistency in the terms used to 
express these circumstances. Some judges refer to 
t a bsurditY',2 some refer to 'repugnance,.3 Closely 
. 4 
. ]Linked. to the latter term are the notions of 'anomaly', 
and 'inconsistency,.5 Some judges refer to 'inconvenience,6 
and some to 'injustice,.7 Whereas the above character-
istics are sometimes referred to simpliciter, at other 
times they are prefaced by an epithet such as 'obvious', 
, great' or 
. 8 
'manifest'. Clearly a reference to 'manifest 
absurdity' in a particular case is an example of ·absurdity. 
The question is, is this category restricted by necessary 
reference to the epithet?~ There is an ambiguity in the 
Uffi of the term 'manifest'. With some judges the term 
is used synonymously with 'great,.9 With others it 
1. Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Colleries (1940]AC 1014, 
1022. 
2. e.g. Grey v Pearson (1857) 6 HLC 106. 
e.g. Becke v Smith (1836) 2 M & W 191. 3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
948. 
227,233. 
743. 
e.g. Stock v Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd.[197811 AllER 
e.g. Parker C.B. in Mitchell v TorruE(17~) Park. 
e.g. River Wear Commissioners v Adamson (1877) 2AC 
e. g. Denver v Holmes 156 Colo. 586 cf. 1fhi teley v 
Chappell, LR 4 QB 149. 
8. e.g. Brown v The Russian Ship A'lina (1880) 42 LT 517; 
The Queen v Judge of the Ci ty of London Court [1892] 1 
QB 273; Becke v Smith loc.cit. 
9. See for example the use 'manifest absurdity' by Jessel 
~LR. in Brm.J'n v The Russian Ship Alina, loc.cit. See 
also the use of the term by Lord Esher in The Queen 
v Judge of the City of London Court loc.cit. 
refers to something demonstrable or obvious and is 
manifest from the terms of the Act itself. 10 
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The difference in terminology can be analysed in 
terms of a fact/value distinction. Fact jUdgements are 
: 
based on empirical o"bservation. They produce an impartial 
transcription of external realities. For example, the 
ascertainment of an inconsistency is a fact judgement 
since the inconsistency can be dis~erned from the terms 
of the Act. A value judgement on the other hand is 
. based on factors such as ,,,"orth, desirabil}ty and utility. 
The existence of these is not empirically observable 
but is ascertained subjectively. Thus, ,,,"here a judge 
refers to 'absurdity' he seems to be making a value 
judgement linked closely ',,"i th the reaso}!,.!.bleness of the 
1 1 
result. Similarly, reference to 'inc ',"\'enience' or 
1 injustice' involves some .evaluation of the consequences 
of a rule's application. 'Repugnancetseems to refer to 
an inconsistency or incompatibility within the Act, as 
do 'anomaly', 'incongruity' and 'illogicality'. The 
determination of their existence would therefore seem 
to bea factual matter determined by the content of "the 
Act itself. 
The fact/value distinction is sometimes put,in 
terms of an objective/subjective distinction. Those 
decisions that involve an analysis of consequences are 
called subjective while those decided on a factual basis 
10. See .for example the use of 'manifest absurdity' by 
ParkeB. in Becke v Smith loc.cit. 
11. For discussion of the meaning of absurdity see pp.140-1. 
belo,,,. Note that the Concise Oxford Dictionary 
defines 'absurdity' in terms of unreasonableness. 
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are called objective. But the comparison is not a 
perfect one. Generally speaking a subjective decision 
presupposes some element of evaluation. It is arguable 
ho,,,ever that not all evaluation is totally subjective. 
Indeed evaluation may connote a kind of psychological 
process - evaluative experience - or a kind of reasoning q 
The former is necessarily subjective, the latter is 
bl f b · b . t . 12 capa e 0 elng 0 Jec-lve. Nevertheless some Ie 
writers and judges condemn an attempt to formulate legal 
rules or principles whose content is broad evaluation. 
Thus Judge Story, the great American jurist of the 
nineteenth century, noted in his treatise on the 
Con:fld..ct of Laws: 
"Arguments dralvn from impolicy or inconvenience 
ought to have little Height. The only sound 
principle is to declare ita lex sculpta est, to 
follow and to obey. Nor if a principle so 
just could be overlooked, could there be well 
found a more unsafe.guide in practice, than mere 
policy and convenience. Nen on such subjects 
complexionally differ from each other; the same 
men differ from themselves at different times. 
The policy of one age may ill suit the wishes 
or policy of another. The lalv is not to be 
subject to such fluctuations." 13 
In terms of the golden rule expressions of 
inconvenience, injustice and even absurdity are vulnerable 
to this criticism. However it is debatable whether Judge 
Story's fears are well grounded. Basically, judges are 
conservative valuers with a strong tradition of decision 
making in terms of reasonableness and justice. The 
- above criticism could well be overstated. Nevertheless 
12. See Z. Najder 'Values and Evaluations' p. 173. 
13. Story 'Conflict of Laws' p. 17. This passage is cited 
by Sir Fortuna tus D'varris in hi s treatise on The 
Construction of Statutes (2nd ed). p. 597. 
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a recent analysis of 1 absurdity' questions both the 
desirability and the historical accuracy of using that 
term to refer to the consequences of an interpretation. 
Expressing his argument in terms of the objective/subjective 
I .: 14 
distinction, E.A. Driedger attempts to equate absurdity 
with repugnance orincdnsistency. "lhereas subj ecti ve 
~>. 
absurdity relates t6 consequence and is dependent on 
, 15 
the opinions and values of the reader, objective 
absurtJ-ity exists if what the legislature has said in one 
part of· an Act clashes with what the same legislature 
has said elsewhere. In Driedger's opinion, only an 
objective absurdity justifies departure from the primary 
meaning of statutory terms. The test is IIdoes the 
grammatical sense produce a result in one provision that 
is absurd in relation to another provision or in relation 
16 to the policy of the statute. 1I 
The basis of Driedger's proposition is an argument 
as to the historical inaccuracy of using absurd{ty in 
its subjective sense to justify departure from ordinary 
meaning. He supports his case by decisions both. prior 
and subsequent to the famous passage of Lord Wensleydale 
17 . in Grey v Pearson, but disregards the equally famous 
passage of Lord Blackburn in River1vear Commissioners 
18 
v Adamson. This he considers to be a misrepresentation 
of the existing state of law and totally ill-founded. 
-
His argument concludes with a statement of the golden 
14. E.A. Driedger, 'The Construction of Statutes'. 
15. Ibid. p. 31. 
16. Ibid. p. 131. 
17. loco cit. 
18. loco cit. 
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rule in entirely objective terms: 
"if the grammatical and ordinary sense is 
not in harmony with the rest of the instrument 
then a less grammatical and less ordinary 
sense may be t'aken." 19 
, 20 Sir Rupert Cross takes a different vie'l.v as to 
the meaning of 'ab 9urdity'. In his opinion, absurdity 
does mean something wider than repugnance or inconsistency. 
, 21 
It does cover absurd or unreasonable consequences. 
While noting the strength of Driedger's argu~ent, Cross 
concludes'that there, appear to be more dicta,according 
to which an absurdity sufficient to justify a departure 
from the ordinary meaning of statutory words need not be 
'in relation to the rest of the statute' than there are 
dicta to contrary effect. 
It is submitted that Cross's conclusion is the 
preferable one. There are cases where external 
consequences have been held so unreasonable as to justify 
the adoption of some secondary meaning. 22 To pote that 
Lord 'Blackburn misrepresented the golden rule in 1877 
may be correct, but it does not nullify subsequent 
decisions which have adopted the wider meaning of 
'absurdi ty' • It is too late to argue that the term should 
be restricted to internal inconsistencie~. 
It should be emphasised that the golden rule permits 
departUre from ordinary meaning only ,.,here the statutory 
words are capable of bearing some secondary, less usual 
19. E. A. Driedger op.cit. p.30. 
20. R. Cross, 'Statutory Interpretation'. 
21. Ibid. pp 81~84. 
22. For example see Richard Thomas &. Bald'vins Ltd. v 
Cummings [t 955J A.C. 321 t 334-5. in \fhich Lord Heid 
referred to "quite unreasonable results." 
142 
meaning. There must be some ambiguity or doubt as to 
meaning. In such a case. the reasonableness of the 
consequences of alternative constructions will be a 
proper consideration in'the assignment of meaning. 23 
Absurd consequences have !lever justified departure from 
the obvious,. unequiv()cal meaning of statutory , .. ords. 
But just as judges in borderline cases will sometimes 
disagree as to the .o~dinary meaning of words, so too 
they will sometimes disagree about the degree of doubt 
necessary to justify the adoption of a'secondary meaning. 24 
The matter is one for each individual judge to decide. 
As Lord Simonds has said: 2 .5 
"Each one of us has the task of deciding 
what the relevant words mean. In coming to 
that decision he will necessarily give great 
,,,,eight to the opinion of others, but if at the 
end of the day he forms his o\V'n clear judgement 
and does not think that the 'vords are 'fairly 
and equally open to diverse meanings' he is not 
entitled to say that there is an ambiguity. 
For him at least there is no ambiguity and 
on that basis he must decide the case." 
It seems that ambiguity in the sense of a word 
having more than one meaning will not necessarily be 
enough. 26 Lord Reid discusses this point in DPP v Ottewell. 
II • it only applies where after full 
inquiry and consideration one is left in 
real doubt. It is not enough that the 
proyision is ambiguous in the sense that 
it is capable of having t,vo meanings. The 
imprecision of the English language, and so 
far as I am aware of any other language, 
is such that it is extremely difficult to draft 
any provision 'vhich is not ambiguous in that 
23. per Lord Reid in Gartside v Inland Revenue Commissioners 
. [1968JA.C. 553 at 612. 
24. See R. Cross op.cit. p.77. 
2.5. In Kirkness v John Hudson &. Co. Ltd 1955 AC 696 at 712. 
26. [1970j AC 642 at p. 649. 
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sense. This section[s.37 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 19671is clearly ambiguous in 
that sense, the Court of Appeal (Criminal 
Division) attach one meaning to it, and your 
Lordships are attaching a different meaning 
to it. But if after full donsideration, your 
Lordships are satisfied, as I am, that the 
latter is a meaning which Parliament must 
have intended. the words to convey, then this 
principle does not prevent us from giving 
effect to our conclusion. 1I 
Should the court, after a full consideration of 
the Act, decide tha t the ,vords used by Parliament are 
clear and admit of only one meaning then that is the 
end of the matter. Unreasonable consequences arising 
from clear stat.utory words are the concern of Parliament 
and not the courts. As with all interpretation, the 
courts are bound by the clear 'vords Parliament has used. 
These cannot be altered merely to conform with a judge's 
conception of what Parliament ought to have said. Lord 
Reid again stated this ppint clearly in IRC v Hinchy:27 
U1{hat we must look for is the intention of 
Parliament, and I also find it difficult to 
believe that Parliament ever really intended 
the consequences ",hich flow from the appellants' 
contention. But ,..re can only take the intention 
of Parliament from the words which they have 
used in the Act, and therefore the question is 
whether these words are capable of a more limited 
construction. If not then we must apply them 
as they stand, however unreasonable and unjust 
the consequences, and however strongly we 
may suspect tha t this ,..ras not the real 
intention of Parliament. •• One is entitled 
and indeed bound to assume that Parliament 
intends to act reasonably and therefore to 
prefer a reasonable interpretation of a 
statutory provision if there is any choice. 
But I regret to say that I am unable to 
agree that this case leaves me with any choice." 
So too said Lord Greene in R.v Mohindar Sing-h: 28 
27. [1960J AC 748 at 767-8.· 
28. [I 950J AC 345. 
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"They (their Lordships) fully appreciate the 
importance of avoiding, so far as the words 
and context fairly and reasonably permit, a 
construction ,.;hich ,,rould lead to. • unreason-
able results. On the other hand 9 it is to be 
remembered that the desirability of avoiding 
such results must not be allowed to give 
to the language used a meaning which it cannot 
fairly and reasonably bear. If the 1 slature 
has used language which leads to such results 
it is for the court to give effect to it. 
The function of the court is interpretation, 
not legis1ction. The limits thus imposed on 
the court prevent the h.;isting of words and 
phrases into a sense they cannot fairly and 
reasonably bear." 
In Stock v Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd Lord Simon 
of Glaisdale discusses what the court is do in 
h . b . d d . 29 c oos1ng etween a pr1mary an secon ary mean1ng. 
"lihat the court is declaring is I Parliament 
has used words which are capable of meaning 
either X or Y; although X may be the primary, 
natural and ordinary meaning of the words, 
the purpose of the provision shows that the 
secondary sense, Y, should be given to the 
words. I So too when X produces injustice, 
absurdity, anomaly or contradiction. The 
final task of construction is still, as 
always, to ascertain the meaning of what 
that draftsman has said, rather than to ascertain 
what the draftsman mea.nt to say. But if· 
the draftsmanship is correct, these should 
coincide. So that if the words are capable 
of more than one meaning it is a perfectly 
legitimate step in construction to choose 
bet,,,een potential meanings by various tests 
(statutory, objective, justice, anomaly etc.) 
which thro,,, light on what the draftsman meant 
tv s'ay.·1" 
Thus we have seen that the consequences of a 
particular interpretation.are relevant in determining 
which of the competing meanings of a word or phrase is 
the one that ought to be applied. "'Ive have also seen 
that where the meaning of words is clear and unambiguous 
the consequences of their application are of no concern 
29. (1978J 1 All E.R. p. 948 at p. 953. 
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to the court .. Does this mean that in the latter case 
consequences are not considered at a11? It is submitted 
that this is not the case. In the following passage 
Sir Fortunatus Dwarris attempts to reconcile consideration 
of consequence with dicta that judges are to construe 
words according to their clear and grammatical sense 
wi thout regard for the consequences lvhich may stem from 
their interpretation: 
"The anSlITer is, that in the act of construction, 
and during the period and gestation of interpret-
ation, the consequences of any particular-
exposition~ will be most unexceptionably, and 
properly, considered and ,.;reighed, for the 
sake of avoiding absurdity; but that after the 
court has arrived at a determinate conclusion, 
what is the fit construction that the meaning 
and context require them to put upon an act 
of Parliament, the Judges have nothing to do 
with the consequences of their decision. In 
Reg. v The Justices of Lancashire (11 AeE 157), 
Patterson,. J. said, 'I cannot tell what 
consequences may result from the construction 
which we must put upon the statute; but if 
mischievous, they must be remedied by the -
Legislature'. In Rhodes v Smethurst (4}1ec &. 
W 63), Lord Abinger said fA court of law ought 
not to be influenced or governed by any notions 
of hardship: cases may require le slative 
interference, but Judges cannot modify the rules 
of law.' In Hall v Franklin ( & \V 259), 
Lord Abinger said: 'He have been strongly 
pressed with the inconveniences that may result 
from this construction of the statute. We are 
not insensible to them; but the only proper 
effect of that argUment, is to make the Court 
cautious in forming its judgement; we cannot 
on that account put a forced construction upon 
the act of Parliament.'" 30 
Interpretation in such cases could perhaps be 
described as 'reflexive interpretation. ,3 1 The unreason-
ableness of a proposed construction puts the court on 
notice that it is to be on the look out for some secondary 
30. Sir Fortunatus Dwarris in his treati~ on the construction 
of statutes. p. 595. 
31. Cf. reflexive equilibrium in John Rawls, 'Theory of 
Jus tice. ' 
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meanlng that the words can bear and which would avoid 
the absurdi Thus~ for examp e, Lord Reid said in 
~~d~~~_~~~~~_<,"~o-w,~ 
;3 2 
!tIn gencraJ_:; if it is aIle that a statutory 
sian brings about a result 1/hich is so 
startl ,one looks for some other possible 
me of the statute \4il.ich Viil1 avoid such 
a result~ because there is some presumptior: 
that Parliament does not intend its legislation 
to produce higbly inequitable results. 1I 
No j e could help but think of the practical 
application of the statute under his consideration. 33 Lord 
Denning has admitted to coneid specific instances 
in attempt to understand a statute. 34 Should quite 
unreasonable consequences adhere to a proposed construction 
the judge would reconsider the Act to see if the Ie slature 
actually said what at first sight it appears to have said. 35 
He 1.o[ould be on for some latent ambiguity within 
the act. In effect~ the judge reinterprets the 
statutory provision. If further consideration of the 
act reveals no doubt as to meaning then the alleged 
Parliamentary intention is conjecture only and ought 
not to be adopted. 
32. 953J AC 267 at p. 1 • 
33. .A. Driedger op.cit. p.66. 
34. See Lord Denning in Escoigne Properties Ltd v IRC o 958J 
1 All ER 406 at p. 41 4 • 
35" See e. g. Lord Reid in nartnell v Minis~ of Housing 
and Local Government []965]AC 1134 at p. 1'157. 
THE MISCHIEF RULE 
The mischief yule, as laid down in 
embodies both historioal and purposive approaches to 
interpretation. . Thus vJ"e hav'e seen it resembles b.'JO French 
approaches, Il'interpr~tation historique l and Iliinterpr/t-
.,. , I' I 1 ation teleo oglque c The former corresponds to the 
historical approach in that it seeks to ascertain Parlia-
mentary intent by reference to the historical backgiound 
of the legislation. The latter is of somewhat wider 
scope than the purposive approach and is pe 
to the equity of the statute idea. 2 
s closer 
Several Commonl'1!eal th countries have embodied the 
purposive approach in statutory form. 3 But the desirab-
ility of such statutory enactments is debatable. 4 
F. Bennion calls such provisions l1a statement of the 
obv-l ous 1\ 5 ,vhich he re 
. k , s as unnecessary w'hen the Act 
is clear and unhelpful when it is not. Certainly New' 
Ze 's Section S(j) has not been utilised to the extent 
that one might expect. Nevertheless the English ane 
Scottish Law Commissions favoured the adoption in the 
United Kingdom of an approach promoting the "general 
Ie slative purpose!! and included a provision to that 
effect in its proposed draft. Such a clause was also 
included in Lord Searman's recent Interpretation Bill. 
But whatev~r else the Lords thought of the Bill, thE:y 
1. See J.B. Farrar, 'Introduction to Legal Method' p.96 
for discussion of these French approaches. 
2. Ibid. p~97. 
" .J • 
4. 
For e, New Zealand's Section S(j). 
of this and other such sections see pp. 16 
See p. 219. 
5. F. Bennion 'Statute La1"'-', p. 81. 
For discussion 
170~ 
6 
certainly regarded this provision as unnecessary. 
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Heydon's Case was decided in 1584 and although it 
continues to be cited today the question arises of its 
relevance to modern society. Perhaps most immediately 
obvious is the archaism of its language. The La,,, Commiss-
ions were very aware, of' this and favoured a draft 
provision expressed in 'terms of 'general legislative 
purpose' rather than 'mischief', a term they regarded 
as having an archaic ring to the layman. 7 Furthermore, 
theybonsidered the word 'mischief' to suggest that 
legislation is only designed to deal with an evil and 
t t f th . t . . I' 8 no 0 ur er a POSl lve SOCla purpose. The Law 
, 
Commissions reservations were perhaps groundless. All 
legislation arises because its promoters consider the 
existing law to contain some defect or inadequacy.9 
And however laudable their concern for the layman might 
be, it is doubtful w'hether a layman ,,,ould ever read an 
Interpretation Act; lawyers on the other hand know 
precisely what 'mischief' means. 
A more important criticism is the allegation that, 
in its original form, the mischief rule reflects a differ-
10 
ent constitutional balance than would now be acceptable. 
This can be regarded in either one of hvo ways. Firstly, 
it can refer to the doctrine of separation of powers 
which developed later. Alternatively it could refer to 
the relationship between common law and statute as the 
6. See House of Lords debate 13th February 1980, Col. 
276-306. 
7. See Law Cnm. No. 21 p. 49 n. 177. 
8. Ibid. 
9. F. Bennion OPe cit. p.88. 
10. See Law Com. No. 21 p. 19. 
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primary source of law in fact. Heydon's Case assumes 
statute law to be subsidiary and supplemental to the 
. t· 1 11 eX1S lng common aWe D~.;arris in his treatise on 
the Construction of Statutes notes that from earliest times 
common law had been regarded as "the perfection of 
reason" and the "best birthright and noblest inheritance 
of the subject. 1I12 It is not surprising that in Heydon's 
Case the first step was to consider the existing rule 
at common law. As Coke said, 
11 to know ,,.,ha t the common law" was, before the 
making of the statute, whereby it may be seen 
whether the statute be introductory of new 
law, or only affirmative of the common law, 
is the very lock and key to set open the 
windoHs of the statute." 13 
Indeed", statutes were to be construed by reference to 
14 the principles of common law, for it was presumed that 
Parliament did not intend to change the common la,,, any 
further than was expressly provided for. In fact, the 
best interpretation was to construe a statute as near 
to the rule and reason of the common 1m" as possible, 
and by the course which the common law observes in other 
cases (1 p. Wms. 252; 2 Inst. 148, 307; 1 Sand 240)~ 
Thus, Dwarris notes,1 5 when a statute alters the 
common law the meaning is not to be strained beyond the 
words except in cases of public utility. Similarly, if 
a statute makes use of a word, the meaning of '"hich is 
well known and definite at common law, the word is to be 
-expounded and received in that same sense. 
11. Ibid. p.20. 
12. See Sir. F. Dwarris 'On the Construction of Statutes' 
p. 564. 
13.2 Inst. 301; 3 Rep. 31; 13 Hob. 83. 
14. See F. Dwarris OPe cit. p. 564. 
15. Ibid. p. 565. 
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The presumption against alterations in the 
common law continues today ,16 but carries less ,,,eight 0 
It is perhaps strongest in cases involving vested rights. 
The legislature h~~ assumed a much larger function as a 
source of law; a development largely from the nineteenth 
century onwards arid .?orresponding with the growth of 
departments of state and the civil service. The volume 
of legislation has increased vastly since the time of 
Heydon's Case and covers subjects not touched upon by 
the c'ommon law, for example. bankruptcy f town planning, 
social welfare and revenue law. A direction to consider 
the existing common law' is often irrelevant. In such 
cases 'common law' would be better replaced by 'pre-
existing statute la1"'. Or perhaps the old practice of 
regarding some ancient statutes as part of the common la1" 
could be extended to cover all statutes. 
Heydon's Case fails to lay down any clear test as 
to the significanc~ of the actual words used by·Parliament. 
Later authorities seem rather confused on this point. 
Sir F. Dwarris made the following comments in his 
consideration of the means by which a court is to deter-
mine the intention of Parliament: 17 
"As a primary rule, (the intention of Parliament) 
is to be collected from the words; when the words 
are not explicit, it is to be gathered from 
the occasion and necessity of the law, the 
defect in the former law and the designed 
remedy; being the causes which moved the 
legislature to enact it." 
16. See 'Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes' 
(12th ed.). p.116. 
17. F. Dwarris OPe cit. p. 562. 
The mischief rule was only to be applied in cases of 
ambigui ty t.o resolve that amb t 18 yo 1-,There the 
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statutory words were clear and unambiguous effect was 
to be given to th~~.Asimilar approach was adopted by 
Tindal, C.J. in the Sussex Pee~~~ Case; only if doubt 
arises from the terms used is lIthe ground and cause of 
the making of the st'atute1! to be called in aid in its 
construction. Both of these statements can be compared 
with that of Parke 'B. in the nineteenth century case of 
Lyde v __ Bernard. 19 Here Parke B. seems to be suggesting 
that the mischief can modify even plain words: 
"I admit that 'vords may be construed in a 
sense different from their ordinary one when 
the context requires it, or when the act is 
intended to remedy some existing mischief, 
and such a construction is required to render 
the remedy effectual. For we must always 
construe an act so as to suppress' the mischief 
and advance the remedy." 
The apparent contradiction between the approaches 
is nowadays resolved by Lord Simon I s speech in 1-1aunsell v 
Olins20 and his two-tiered approach to interpretation. 
A conflict between the statutory purpose and what would 
otherwise appear to be the plain meaning of ,,,ords may 
arise in Lord Simon's initial stage of interpretation. 
Arguably, such a conflict l"ould operate in a similar ,,,ay 
to the 'reflexive interpretation' situation discussed 
18. Cf. the American position as stated in Vol. 73 American 
Jurisprudence 2d p. 361; the mischief approach is 
applied in the construction of ambiguous statutes. 
See for example: US v Champlin Refining Co. 341 US 
290 95 LEd 949 71 SCt 715; Apex hosiery Co. v Leader 
310 US 469, 84 LEd 1311, 60 S Ct 982; Hennessy v 
~alker 279 NY 94, 17 NE 2d 782, 119 ALR 1029; Sun 
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v Unemployment Camp. Ed. 
of Review 358 Fa 224, 56 A2d 254. 
19.1 :tvI & If 113. 
20. Quoted above at Pp. 115-116. 
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above in relation to the:golden rule. It would put the 
court on guard to look for ambiguities in the legislative 
text. The court rnust'presume that Parliament intended 
to enact provisions consistent with the legislative 
purpose. In this re~pe~t the mischief and golden rules 
are related. The absurd or repugnant results that lead 
a court to depart from 'the primary meaning of' Hords are 
I absurd , or , repugnant , ·for the very reason that they are 
inconsistent with the supposed legislative intention. 
Presumably with this in mind the English and Scottish 
La1'; Commissions have stated that the golden rule lion 
closer examination turns out to be a less explicit form 
of the " h" f I ~21 m~sc ~e ru e. It is now clear, therefore, 
that the I1ground and cause of the making of the statute ll 
is referred to before deciding whether the statutory words 
are clear and unambiguous. The mischief rule has thus 
, 22 insinuated itself into the literal rule. 
It is alleged by some writers that the courts at 
the time of Heydon's Case took much greater liberties 
with the actual words of the statute than would be 
permissible today.23 Their approach was rationalised as 
the equity of the statute approach by Tudor lawyers. 
In fact, Heydon's Case represented a limitation of this 
freedom. Concentration was on ~he spirit of the statute 
but not necessarily at the expense of the letter. It is 
arguable that the extent of this earlier freedom is 
21. Law Com. No. 21 p. 19. 
22. R. Cross op.cit. p. 170. 
23. See for example E.A. Driedger' in IThe Construction of 
Statutes'. We have already mentioned this point 
briefly in the History section above. 
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sometimes overstated and the limitations imposed by 
Heyd£n's Cas~ unnoticBd •. Prior to this case the courts 
were prepared to take greater latitude in the interpretation 
, 24 
of statutes when these were "ill pend"., This latitude 
in interpretation was to correct obvious drafting errors. 
It would be a mist~k~ to infer that this approach was 
. . 
very common, the impression given by Driedger. 25 It is 
fallacious to argu~th~t because there are some examples 
and these can be described as involving old statutes, 
that the judges in the i~terpretation of old statutes 
adopted such an approach. It is interesting that Driedger 
seems to rely for this part of his' book on J.A. Corry, 
whose wide-ranging article is reproduced in his appendix. 
Be that as it may, it is certainly true that modern 
examples of courts tampering with the letter of a statute 
in pursuit of the spirit are few and far between. Courts 
today regard themselves as more confined by the actual 
words used. They regard their function as primarily, 
almost exclusively, circumscribed by those words. 
In essence, the mischief approach enjoins a court 
to look to the object or purpose of an act and to construe 
doubtful passages in accordance with that purpose. At 
the time of ;Heydon's Case -the "four-corners ll rule prevailed. 
As Lord Diplock explains in Black Cla\.,rson, when the 
mischief rule was first propounded the judges needed to 
look no further than the Act itself: 
24. To use the words of Cok~s 'Institutes'. For example, 
the Statute of Gloucester (6 Edw.l, c.11) referring to 
London ,.,ras held to have intended to include all cities 
and boroughs equally, London having been named simply 
for pre-eminence - Cokes Instmtutes Vol.l, pt.2, p.J22. 
25. See E.A. Driedger op.,cit. p.58. 
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"Statutes in the sixteenth century and for long 
thereafter in addition to the enacting words 
contained lengthy preambles reciting the 
particular mischief or defect in the common 
law , that the enacting l<Jords '<Jere designed to 
remedy. So, when it vIas laid dO''1n, the 
'mischief! rule did not require the court to 
travel beyond the actual words of the statute 
itself to identify 'the mischief and defect 
for which the common lal<J did not provide', 
for this would have been stated in the preamble. 
It ,,<[as a rule of construction of the actual 
words appearing in the statute and nothing 
else. In construing modern statutes which 
contain no preambles to serve as aids to the 
construction of enacting words the 'mischief' 
rule must be used with caution to justify any 26 
reference to extraneous documents for this purpose. 1I 
Today, evidence of purpose is not always apparent from 
the face of the Act. Adoption of a purposive approach 
raises the question of how far beyond the Act the court. 
can go' in determining what that purpose is. Lord Dipl6ck 1 s 
passage illustrates the hesitance with which some courts 
approach extrinsic materials. By no means all are 
permitted as evidence of Parliamentary intention.' The 
reasons for and consequences of this rule of exclusion 
will be discussed fully below. It only remains here 
to say that the effectiveness of the mischief rule,· 
and indeed of the various statutory enactments of a 
purposive approach, depend greatly on the availability 
of reliable evidence of legislative policy. 
26. Black Clawson (j975]AC 591 at 638. 
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CHAPTER X 
THE CANONS: MODERN ACADEMIC REFORMULATION 
An examination of the traditional canons shows 
that they basically_embody two approaches to interpret-
ation, literal and purposive. 1 The golden rule contains 
aspects of b9th but essentially adopts a literalist 
approach. The history of our law on interpretation of 
statutes really consists of a battle between these two 
2 
rival schools of thought. Both approaches purport to 
give effect to the intention of Parliament. The 
difference lies in the means by which they ascertain 
this supposed intention. The literalist school stresses 
the statutory words. These are the vehicle used by 
Parliament to express its intention and, ,.;here these 
words are cl:ear, effect must be given to them. The 
purposive school, on the other hand, may look beyond the 
words to 1.;ha t Parliament meant to do. It then seeks to 
give effect to the object or purpose of the legislation • 
. -" ~ 
Changes have occurred in both approaches as judges become 
increasingly aware of the importance of context in 
ascertaining meaning. And with these changes .the once 
diverse approaches begin to merge. The ordinary meaning 
1. This is qui te different from the distinc tion betw"een 
strict and liberal interpretations. A literal interpret-
ation need not give rise to a narrow or strict interpret-
ation; nor does a purposive interpretation necessarily 
give rise to a liberal one. 
2. See Lord Hailsham LC in House of Lords Deb. 13th Feb. 
1980 Cols. 301-2. 
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of 90rds will now be determined only after the statute 
has been read as a whole in its appropriate context • 
. The purpose or object of a statute is now commonly 
regarded as part of that appropriate context. It is a 
small step to argue 'that ordinary meaning must accord 
with statutory purpose. This of course differs from the 
view adopted in Sussex Peerage, and still held by some 
today,3 that consideration of the statutory purpose.only 
becomes relevant if the statutory words are 'unclear.' 
s view is to be contrasted with that of Lord Simon in 
MLaunsel1 v Olins who makes it clear that purpose is 
relevant at a more fundamental stage; that of deciding 
whether the statutory words are in fact clear at all. 
The great difficulty experienced today in reconciling 
judicial statements on interpretation arises because 
these can no longer be pigeon-holed into three isolated 
categories (subject of course to the comments already 
made concerning the golden rule). To attempt to do so 
only gives rise to confusion. The three 'approaches' are 
relevant only from their historidal perspective. Some 
modern academics have recognised this change and have 
. attempted a reformulation of the rules of interpretation. 
We will consider two such reformulations, those ofE.A. 
Driedger and R. Cross. 
Driedger's thesis accords with what has already 
been said, that the literal, golden and mischief approaches 
no longer exist as separate entities; in ,his view they 
3. For example see Lord Dilhorne in House of Lords Deb. 
13th Feb. 1980. Col. 298. 
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4 
merely express different-aspects of the same process. 
There is no"" only one approach to interpretation claims 
Driedger. The words of an act are to be read in their 
grammatical and ordinary senses and harmoniously with 
the scheme of the act, the object of the act and the 
. 5 intentions of Parlia]Jlent. This approach is essentially 
a literal one, but literal in total context, Consider-
ation of context becomes an integral part of ascertaining 
the literal meaning of·iVords; words only acquire this 
meaning through the use in specific cOlitexts. In 
detail, the steps to be followed in interpreting a 
particular provision are as follow~: 
"1) The Act as a whole is to be read in its 
entire context so as to ascertain the intention 
of Parliament (the law as expressing or 
impliedly enacted by the words), the object 
of the Act (the ends sought to be achieved), 
and the scheme of the Act (the relation 
between the individual provisions of the 
Act). 
2) The "lvords of the individual provisions to 
be applied to the particular case under 
consideration are then to be read in their 
grammatical and ordinary sense in the light 
of the intention of Parliament embodied in 
the Act as a whole, the object of the Act 
and the scheme of the Act, and if they are 
clear and unambiguous and in harmony ,,,i tJ:1 
that intention, object and scheme and with 
the general body of the law- , that is the end. 
3) If the words are apparently obscure or 
ambiguous, then a meaning that best accords 
with the intention of Parliament, the object 
of the Act and the scheme of the Act, but 
one that the w6rds are unreasonably capable 
of bearing, is to be given them. 
4) If, notiVithstanding that the words are clear 
·and unambiguous when read in their grammatical 
and ordinary sense, there is disharmony 
within the statute or statutes in pari 
materia, then a less grammatical or less 
4. See E.A. Driedger tThe Construction of Statutes t 
pp. 61-62. 
5. Ibid. p. 67. Judicial expression of this principle is 
to be found in Victoria City v BiRhop of Vancouver Island U92U AC 384 per Lord Atkinson p. 387. 
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ordinary meaning that "viII produce harmony 
is to be giv~n the words if they are 
reasonably capable of be that meaning. 
5) If obscurity, arnb ty or disharmony cannot 
be resolved objectively by reference to the 
intention of Parliament, the object of the 
Act. or the scheme of the Act, then a meaning 
that appears to be the most reasonable 
may be se'lected •• II 6 
Sir Rupert Cross, in his book 'Statutory Interpret-
ation\ supports Driedger's contention that the three 
traditional canons have been fused. 7 He does not however 
8 
accept Driedger's reformulation of the golden rule and 
on this .Cross's view has been preferred in Chapter IX. 
According to Cross the common academic practice of treating 
cases as illustrations of one or more of these three 
canons is not supported by the authorities. Rather., it 
is now an accepted fact that 
lithe 'grammatical and ordinary sense of the 
words' means those senses after due allowance 
has been made for the context. The 'context' 
includes the object of the statute. The 
'mischief' rule bas insinuated itself into 
the literal rule. 'Some absurdity' is broader 
than 'some repugnance or inconsistency with 
the rest of the instrument'; it includes a 
construction which leads to 'quite unreason-
able results'." 9 
In his attempt to reconcile the authorities, Cross 
sets out wlrt he considers to be the basic rules of 
interpretation: 
111) The judge must give effect to the ordinary, 
or, ""here appropriate, the technical 
meaning of words in the general context of 
the statute; he must also determine the 
,extent of general words with reference to 
that context. 
2) If the judge considers that the application 
6. Ibid. pp. 81-82. 
7. R. Cross 'Statutory Interpretation' p. 169. 
8. Ibid. p. 169. 
9. Ibid. p. 170. 
3) 
4) 
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of the words in their ordinary sense would 
produce an absurd result which cannot 
reasonably be supposed to have been the 
intention of the legislature, he may apply 
them in any secondary meaning Hhich they 
are capable of bearing. 
The judge may read in words 1",hich he 
considers to. be necessarily implied by 
words 1-Thich are already in the statute 
and he has a limited power to add to, 
alter 6~ ·ignore statutory words in order 
to prevent a provision from being unin-
telligible or absurd or totally unreason-
able, unworkable or totally irreconcilable 
with the rest of the statute. 
In applying the above rules the judge may 
resort to (various aids to construction 
and presumptions).11 10 
It is submitted that the above reformulations are 
preferable to the traditional three-fold statement of 
the rules of statutory interpretation. Their recognition 
of the essential role of context and of the interrelation 
between the various approaches has much to recommend it 
from a linguistic point of vieH. Moreover, as we shall 
see in Part C, they more accura'~ly reflect current 
judicial practice than does the old categoii~ation. 
1 0 • Ib i d • P • 43. 
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CHAPTER XI 
THE PRESlliPTIONS 
Qui te apart f"rom the canons of construction 
d±scussed above, the final decision of a court may be 
'greatly influenced by various presumptions of intent. 1 
The juridical nature of presumptions has been discussed 
2 
above. It may be concluded that no one analysis can 
"be stated ,vi th complete accuracy due to the great 
diversity of individual presumptions. Bearing this in 
mind it may be noted that the presumptions in some. way 
point to a presumed Parliamentary intention, that is, 
an attributed intention. E.A. Driedger has called the 
presumptions lI external sources of Parliamentary intent. n3 
More accurately they are external sources of continuing 
Parliament intent as they are rebuttable by the express 
words of the statute. Thus whatever label we care to 
refer to them by, presumptions always relate in some way 
4 to the burden of proof. Legislation is made within a 
framework of social and' economic values ,,,hich, in the 
absence of an express indication to the contrary, it is 
assumed Parliament intended to respect. 5 Hart and Sack.s 
have equated presumptions with principles of social 
relations and have called them "a distillation of the 
experience and wisdom of the society.1I 6 As social values 
1. See La,,, Com. No. 21 p.21. 
2. See p.97. 
3. E.A. Driedger 'The Construction of Statutes' p.137. 
4. R. Cross 'Statutory Interpretation' p.142. 
5. Law Com. No. 21 p.21. "" 
6. H. Hart (Jr) & A. Sacks 'The Legal Process' (tentative 
edition) p.1240. 
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change, so too will particular presumptions, even to the 
extent of being totally abandoned by the courts. 7 
Many presumptions are applied almost unconsciously 
in the process of interpretation. Such presumptions 
embody fundamental principles of communication and the 
legal system. They apply even ,,,here there is no question 
'of linguistic ambiguity. 8 R. Cross has called the~ 
"presumptions of general application" .. The principles 
they embcMiy are illustrated in detail in various of the 
more specific presumptions. ,The presumption of normal 
usage would be one such presumption of general application. 9 
It is presumed that the author of a document has followed 
the established conventions of language to him and his 
audience. More specifically, that he has used his words 
in s ens es normal or usual for the subj ect to ,"hich the 
statute is addressed .. 10 A further basic presumption is 
that a statute has a single true meaning which approximates 
with the legislative intent. 11 Hart and Sac~s identify 
yet another such presumption; that the court "should 
assume, unless the contrary unmistakeably appears, that 
the legislature was made up of reasonable persons pursuing 
12 
reasonable purposes reasonably.1I They add that the 
court should also ftpresume conclusively that these 
persons, whether or not entertaining concepts of 
reasonablelless shared by the courts, were trying 
7. Law Com. No. 21 p.21. 
8. R. Cross op.cit. p. 143. 
9. See R. Dickerson 'The Interpretation and Application 
of Statutes', p. 223. 
10. Compare this with general question of linguistic 
register - see above pp 
11. R. Dickerson op.cit. p.225. 
12. Hart & Sacks op.cit. P o1415o 
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responsibly and in good faith to discharge their 
consti tutional pOlvers.' and duties. II 1 J 1{e could call this 
14 
a presumption of reasonableness and fidelity to duty. 
A final illustration is one peculiar to prescriptive 
documents; that the legislature has taken account of the 
rest of the legal.orcler and has tried to integrate the 
statute with it fai~ly:and rationally.1 5 
The general body of presumptions is expressed in 
far more detail than those above. They can be broadly 
telassified into t1vo groups; those relatirg to form and 
those relating to substance. The former relate to 
questions of language, grammar, syntax and logic. The 
latter are more specifically 'legal' in nature.· All are 
devised for application in the doubtful case. 1"hile 
giving illustrations of the two categories, it is in no 
way proposed to give a full account of their contents. 
16 This has been done more than adequately elsewhere. 
The presumption of formal consistency17 falls 
under the first head. It is presumed that the draftsman 
has not varied his terminology unless he has changed his 
meaning and vice versa. Obviously the strength of this 
presumption will vary greatly from case to case, bearing 
more weight where the statute as a whole appears to have 
been carefully drafted and is generally consistent in 
I t d t . t· 1 8 L . k . th auguage, arrangemen an punc ua lone 1 eWlse ere 
13. Ibid. p.1415. 
14. R. Dickerson, op.cit. p.226. 
15. See E. Crawford 'The Construction of Statutes' Ch.XXII 
(1940 - St. Louis). 
16. See for example discussion of the presumptions in 
'Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes'. 
17. See E.A. Driedger op.cit. pp. 74-75. 
18. R. Dickerson op.cit. p. 225. 
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is the presumption that one part or the statute is not 
intended to contradict another part of the same statute. 19 
This presumption R. ckerson notes to be based on the 
observed fact that inconsistency almost always frustrates 
rather than advances human purposes. It is therefore 
rooted in an even more basic presumption, that the 
" 
statute expressed an immediate, coherent purpose'that 
, 
in turn implements broader or more remote pu~poses. 
Principles such as ejusdem generis, noscitur a 
sociis, expressio .. unius eSt exclusio al tcrius and generalia 
specialibus r:on derogarit have sometimes been classified 
under the general linguistic presumption that words 
take meaning rrom the: context. 20 It is doubtful 1.;rhether 
they should be classified as presumptions at all -
Behnion calls them maxims and distinguishes them from 
t . 21 presump 10ns. According to him they embody canons of 
construction applicable to any type of prose and are 
based mainly on 10 22 c. However classified, it is clear 
that they are neither legal rules nor legal principles. 
lviore probably they are general rules of language , although 
R. Cross points out that it is hardly even correct to 
label them thus. 23 To him they simply refer to the way 
in 1vhich people speak in certain contexts and are no more 
than 'rough guides' to the intention of the speaker or 
writer. 
19. Ibid. p. 224 • 
. 20. See for example 1'1. Zander 'The La1-l-Making Process I, 
p. 83. 
21. F. Bennion I Sta tute Law' pp. 83, 8l~. 
22. Ibid. p. 83. 
23. R. Cross, opocit. p. 115. 
16L~ 
Finally there are presumptions, which relate to 
the substance of legal rules. There is the presumption 
against interference with vested rights. And as a 
particular facet of this, there is fue presumption that 
an Act should not be given retrospective effect. There 
is the presumption that jurisdcition of the court should 
not be ousted, that an Act should accord with international 
law and treaty obligations and that there should be no 
crime without a guilty mind. Numerous other examples 
could be given. Many of~ these presumptions are subject 
to exceptions. For instance, where an Act is declaratory 
in nature, the presumption against construing it retro-
t " 1 ." I" bl 24]\1 flO t "th h spec 1ve y 1S 1napp 1ca e. any con 1C W1 eac 
other in relation to particular enactments. Even 
the content of some is doubtful today; is it necessarily 
beneficial to modern society that taxing statutes be 
strictly construed?25 
Perhaps the principal criticism of presumptions 
as a guide to interptetation is that the courts are in 
26 
no way effectively bound by them. The Report of the 
Law Commissions sets out four reasons for this : 
n(a) There is no established order of precedence 
in the case of conflict between the different 
(b) 
(c) 
presumptions. 
The individual presumptions are often of 
doubtful status or imprecise scope. 
A court can give a decision on the meaning 
of a statute which conflicts with a particular 
presumption without referring to presumptions 
of intent at all. The possibility for the 
court to decide in the first place that 
the meaning is clear enables it to exclude 
24. See 'Craies Statute Law' (1971) p.387. 
25. See F. Bennion op.cit. p. 85. 
26. Law Com. No. 21 p.21. 
165 
altogether any operation of a presumption. 
(d) There is no accepted ,test for resolv,ing 
a conflict between a presumption of intent, 
such as the pre ion that penal 
statutes should be construed restrictively, 
and giving effect to the purpose of a 
statute (the 'mischief' of Heydon's Case), 
for example, the purpose of factory legis-
lation to securesafe ,vorking conditions. II 27 
Note that in relation to this last ~oint, Cross has 
questioned whether the possibility of conflicting 
presumptions (leaving aside that for strict construction 
of penal statutes) presents any great practical diffic-
It ' 28 1U leSe He also notes that the presumptions could not 
be arranged in any hierarchy because their strength is 
so largely dependant on the particular facts of each 
individual case. 29 They are merely 'pointers' to a 
conclusion, not rules obliging a judge to reach a 
certain conclusion. 
If merely 'pointers' to a p~articular intention, 
then the question arises of how the traditional canons 
of construction differ in status from the presumptions. 
They are not rules and in no ''lay bind a judge to follow 
them. They are merely approac~e,s to interpretation which 
have been adopted from time to time with more or less 
judicial approval.... They too have been described as 
'pointers' to statutory meaning. 30 Bennion has in fact 
described the literal, golden and mischief approaches in 
terms of presumption. 31 The bnly distinction between the 
t,vo is some"IVhat subtle and relates to their non-application. 
27. Ibid. p. 22. 
28. R. Cross, op.cit. p. 144. 
29~ Ibid. p. 144. 
30. See Lord Reid in :tvIaunsell v Olins [1975JAC 373, 382. 
31. F. Bennion op.cit. p. 84. 
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While presumptions are generally said to be rebuttable 
by clear evidence that a contrary intent applies, it is 
a rather strained use ~language to refer to a canon 
being 'rebutted' in this way. Rather, a court simply 
chooses not to apply a particular canon or canons 
largely because of its own view as to what best accords 
with the Parliamentary intent. 
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CHAPTER XII 
SECTION 5(j) AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CANONS 
Section 5(j) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1924 
is often said to be legislative enactment in modern 
1 language of the mischief approach. It provides as follows: 
"Every Act, and every provision or enactment 
thereof, shall be declared remedial, w"hether its 
immediate purport is to direct the doing of 
anything Parliament deems to be for the public 
good or to prevent or punish the doing of" 
anything it deems contrary to the public good, 
and shall accordingly receive such fair, large 
and liberal construction and interpretation 
as will best ensure the attainment of the object 
of the Act and of such provision or enactment 
according to its true intent," meaning and spirit.1! 
The origin of the particular ,-lording is obscure o 
It appears to have been taken from the Canadian Revised 
Acts 1886 c. 1 s. 7. Some of the wording resembles 
some Canadian cases on construction of constitutional 
law but surprisingly there is no Canadian literature on 
it, although in a slightly revised form it is still 
contained in s.11 of the Federal Interpretation Act 
1967-68 c.7. The Canadian Abridgement makes no reference 
to it and there is no discussion in E.A. Driedger's 
'Construction of Statutes'. 
The section originally appeared in Ne\v Zealand 
in the Interpretation Act 1888 section 5(7). It was re-
enacted in section 6(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act 
1908 and then in 1924 as section 5(j). 
1.See for example D.A.S. Ward in his article 'A Criticism 
of the Interpretation of Statutes in New Zealand Courts' 
[1963] NZLJ 293 at 294. 
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In its terms the section abolishes the old 
distinction between r~medial and non-remedial legislation 
by deeming all legislation to be remedial e The 
sigri:ficance of this 1vas i that at common law remedial 
statutes were to be con~trued liberally, whereas certain 
other statutes, such. as penal and taxing statutes, were 
to be strictly construed. The section then goes on to 
use rather tautologous language reminiscent of a North 
American constitution ~hen it states that every Act shall 
receive Hsuch fair, large and liberal ll ccnstruction as 
will best assure the attainment of its object. To this 
extent section 5 (j) adopts a purpo'si ve approach. 
Professor J.F. Burrows 2 has mentioned that whereas it 
is easy to see that IIfair ll means something different 
from IIlarge and liberal", it is not easy to see a 
difference between "large If and IIliberal ll which are 
synonyms. This direction to give a Iflarge and liberal lf 
interpretation he considers to be an injunction to give 
words a sense other than their most natural one where 
this is necessary to effectuate the statutory or 
provisional object. 3 The word "fair" probably refers 
to the construction of the relevant provision and not 
to the result of the construction. 4 In other words it 
merely emphasises that a court must not put a meaning 
on the words of a section which those words cannot 
reasonably bear. The section ends 1vi th a reference to 
3. 
4. 
In his article 'The Cardinal Rule of Statutory Inter-
pretation in New Zealand I (1969J 3 NZLR 253. 
Ibid. p. 266. 
See 1Hlson, J. in Union }1otors Case [T 964] NZLR 146 at 150. 
sion 
Again, this final wo~d is It 
is clear, however t one must start by disc 
the statutory object and then interpret all doubtful 
words so as to c rm 'td th tha t ect" 
Section 5(j)~as been on the statute book for 
nearly one hundred years ~ yet its eff'ect on the interpret-
ation of statutes in New Zealand is very conjectural. 
Professor Burrows has id~ntified two t es, 1910-1920 
and the 1960's, when the section has been applied more 
regularly.. '{hile compiling the survey contained in 
Part C of this thesis, the impression was left that~ 
,.".hile Section 5 (j) , .. as not necessariJ.)r cited frequent 
the principles embodied in that section were probably 
in the minds of the judges. To this extent the section 
could well be regarded as an attempt to give definitive 
expression in statutory form of the correct judicial approach. 
The cases in h'hich the section has been considered are 
. fully deal t '\vi th elsewhere 5 and it is unnecessary to 
repeat the analysis here. 
As Haslam, J. has pointed out,6 the section offers 
no assistance until the intention of the Ie slature has 
first been ascertained. It is silent on the question of 
'-That extrinsic evidence, if any 9 is permissible to 
determine this intention. In this respect section 5(j) 
5. See J.P. Burrows op.cit& 
6. In Nunns v. Licens~n,'; Control Comm?,;ssio:l:!; 0967] NZLR 
76 'at 78" 
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should be compared with section 19 of Ghana's Interpret-
ation Act which attempts to meet this deficiency. 
Section 19 reads as follows: 
11(1) For the purpose of ascertaining the mischief 
and defect which any enactment was made 
. ( 2) 
to cure and as an aid to the construction 
of the enactment a court may have regard 
to any textbook or other work of reference, 
to the report of any commission of inquiry 
into the state of the la"lv-, or any memorandum 
published by authority in reference to 
the enactment or to the Bill for the 
enactment and to any papers laid before the 
National Assembly in reference to it, 
but not to the debates in the Assembly • 
The aids to construction referred to in 
this section are in addition to any other 
accepted aid. 1I 
The relationship of section 5(j) to the traditional 
common la,,, approaches to interpretation is also obscure. 
The influence of English textbooks with their exposition 
of these traditional approaches has certainly been a 
conservative influence on New Zealand judges in the past. 
The common law approaches all seem to continue to exist 
although it is arguable that section 5(j) should have 
priority by reason of its legislative character. A 
possible argument that it is not a proper subject for 
legislation is really off the point. Impropriety per 
se does not invalidate Ie slation. 
CHAPTER XIII 
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CONTEXT AND 
THE EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE EXCLUSION RULE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
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A recurr theme has appeared throughout this 
thesis; that without p~oper regard for context the courts. 
cannot hope to make an accurate appraisal of statutory 
meaning. The relevance of statutory context is not 
necessarily a ground for its legal admissibility, however. 
The common law rUlesgoverning the admissibility of 
atatutory context as evidence of the legislative 
intention are often irrational and incoherent. To some 
extent the New Zealand Acts Interpretation Act has 
improved upon the common law position, but many of the 
problems still remain. We will now consider the rules 
governing the admissibility of intrinsic and extrinsic 
materials currently in force in Ne\v Zealand. Because 
r these rules have been adequately covered else,,;here only 
a brief account of them \vill be given here. The main 
concern of this chapter will be the underlying policy 
issues and reform proposals. 
II. THE PRESENT POSITION 
(1) Internal Context 
It hardly needs repeating that statutes are a 
communication between Parl::'ament and the various audiences 
1. For full discussion see R. Cross 'Statutory Interpret-
ation' and E.A. Driedger 'The Construction of Statutes'. 
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to which the statutes are addressed. The general rules 
and principles ot~ communication apply to their interpret-
ation. Various so-called legal maxims, for example 
noscitur a sociis; ejusdem generis and expressio unius 
est exc1usio alterius t are in fact general principles 
2 I 
of language and may affect the meaning of doubtful words 
or phrases. The first'tw'o in particular are merely an 
aspect of the general rule that words derive clear mean-
ing from their context - the meaning of a word is 
influenced by the other ,-lords ,.;i thwhich it -is ass9cia ted 
(noscitur a sociis), and, more specifically, general 
words may be restricted to the sam'e genus as the specific 
words that precede them (ejusdem generis). This general 
rule about context is perhaps the most important linguistic 
rule or principle affecting the interpretation of 
statutes. The courts have stressed on numerous occasions 
that an Act must be read as a whole.) Although regard 
for the immediate statutory context alone would probably 
not satisfy the semanticist, it will often help the court 
to resolve the nncertainty with which it is faced. It 
will however be of more use in some cases than in others, 
as Lord Reid notes in IRC v HinChy4: 
4. 
"It is no doubt true that every Act should be 
read as a whole, but that is, I think, because 
one assumes that in drafting one clause of a 
bill the draftsman had i'n mind the language 
and substance of the other clauses, and attributes 
to Parliament a comprehension of the whole Act. 
See p. 163. 
See for example, Fair, J. 
~938JNZLR 885 at 913. 
U9bO]AC 748, 766. 
in United Insurance Co Ltd. 
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But where, as here, quite· inco'ngruous provisions 
are lumped together and it is impossible to 
suppose that anyone, draftsman or Parliament, 
ever considered one nf these sections in the 
light of another J I think it would be just as 
misleading to ba~ conclusions on the different 
language of different sections as it is to 
base conclusions on the different language of 
sections in different Acts. 1i 
The meaning of ,-,ords may of course be affected by 
the inclusion of a statutory definition section. These 
usually take one of two forms; either a particular word 
~shall mean' something or it ! shall include· t something. 
l{here the former is used, the meaning indicated will 
prevail over any ordinary meaning that may otherwise 
have been indicated by the context. If the latter 
formulation is used, the meaning indicated will apply 
together with any ordinary meaning indicated by the 
context. 
Clearly, to read an Act flas a \vhole" involves a 
consideration of the enacting provisions. The question 
is, does it also involve a consideration of the non-
enacting parts of a statute, the title, preamble, headings, 
etc.? As these may provide some evidence of intention, 
arguably they should be considered in resolving the 
.uncertainty. As we have already noted, however, relevance 
does not always determine admissibility. A body of 
common law has developed which excludes many such non-
enacting parts of the statute ·from consideration. In 
New Zealand, the Acts Interpretation Act governs the 
admi~sib~lity of some, but not all these ~tems. 
Section 5(e) declares the preamble to be available 
lito assist in explaining the purport and object of the Act." 
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This enacts the common laH" position. 5 No mention is 
made of the title but at common law this may be used as 
a guide to interpretation. 6 This common la'\T practice 
continues to apply in New Zealand. 7 However while at 
, 
common law the preamble and title could both be looked 
at to resolve an unc~rtainty, they could not be used 
"to affect the otherwise clear words of an Act. It has 
been pointed out by J.F. Burrows that section 5(j) of 
the Acts Interpretation Act seems implicitly to reverse 
" " "8 
this rule in New Zealand. 
Section 5(f) states that the headings of any 
parts of an Act II shall be deemed • • to be part of the 
Act, but the said headings shall not affect the inter-
pretation of the Act. II This can be compared '\Ti th the 
common law position ,\There headings can be used to 
resolve an ambiguity in the body of the Act. Recently 
it has become do~btful whether headings should not play 
an even greater role at common law. In DPP v Schildkamp9 
Lord Upjohn, supported by Lord Reid, considered headings 
to be part of the general context which is relevant in 
determining even the scope of words which appear 
unambiguous '\Then read by themselves. 
Section 5(g) states that marginal notes shqll not 
5. See A.G. v Prince Ernest Augustus of' Hanover [J957]AC 
436. See also DPP v Schildkamp [1971J AC 1. The preamble 
can be looked at as part of the general context even 
'\Then there is no apparent ambiguity. 
6. For judicial statement of rule concerning titles see 
Donovan,J. in R v Bates 0952J2 All ER 842 at p.844. 
7. See for example United Motors Ltd v Motor Spirits 
Licensing Authority [1964] NZLR 146 at 151. 
8. See J.F. Burrows, 'The Cardinal Rule of Statutory Inter-
pretation in New Zealand' [j 969J 3 NZLR 253 at p. 257. 
9. loco cit. 
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be deemed to be part of an Act. This corresponds with 
t 1 'to 10 he common aw POS1 10n. Since they are not to be 
considered part of the Act, they cannot influence the 
sense or scope of statutory words. Their utility lies 
solely in their function as a visual guide to the 
contents of an Act. 11 
Section 5(h) deems every Schedule and Appendix 
to be part of the Act in which it is contained. 
again enacts the common law position. 
Nothing is mentioned of punctuation in the Act. 
Presumably the common la,v position continues to apply. 
This has been called "one of the more bizarre rules of 
statutory interpretation. n12 Namely, punctuation is to 
be disregarded in the construction of statutes. Whether 
in fact this is possible in practice is debatable. "Correct 
punctuation can lead the mind of the reader to the 
grammatical construction intended by the dra':ftsman, 
just as incorrect, too much or too little, can lead him 
astray. Punctuation may therefore have a subconscious 
as ,,,ell as conscious influence on the mind of the reader. II 13 
(2) External Context 
A literal construction is concerned primarily with 
the words of a statute; the intention of Parliament 
is to be discovered from those words. A judge adopting 
such an approach therefore would most likely end his 
considerations of context ona he had read the act as a whole. 
10. See A.G. v Great Eastern Railway Co.(1879) 11 Ch.D.449. 
11. ~.A. Driedger op.cit. p. 109. 
12. N. Zander 'The La'tv-Making Process' p.59. 
13. E.A. Driedger op.cit. p.l09. 
A few, unfortunately; would not even go so far as this. 
A court adopting a mischief or purposive approach on 
the other hand may decide to look outside the statute to 
determine Parliam~ritls intention if it is unable to 
determine that intentioh from the act itself. The extent 
to which it can consider evidence of intention from 
~ !" 
outside the act is ~trictly limited however. A body of 
common law rules has grown up 1vhich determines the 
admissibility of such evidence. These rules may make 
the d~fference b~tween helping and hindering a court 
to discover the true intention of Parliament. 
The follo1dng discussion of' the admissibility 
of extrinsic evidence will be divided under three heads; 
general background, legal background and legislative 
history. 
Ca) General Background. As Lord Denning says: 
"A statute is not passed in a vacuum, but in 
a framework of circumstances, so as to give a 
remedy for a known state of affairs. To arrive 
at its true m~aning, you should know the 
circumstances with reference to 'l.vhich the 'vords 
were used; and what was the object appearing 
from those circumstances, which Parliament 
had in view. • but how are the courts to 
know w;hat were the circumstances with reference 
to which the words ,vere us ed? And what ,vas 
the object Par£iament had in view? • All 
that the courts can do is to take judicial 
notice of the previous state of the law and of 
other matters generally known to well 
informed people." 14 
The historical sett of a statute might be of 
assistance in its interpretation. The historical 
14. per Lord Denning in Escoigne Properties v IRe [1958J 
1 All ER 406 at 414. 
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or 'social,15 context will often reveal the 'mischief' 
which Parliament intended to remedy or the circumstances 
it had in mind when enacting the legislation. Previous 
cases, legal textbooks and perhaps even general historical 
works may be referred to as evidence of this backgrOunde 16 
The case of Chandler v DPp17 illustrates reference 
,to the general historical background of legislation as 
evidence of the intention of Parliament. In that case 
the House of Lords held that protestors obstructing an 
airfield acted for a purpose. "prejudicial to the safety 
or interests of the state" (S.I. Official Secrets Act 1911 
(u .K. )) even though they agreed 'vi th the sen.timents of 
the protestors' ultimate cause. As Lord Reid said: 
"The 1911 Act was passed at a time of grave 
misgiving about the German menace, and it 
would be surprising and hardly credible that 
Parliament of that date intended that a person 
\,rho deliberately interfered 'vi th vi tal 
depositions of the armed forces should be 
entitled to submit to a jury that govern-
ment was wrong and that what he did was 
really in the best interests of the country, 
and then perhaps to escape conviction because 
a unanimous verdict on the question could 
not be obtained." 18 
Occasionally a broader reference is made to the 
'intellectual' context ~f legislation. 19 Presumably 
this refers to the interpreter IS O\,rn general knowledge 
acquired through education and experience. It thus 
encompasses more than just kno1 .... ledge of the prevailing 
15. See E.A. Driedger op.cit. p. 124. 
16. For example of reference to a general history text see 
Ledwith v Roberts D936]3 All ER 570 where in the inter-
pretation of the U.K. Vagrancy Act 1826 reference was 
made to 'Webb's English Poor Law History' Part 1 to 
ascertain the broad features of the class 'vagrants'. 
However such reference is exceptional. 
1 7. (1 964] A C 763. 
18. Ibid. at p. 791. 
19. See E.A. Driedger ape cit. p. 125. 
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social conditions. Whereas knowledg~ of the latter 
will usually be of relevance to the reason for a statute, 
this wider background knowledge may be relevant to the 
20 
actual meaning of statutory words. 
21 Dictionaries and other literary sources also 
form part of the general background and may be referred 
to as an aid to the construction of statutory words. 
In many cases dictionaries are used as evidence of ordinary 
meaningg 22 Such evidence is of course subject to any 
contrary indications from the statute itself. Where 
the statute fails to provide evidence of the intention 
of Parliament, dictionaries may be of help. 
Coleridge recognised in R v Peters 23 : 
As Lord 
"I am quite a,,,are that dictionaries are not 
to be taken as authoritative s of the 
meanings of words used in Acts of Parliament, 
but it is a ,,rell-kn01'17n rule of courts of law 
that words should be taken to be used in their 
ordinary sense, and we are therefore sent for 
instruction to these books.1! 
Sometimes, . hm,ever, a judge "rill give more "eight 
to judicial statements of meaning than to statements 
~. d" d" t" " 24 ~oun 1n 1C 10nar1es. Since, on the whole, the latter 
accord more closely with the commonly accepted meaning 
. of words, this practice is open to criticism. Interpret-
ation, it would seem, has increasingly become a 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
For exa~ples of the application of 
context see E.A. Driedger Ibid. p. 
The courts frequently refer to tlle 
such as Coke, John Stuart Mill and 
See for example Cozens Hardy MR in 
v IRC [1914J 1 KB. 641 at p. 647. 
(1886) 16 Q.B.D. 636 at p. 641. 
this 'intellectual' 
125. 
works of writers 
Sir James Stephen. 
Camden (jlTarquis) 
See for example the dissenting opinion of Lord 
HacNaughton in lVtidland Rail Co. and Kettering, Thrapston 
and Huntingdon Rail 00 v Robinson (1890) 15 App. Cas. 
19 at pp. 34-5. 
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specialised process, removed from th~realm of the 
ordinary citizen whom it professes to represent. 25 In 
this respect at least the House of Lords' attempt in 
26 Cozens v Brutus to reverse this trend is to be commended. 
(b) Legal Background. 
The courts may of course have regard to the 
existing state of the common law as a guide to Parliament's 
intention. This has already been discussed fully above 
and need nnt be repeated. Of increasing importance is 
their regard for statute 1m". Firstly, they may have 
regard for earlier statutes ih pari materia. The 
general principle is stated by Lord Mansfield in 
R v Loxda~e27: 
HI-There there are different statutes in pari 
materia though made at different times, or even 
expired, and not referring to each other, 
they shall be taken and construed together, as 
one system, and as explanatory to each other.H 
Thus it seems that an earlier statute in pari 
materia with a later one is part of the context to be 
considered in deciding whether the meaning of a provision 
in the later statute is plain. 28 The earlier statute 
may not be allowed to raise an ambiguity although it 
may help to res ol'\e an ambigui ty raised by other 
considerations. 29 
A related but not identical point is the court's 
25. For similar comments on the use of the phrase 'well-
informed people' by Lord Denning in Escoigne Properties 
Ltd. v IRC loc.cit.p.565, see R. Cross, op.cit.p.122. 
26. [1973J AC 854 
27. (1758) 1 Burr. 445 at p. 4470 
28. See R. Cross op.cit. p.128 ","ho cites Lord Simonds in 
A.G. v Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover loc.cit. at p. 
461 in support of this proposition. 
29. R. Cross, Ibid. p. 128. 
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regard for the history or evolution of a particular 
provision. Sometimes assistance may be gained by tracing 
the legislative antecedents of the doubtliul provision. 
Changes or similarities in the text due to repeal or 
reenactment may indiuate the intended meaning. 
Secondly, a court may have regard to earlier 
statutes not in pari materia, but in the same general 
category. These earlier statutes may influence the meaning 
of a later one by contrast or analogy, the idea being 
1;:;0 promote harmony '.fi thin the body of the law as a ... hole. 30 
·There is no obligation on the judge to consider these 
statutes as there is with statutes in pari materia. 31 
A court will look at earlier judicial decisions 
on the provision under consideration. In the sense 
that the use of precedent involves the adoption of a 
meaning already ascertained, it is one step removed from 
the ascertainment of meaning itself. For this reason 
the follo·wing discussion of the binding nature of precedent 
in cases involving the construction of statutes is by 
way of summary only.3 2 
In Paisner v Goodrich33 and London Transport 
Executive v Betts34 Lord Denning, in dissent, adopted 
the view that decisions on interpretation should only 
be regarded as authority for what they actually decide 
in subsequent cases involving similar facts. He thought 
30. E;A. Driedger op.cit. p.133. 
31. R. Cross op.cit. p. 129. 
32. For full discussion see R. Cross 'Precedent in English 
Law'. For discussion of the effects of Cozens v Brutus 
'see J.F. Burrows 'Some Reflections on Cozens v Brutus' 
0975]4 Anglo-American L.Rev. 366. 
33. 0 95.:D 2 QB 343. 
34. (!959J AC 211. 
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that the words which the judge has u$ed in giving his 
decision were not binding. 35 In his opinion, it was 
up to each new court to decide whether the situation. 
before it differed in a material respect from that in 
the previous case and in so deciding the court was not 
bound by the principle '''hich the judge in the previous 
case appeared to have considered necessary for his decision. 36 
On appeal to the House of Lords, the majority 
decision of the Court of Appeal in Paisner v Goodrich was 
reversed. Although alluding to Lord Denning's comments, 
the Lo~ds do not appear to have agreed with them. Lord 
Reid had this to say: 
"No court is entitled to substitute its ,,,ords 
for the words of the act. A court, however, 
can, and must, decide the appropriate 
test in a particular case and, when the 
Court of Appeal has laid down a test, that 
test ought to be follo\ved in all cases ,"hich 
do not present substantial relevant differences 
• • That does not mean that the words used 
by the Court of Appeal are fu be treated as if 
they were words in an act of Parliament. In 
substantially different circumstances they 
are only a guide, and not a rule.1! 37 
Unlike Lord Denning, Lord Reid obviously considers that 
the judge in a subsequent case should have regard to.the 
words used by the previous judge in order to determine 
whether there are relevant differences between the facts of 
the two cases. 38 
35. Paisner v Goodrich lac. cit. p. 358. 
36. See R. Cross, 'Precedent in English Law' p. 172. 
37. Goodri'ch v Paisner(1957]AC 65 at p. eg. 
38. See R. Cross op.cit. p.l?3. 1b-t5 vie,v is borne out by 
the fact that in London Trap~~ort Executive v Betts loco 
cit. Lord Reid asserted ~n effect that there is no 
difference, so far ap che binding force of the ratio 
decidendi is concp~ned, between a decision on the 
construction ~~ a statute and a decision on any other 
po in t 0 f 1. :dv • 
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In civilian systems of law thc,re is no doctrine 
of binding precedent in relation to interpretation of 
statutes. Lord Denning ,seems to be propounding a view' 
which, while not going so far,' does a court great 
flexibility in deciding whether or not to follow a previous 
decision. The view put fOT\vard by Lord Reid, on the o,ther 
hand, seems to equate this aspect of interpretation more 
closely with analogy. Both have some merit. Arguably 
the view put for,,,rard by Lord Denning is supported by 
the fact that the actual words used by Parliament ought 
to be given more weight than judicial statements conc 
those ,vords. That put forward by Lord Reid accords with 
the need for consistency in the law. rmore, it 
should not be forgotten that in deciding a case a court 
is in fact redefining the scope of the Ie rule. 39 
As E.H. Levi points out, 
II 
is not 
decide 
to the 
a court's interpretation of 1 slation 
dictum. The words it uses do more than 
the case. They give broad direction 
statute." 40 
In theory, the recent e of Lords decision in 
41 Cozens v Brutus seems to point more in the direction of 
Lord Denning's view at least so far as 'ordinary words 
of the English language' are concerned. In practice, 
however, it is most unlikely that the courts will 
disregard previous decisions on the same act. Force of 
habit, convenience and the requirement of consistency in 
judicial decisions make it likely that a previous decision 
39. See p.92. 
40. E.H. Levi 'An Introduction to Legal Reasoning'. p.32. 
41. (1973J AC 854. 
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will still operate as a precedent. 42 While not laying 
down binding rules, such decisions may at least provide 
useful 19uides l • 43 In this respect the situation is 
similar to that in civilian systems where, although not 
binding, previous decisions on the same provision are 
certainly of persuasive value and are considered in 
, . 44 practlce. 
(c) The Legislative History. 
We shall divide our discussion of the admissibility 
of legislative history into three parts: 
(i) the admissibility of pre-parliamentary materials. 
(ii) the admissibility of parliamentary materials, and 
(iii) the extent to which international agreements may be 
considered in the interpretation of domestic Acts. 44a 
,(i) Pre-parliamentary materials can be divided 
into two categories. 45 First, there are reports of a 
committee which precedes and leads to a particular 
statutory enactment. These would include the reports of 
Royal Commissions, law reform and departmental committees. 
Secondly, there is any other form of material. This 
would include documents such as the explanatory memoranda 
attached to bills and "fhi te Papers. The rule with regard 
42. See J.F. Burrows 'Some Reflections on Cozens v Brutus' 
op.cit. at p.382. For an example see Kimpton v Steel 
Co. of 'vales [I 960J 1 Iv. L. R. 527. The Court of Appeal 
accepted that the question of whether three steel steps 
constituted a'staircase' was a question of fact, the 
word 'staircase' being one in daily use. Nevertheless 
reference was made to a previous case where IIthere 
was a somewhat similar set of steps." 
43. J.F. Burrows, ibid. p.382. 
44. See J.H. Nerryman 'The Civil Law Tradition' p.48. 
44a.I am grateful to Dr. D. Miers for information supplied 
on the topic of legislative history. 
4.5 • See 1-1. Z and e r 0 p • cit. p. 67 • 
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to the latter is clear; the courts may not look at any 
such material either fo~ ascertaining/the purpose or for 
ascertaining the meaning of legislation. 1:1e are concerned 
here with the lawrel~ting to the first category of 
materials. 
Until 1898 the courts refused to take account of 
any pre-parliamentary publications. Then in Eastman 
Photographic }·ia terials ·Co. Ltd. v Comptroller Ge!}E;:ral of 
46 ,. 
Pa~ents Lord Halsbury held it permissible to look at 
. . . \ 
the report of a Royal Commission to clarify the 'mischief' 
at which the statute was aimed 4 47 It was still not 
permissible to consider such reports as an aid to the 
construc tion of the statutory ,.vords themselves ho; .. ever. 48 
The present position was established in the Black 
Cla1vson case. 49 There the court considered a section of 
the Foreign Judgements (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 
which was a verbatim reproduction of a draft clause 
prepared by the Committee on whose report the Act was 
based. The Lords were unanimous in their opinion that 
it was permissible to look at the Report to understand 
the background to the legislation. 50 They were divided 
on the issue of whether it is permissible to look at the 
Report to determine the meaning of disputed words. Lords 
Dilhorne and Simon took the following view: 
"where Parliament is Ie slating in the light 
of a public reD~rt I can see no reason why a 
court of cCI~6truction should deny itself any 
part of::'uat light and insist on groping for 
46. [1878JAC 571. 
47. See Lord Halsbury Ibid. at p.575. 
48. As sam Hailiva:v Co. Ltd v IRe [193 5J AC hh 5. 
49. [1975J 1 All E:R. 810. 
50. See for example Lord IHlberforce Ibid. p.629. 
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a meaning in the darkness or half light. 
I conclude therefore that such a report should 
be available to the court of construction, 
so that the latter can put itself in the 
shoes of the draftsman and pl~ce itself on 
the parliamentary benches. I. The object is 
• to ascertain the meaning of the words 
used, that meaning only being ascertainable 
if the court 'is in possession of the knmv-ledge 
possessed by the promulgator. • II 51 
Lords Reid, Wilberforce and Diplock disagreed with this 
view and reiterated the established position. 
Three years after the Black Clawson case the 
House of Lords again considered the issue in the case of 
Davis v Johnson. 52 Lord Diplock reiterated the unanimous 
view expressed in Black CIa-lv-son as to the admissibility 
of reports to ascertain the purpose of a statute. He 
approved the majority view that they are inadmissible 
as evidence of meaning. Lord Kilbrandon agreed. Lord 
Salmon regarded the first part of5Lordc Diplock's 
. reiteration as 'well-settled practice'. Viscount Dilhorne 
made no reference to the views expressed by him in 
Black Clawson and Lord Scarman neither approved nor 
disapproved of what Lord Diplock said. He did ho,,,ever 
think it desirable that Parliament indicate clearly in 
individual statutes whether pre-parliamentary reports 
were to be a proper guide to their interpretation. 
The situation was left somewhat uncertain by 
these House of Lords cases. The present position remains 
that pre-parliamentary materials may be referred to as 
an indication of purpose but not meaning as such. Some 
judges have obvious doubts as to "lhether this practice 
51. per Lord Simon Ibid. p.546. 
52. (1 979J AC J 17 • 
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should continue. Lord Scarman sought to clarify the 
issue in his recent Interpretation Bill. The Bill failed 
in its initial form;largely because of its attempt to 
liberalise the lai., rela;ting to the ,admissibility of 
. 53 
such material. Th~ i,ndications are that current :feeling 
remains against any ,change • 
(ii) Parliamentary materials include Parliamentary 
debates, explanatory and financial memoranda attached to 
Bills and Notes of'Cla~ses prepared for a Minister by 
his department. Subh materials are not admi~sible as 
evidence of rarliamentary intention. 54 This rule was 
recently brought into issue by Lord Denning's Court of 
Appeal decision in Davis v Johnson55 where he admitted 
gaining assistance in his construction from things said 
in Parliament: 
"Some may say, and indeed have said, that 
judges should not pay any attention to 1-lhat 
is said in Parliament. They should grope 
about in the dark for the meaning of an Act 
without switching on the light. I do not 
accede to this view. In some cases Parliament 
is assured in the most explicit terms what the 
effect of a statute will be. It is on that' 
footing that members assent to the clause 
being agreed to. It is on that understanding 
that an amendment is not preBsed. In such 
cases I think the court should be able to 
look at the proceedings ••• and it is 
obvious that there is nothing to' prevent 
a judge looking at these . debates himself 
privately and getting some guidance from them. 
Although it may shock the purists, I may as 
well confess that I have sometimes done it. 
I have done it in this very case. It has 
thrown a flood of light on the position • • • "56 
53. For a full discussion of the Billls proposals see 
Pp. 207-211 and pp. 218-221 below. 
54. See for example Lord Simon of Glaisdale in Ealing London 
Borough Council v Race Relations BOard[1972J2WLR 71 at p.82. 
55 _ [1979J AC 264. 
56. Ibid. pp. 276-7_ 
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The House of Lords in the same case unanimously 
declared the above approach to be wrong. Lord Scarman 
had this to say on the matter: 
IIThere are two good reasons why the courts 
should refuse to have regard to what is said 
in Parliament or by :tfinisters as aids to the 
interpretation of a statute. First, such 
material is an unreliable guide to the meaning 
of what is enacted. It promotes confusion, 
not clarity. The cut and thrust of debate 
and the pressures of executive responsibility, 
essential features of open and responsible 
government, are not always conducive to a 
clear and unbiased explanation of the meaning 
of statutory language. And the volume of. 
Parliamentary and ministerial utterances can 
60nfuse by its very size. Secondly, counsel 
are not permitted to refer to Hansard in 
argument. So long as this rule is maintained 
by Parliament(it is not the creation of the 
judges), it must be wrong for the judge to 
make any judicial use of proceedings in 
Parliament for the purpose of interpreting 
statutes." 57 
As Lord Denning has admitted however, there is 
nothing to stop a judge having regard privately to 
Parliamentary materials. The exclusionary rule merely 
stops him from using any information he gains as a basis 
f h " d ." 58 or 1S eC1S10n. Evidence that a private investigation 
of this kind occurs appears from time to time in cases 
where unreferenced passages appear to be taken virtually 
verbatim from debates. 59 Similarly, Parliamentary debates 
may be indirectly brought to the attention of the court 
through the analysis of legislative history in textbooks. 60 
Recently, Lord Hailsham has commented on this practice 
57. Davis v Johnson [1979]AC 317 at pp.349-50. 
58. See R. Cross op.cit. p.130. 
59. For example see the Privy Council case of In re The 
RegulA. tion and Control of Aeronautic s in Canada [1 932J 
AC 54. 
60. See Bradford City Council v Lord Commissioners (1978) 
unreported - referred to by Lord Denning in 'The 
Discipline of Law' p.l0. 
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of referring privately to Hansard: 
HIt is really very difficult to understand what 
(Parliamentary draftsmen) mean sometimes. I 
always look at Hansard, I always look at the 
Blue Books, I always look at everything 
I can in order to see what is meant and as I 
was a Member of the House of Commons for a 
long time of course I n-e·ver let on for an 
instant that I had read the stuff. I 
produced it as an argument of my mvn, as if 
I had thought of _it myself. I only took the 
trouble because I could not do the work in 
any other way.!! 61 
(iii) Finally we will consider the extent to 
which international treaties and conventions may-influence 
the interpretation of a domestic Act. This is an issue 
of increasing importance as more and more British and 
Common,vea1 th acts give effect to such agreements. In 
the case of R v Chief Immigration Officer, Heathrow 
~A~i~r~p~0~r~t~,~e~x~~p~a~r~t~e~B~~~'b~i~2 the U.K. Court of Appeal held 
that where an international agreement to which Britain 
is a signatory has not been incorporated into domestic 
law it cannot override the meaning of a U.K. Statute, 
even -though the two may conflict. The position is quite 
different ,,,,here the convention is incorporated into 
domestic law by statute. Two House of Lords cases have 
recently laid dOlvn guidelines as to the interpretation 
of such legislation. ~be most recent and important is 
Fothergill v Monarch Air1ines. 63 The Lords considered 
three issues: 
1) What approach is a British court to adopt in interpreting 
such legislation? 
61. House of Lords debate on the U.K. Interpretation Bill, 
26th March 1981. 
62. [1976J 3 All ER 843. 
63. [1 980J 2 All ER 696. 
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2) To '\.vhat aids may the court have recourse? 
3) If the courts may have recourse to travaux pr~paratoires, 
by '\",hat criteria are they to select the material and 
what weight are they to give to it?64 
In answering the first question assistance was 
obtained from the earlier House of Lords case, James 
Buchanan v Babco. 65 Here the Lords had unanimously 
supported the following proposition stated by Lord Wilberforce: 
"The correct approach is to interpret an 
English text • • • in a normal manner, 
appropriate for the interpretation of an 
international convention, unconstrained by 
technical rules of English law, or by legal 
precedent but on broad principles of 
general acceptation." 66 
The m~jority of the House of Lords in Fothergill agreed 
with Lord Wilberforce; the most important reason for 
adopting a broad approach being to ensure as far as 
possible a uniformity of :interpretation among the 
signatory states. 
As to the second question, Lord Scarman considered 
that English judges "should be able to have recourse to 
the same aids of interpretation as their brother judges 
in other ~ontracting states.,,67 This included travaux 
, 
preparatoires, the preparatory works frequently prepared 
and published prior to the signing of international agree-
ments. Lord Diplock went so far as to consider that 
English courts were possibly under a duty to consider such 
material. 68 The rest of the court was not prepared to go 
64. These questions were posed by Lord Scarman, ibid. 
at p. 713. 
65. 0977J3 All ER 1043. 
66. Ibid. at p.l052. 
67. Fothergill v ~ronarch Airlines loc. cit. p. 715. 
68. Ibid. p. 707. 
190 
qui t e that far, ho,,, ever. Lord Wilberforce thought this 
preparatory material ,,,ould be useful ,,,hen it was public 
and accessible and when it clearly pointed to a definite 
I '· It' . t t' 69 egls a lve ln en lone 
The ~lTeight to' be attached to this material was 
held to be a matter for the court to decide, but, 
III. 
"if there be ambiguity or doubt, or if a literal 
construction appears to conflict with the 
purpose of a convention, the court must then • 
have recourse to such aids as are admissible 
and appear to it to be not only relevant but 
helpful on the point under consideration. 
aere marginal re.le vance ,.,rill not suffice; 
the aid must have weight as well. 1I 70 
POLICY 
The general aims of any policy relating to legal 
procedure should be to promote rationality,7 1 efficiency 
and fairness. Prima facie these ends would best be 
served by the admissibility of all relevant evidence and 
material. It is submitted that the onus is on those '''ho 
seek to exclude materials to produce convincing reasons 
based on rationality, efficiency and fairness or, other 
relevant values. 72 It is now proposed to consider 
particular policy arguments put forward for the admissibility 
or inadmissibility of extrinsic materials. Having stated 
these arguments, we '''ill consider their adequacy as judged 
69. Ibid. p.703. 
70. per LO:l'd Scarman Ibid. p.716. 
71. Compare definition of 'rationality' in Max Weber on 
'Law in Economy and Society' translated by Max Rheinstein. 
'veber distinguishes bet,.;een formal and substantive 
xationality. The latter would subsume values such 
as fairness under an overall concept of rationality. 
72. Compare R.S. Summers 'Evaluating and Improving Legal 
Processes - A Plea for Process Values' (1974) 60 
Corn.eIIL.R.1. 
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by the basic values listed above. 
Arguments against the admissibility of extrinsic 
evidence as an aid to interpretation fall under two heads; 
theoretical and practical. We shall start by considering 
the theoretical just~fications for the present position. 
(1) Conformity to the 'Ordinary Meaning' of Language 
The 'Diplock principle' of normal usage73 has 
already been noted and commented on. The court must give 
effect to what the words of the statute would be reasonably 
understood to mean by those whose conduct it regulates. 
In other words, it must give the words their 'ordinary' 
meaning. Hhat is important is what the statute says, 
.not what the legislators meant it to say. This basic 
principle of the English legal system has been used to 
justify the exclusion of materials ouside the statute 
and unavailable to the ordinary man or woman. The 
reason for the inclusion of certain internal materials 
such. as the preamble becomes obvious in light of this 
principle; such materials would be taken into account 
by the normal user when construing a statute. On the 
other hand, it would be quite ridiculous to expect those 
acting on the statute extrajudicially to refer to extrinsic 
materials when they consider the statutory meaning to 
be plain without them. 74 
Not all would agree that adherence to the above 
principle prodrices the most desirable result however. 
73. See Lord Diplock in Black Clawson case 1975 1 All 
ER 810 at p.836; cited ahove at p. 121. 
74. R. Cross oP9cit. pp. 133-134. 
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It has been claimed75 that its application means that 
the judge in our leg~l system 
"does not generally feel himself under the 
same obligation to search as deeply as possible 
for the most satisfactory meaning of the statute, 
if he has.to hand an interpretation which accords 
with the normal usage of language as employed 
in the text of the statute, and of the more 
obvious and immediate contextual implications 
of the text. 1I 
This is unfortunate reasoning. The main justification 
for the ordinary meaning approach is that it affords the 
best evidence of the legislative intent in the normal 
case. It does not afford justification for judicial 
laziness nor the acceptance of anything less than the 
most satisfactory meaning. It is debatable however 
whether the extrinsic evidence exclusionary rules should 
in fact be based on the supposed practices of the 'normal 
user' of language. As often as not, it will be the 
ordinary person's legal advisor ,"ho considers the import 
of various statutes. Such an advisor is hardly a 'normal 
user' of language. Lawyers ,,,ill usually have resort to 
specialist textbooks whose authors have had access to 
extrinsic materials and will consider them in giving. 
their advice. 
(2) Derogation From the Court's Powers 
The courts alone have the task of definitive 
statutory interpretation. It is sometimes argued that 
75. See Norman S. Marsh QC in 'Interpretat~on in a 
National and International Context' p.75. (lectures 
delivered at the Centre for European Studies in 
Luxembourg in 1973, and published by D.G.A. in 
Belgium in 1974, quoted in R. Cross op.cit. p.133). 
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reference to non-statutory materials, such as committee 
reports and Parliamentary debates, ;vould detract from 
the court's function as interpreter by conf that 
role on Parliament itself. At the very least, it is 
argued, the courts '-.Tould become a 'reflecting mirror' 
of that body. As Lord 
Black Claw'son Case: 76 
lberforce has stated in the 
"Legislationin England is passed by 
Parliament, and 'put in the form of written 
words. This legislation is given legal effect 
upon subjects by virtue of judicial decisions, 
and it is the, function of the courts to say 
what the application of the words used to 
particular cases or individuals is to be. 
This po\-.Ter which has devolved on the judges 
from the earliest times is an essential 
of the constitutional process by which subjects 
are brought under the rule of law - as distinct 
from the rule of the or of Parliament; and 
it would be a degradation of that process if 
the courts were to be merely a reflecting 
mirror of what some other interpretation 
agency might say." 
Related to this argument is Lord Halsbury's point that 
those responsible for an Act are the worst persons to 
interpret it.77 
It is surely going too far, however,to suggest 
that in such circumstances Parliament has become interpreter 
as well as lawmaker. Extrinsic materials would merely 
'provide evidence that one interpretation is to be preferred 
to another. The weight, if any, to be given to this 
evidence would remain entirely at the discretion of the 
court. The_ court alone 1-.Tould retain the task of applying 
general Parliamentary intentions to the case before it. 
76. loco cit. p. 828. 
77. Cf. Y.B. 33 & 35 Edw.l.(RS) 83. 
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(3) Derogation From The Soverei,.g,nty of Parliament 
Alternatively,· it has been argued that reference 
to pre-Parliamentarymaierials confers on the committee, 
Commission or oth~r s~ch body the role of lawmaker and so 
derogates from the spve'reignty of Parliament. Only the 
statute in its finali form, passed by Parliament, represents 
the law. Reference to'the recommendations of pre-
Parliamentary committees could well result in the court 
giving weight to thing~ which never in fact received full 
Parliamentary assent. As Lordlvright said in Assan: 
Railway Co. Ltd v IRC: 78 
nOn principle no such evidence for the purpose 
of showing the intention, that is the purpose 
or object, of an Act is admissible; the 
intention of the legislature must be ascertained 
from the words of the statute with such 
extraneous assistance as is legitimate. 
it is clear that the language of a Minister of 
the Crown in proposing in Parliament a measure 
which eventually becomes law is inadmissible 
and the Report of~Commissioners is even more 
removed from value as evidence of intention, 
because it does not follow that their 
recommendations were accepted. 1l 
However, where a statute clearly manifests an intention 
to implement such a Report, as for instance ~~ere it is 
virtually id~ntical in its terms to the draft bill 
proposed by the Report, the above argument loses its 
effect. The counter arguments for admitting evidence 
of the Report recommendations are set out belm",. 
(4) The Parol Evidence Rule 
The rule excluding certain extrinsic materials 
,arguably forms part of a wider rule which excludes parol 
evidence in the construction of deeds and other written 
78. loc.cit. at p. 458. 
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documents. Although the rule is expressed in terms of 
parol evidence, it does in fact apply to all forms of 
extrin~ic evidence. 79 Basically the rule means that the 
interpretation of a document must be found in the document 
itself with the addition, if necessary, of such evidence 
as is admissible for explaining or translating the words 
or expressions used in that document. 80 The justification 
for the rule is that when parties have recorded their 
agreement in an instrument it is in everyone's interest, 
in order to obtain certainty, to presume that the instrument 
records the full and final intentions of the parties. 
This reasoning is at the root of objections to the 
admissibility of extrinsic evidence in the interpretation 
of statutes. 
The major practical arguments against the admissibility 
of parliamentary materials were identified by Lord Reid 
. B . k B . 1 81 ln eSW1C v eSW1CC. 
If In construing any Act of Parliament we are 
seeking the intention of Parliament, and it 
is quite true that we must deduce that intention 
from the words of the Act. If the words of the 
Act are only capable of one meaning we must give 
them that meaning, no matter how they got there. 
But if they are capable of having more than one 
meaning we are, in my view, well entitled to 
see how they got there. For purely practical 
79. lOdger's Construction of Deeds and Statutes' 5th edition 
by G.Dworkin, p. 106. 
80. Ibid. p.106. 
81 • (196 8J AC 58" 
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reasons we do not permit debates in either 
House to be cited. It would add greatly to the 
time and expense involved in preparing cases 
involving the construction of a statute if 
Counsel were expected to read all the debates 
in Hansard, and it '\·(ould often be impracticable 
for counsel to get access to at least the older 
reports of debates in select committees of the 
House of Commons; moreover, in a very large 
proportion of cases such a search, even if 
practicable, would throw no light on the 
question before the court. • It 82 
The same arguments,although to a lesser extent, apply 
to a consideration of pre-parliamentary material. Lord 
Mishcon has recently been at pains to point out the 
same difficulties: 
It •• the interpretation of an Act of Parlia-
ment is not just the job of the Courts; it is 
the almost daily job of my profession in 
advising ordinary citizens, and that power to 
interpret must not be beset by mea&ures 
which make that interpretation uncertain 
or cumbersome or expensive. 1I 83 
(5) Availability 
Statutes are addressed not merely to courts but 
to a wider audience. The que s tion is, ,,,ould the materials 
discussed above be sufficiently available to the whole 
Ie slative audience to be part of the legislative context 
and thus capable of affecting actual meaning in the' 
84 
manner of context generally? 
Reports of Parliamentary debates were not 
available until the nineteenth century. Indeed it was 
regarded as contempt to publish such debates. F • 1{. Hai t-
land in 'The Constitutional His.tory of England' 85 writes: 
82. Ibid. pp. 73-4. 
83. House of Lords debate 13th February 1980 Col. 290. 
84. R. Dickerson op.cit. p. 147. -
85. 'The Constitutional History of England' ed. by H.A.L. 
Fisher at p. 376. 
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"This perhaps we ought to regard in its origin 
as a measure of self-protection against the 
Crown; so long as the Houses had to dread the 
action of the Crown, they did well to insist 
that their proceedings should be secret. lI . 
Such reports have been available since the nineteenth 
century at a cost. In Britain, for example, the cost of 
Hansard materials is way beyond the means of most law 
firms and many libraries. The 1981 daily subscription 
for both House of Commons and House of Lords debates ,,,as 
£267. For papers other than debates, for example command 
papers, bills, votes and proceedings, the Commons' papers 
were available at a cost of £h,660 per annum and the Lords' 
papers at £1,320 per annum. These figures represent 
the cost of a current subscription only and are quite 
apart from the cost of a full back run of materials. For 
this reason few public libraries have a complete set of 
materials and if a practi titbner;'wishes to consult them 
he will have to go to the reference library of one of the 
larger cities, a university library, or lmv society library. 
Smali town and country practitioners would immediately 
be at a disadvantage should they be obliged to consult 
these d.eba tes. 
Even assuming that this information is practically 
available to both courts and practitioners, is this 
enough to make it part of -the legislative context? It 
86 
would seem not. Firstly, the average cj.tizen is not 
presumed to rely on lawyers for information about statutes 
governing his or her actions. Every citizen is however 
presumed to have kn01vledge of the la,,,. In return, 
86. See R. Dickerson, op.cit. at p.150~ 
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Parliament is to make the law reasonably accessible to 
the general legislative audience. As R. Dickerson puts 
it, 
"the notion that reasonable access to legislative 
communication is being provided implies that 
both the statute and the collateral matters of 
context of which it takes account are shared 
or are reasonably shareable ••• on this basis, 
items of legisla~ive history, no matter how 
relevant and reliable, are no part of the proper 
legislative context, if they are significantly 
less accessible than the standard of accessibility 
implicit in the constitution requires.!! 87 
No one could argue that the present availability.of 
legislative history meets this requirement. 
Secondly, the information that is practically 
available to a la't<{yer when he considers the application 
of a statute to a past event is not necessarily the kind 
of information that is practically available to him when 
he wishes to advise a client on future conduct in relation 
88 to a statute. It may be difficult to search legislative 
history as it relates to a particular dispute, but it is 
almost impossible to search it in the hope of anticipating 
all problems that might arise sometime in the future. 
(6) Relevance 
Even if legislative history. were readily available, 
it is doubtful 't<{hether much ofi t would be relevant to 
specific disputes. Reed Dickerson points out that amongst 
the almost unlimited number of potential controversies 
that may arise, probably only a very few would get any 
assistance from anything in the legislative history.89 
87. Ibid. pp. 151-2. 
88. Ibid. p. 150. 
89. Ibid. p. 154. 
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Even in these few cases, much relevant material may in 
fact be unreliable. Lord Reid also recognised that 
extrinsic materials mayor may not help to resolve the 
issue in Beswick v Beswick,90 and again in Black Cla,vson: 
liThe questions which give rise to debate are 
hardly ever those which later have to be decided 
by the courts. One might take the views of 
the promoters of the Bill as an indication, 
but any view the promoters may have had about 
questions which later come before the court will 
not often appear in Hansard and often those 
questions have never occurred to the promoters.1!91 
All other factors being equal, the irrelevance of 
extrinsic material in some cases should not be used as 
an argument for its general inadmiss~bility. But very 
rarely will all other factors be equal. The question of 
relevance cannot be considered in isolation from other 
policy factors. The ultimate question must be whether 
the time, energy and money spent on making these materials 
available and examining them is justified by their 
relevance in , .. hat may only be a very small number of cases. 
At the end of the day any judgement must be based on a 
cost-benefit analysis. 
(7) Reliability 
Unreliability is perhaps the greatest weakness 
of legislative history.92 The reliability of particular 
material will depend very much on its source and the 
circumstances in , .. hich it arose. Parliamentary debates, 
for example, would seldom have much credibility for the 
purpose of interpretation. The debates are largely 
90. loc.cit. p.74. 
91. Black Clawson loc.cit. p. 815. 
92. See R. Dickerson op.cit. p. 155. 
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dominated by those promoting the enactment of the 
particular piece of leg~slation. It has been said that 
this process is not !Ian intellectual exercise in the 
pursuit of truth but an essay in persuasion or pehaps 
almost seductiono ll93 W"hat is more, statements may be 
made by people with little real kno~ledge of the subject 
under discussion. Even when made by people with this 
1 h f t t · "b' t 94 know" edge, t ey are 0 ten enta ~ve and may e ~mpromp u. 
Nor is there any guarantee that "\-lhat is said represents 
the intention of all the legislators. As Reed Di6kerson 
says: 
IILegislators who ordinarily have little 
professional skill in achieving the kind 
of legislative definiteness needed in statutes, 
speaking in circumstances that call for gross 
oversimplification, at best describe only their 
subjective beliefs about '''hat the bill is 
supposed to say.1I 95 
Committee Reports are somewhat less of a problem. The 
biggest risk with these is that thei~ recommendations 
may not in fact have been adopted by Parliament. 
Despite these criticisms, many countries do not 
consider legislative material so unreliable that it 
should be totally excluded from consideration. The 
courts discriminate between the value of various kinds 
of material. 96 In practice debates are much less likely 
to be used as evidence of intention than are, say, 
committee reports. Where debates are considered, the 
courts will probably only have regard to the Minister's 
93. J.A. Corry 'The Use of Le slative History in the 
Interpretatiori of Statutes' (1954) 32 Can.Bar.Rev. 
624 at p. 631 .. 
94. R. Dickerson op.cit. p.155. 
95. Ibid. p. 156. 
96. Law Com. No. 21 p.33. 
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speech. In no way are the courts compelled to give 
effect even to this evidence. The final decision as to 
meaning remains entirely at the discretion of the judge. 
(8) Time and Expense 
The practical inaccessibility of legislative 
,materials is a consequence of the time and expense necessary 
to make them available and to give them proper consider-
ation. Ultimately this expense would be borne by the 
ordinary citizen seeking legal advice. As a general rule, 
justice is best served by speedy, inexpensive procedure 
in the majority of cases. Arguably the additional 
information pro~ided by legislative history in a few 
does not out'veigh this benefit to the maj ori ty. 
(9) Greater Uncertainty 
It has been argued that the need to construe t,,ro 
or more documents instead of just one would increase 
rather than resolve uncertainty. 'The more words, the 
more doubts to be entertained. 97 This reasoning is 
questionable. The same argument would lead to the 
exclusion of all explan~tions and definitions,98 which 
could hardly be considered desirable. 
97. See for example the introduction to Halsbury's 
'Laws of England f where exactly this vie\v 'vas taken. 
98. See J.H. Farrar 'Law Reform and the Law Commission' 
pp. 52-53. 
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IV. SOME PHOPOSED REFORMS 
General reform p~oposals for the law of statutory 
interpretation wi~l be consider~d in the following 
chapter. The present discussion will deal only with 
those proposals relating to statutory context. Matters 
already provided for in the Acts Interpretation Act 1924 
will not be dealt with. Rather, emphasis will be on 
those areas ,,,here th~ common law' rules still prevail. 
(1) Inter~alContext 
Punctuation is one matter still governed by 
common la...,- rules. 99 . The English and Scottish Law Commissions 
in their Report on The Interpretation of Statutes 1969 100 
recommended that punctuation should be taken into account 
" "t t" t t t ." 101 1n 1n erpre 1ng a s a u ory prov1s1on. They noted 
the Scottish practice of giving effect to punctuation102 
and recognised its, practical importance in conveying 
. 103 
meaning and influencing the interpretation of an act. 
. '1 4 
The Renton Committee 0 agreed with this proposal and 
Lord Scarman's,recerit Interpretation Bill (U.K.) contained 
an identical clause to that proposed by the Law 
C ." 105 , omm1SS10ns. 
99. See p.175. 
100. Law Com. No. 21. 
101. Ibid. p. 25. A clause to this effect was included 
in their draft proposals; see clause 1(1)a. 
102. See for example Alexander v l'!acKenzie [1947J JC 155. 
103. La,,, Com. No. 21.p.25. 
104. In its Report on the Preparation of Legislation, 
published 1975. 
105. See clause 1(1)a Interpretation Bill (U.K.) contained 
in Appendix I to this thesis. 
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(2) ~xternal Context 
The Law Commissions went on to consider ,..-hether 
the present law with regard to the admissibility of 
legislative history is satisfactory. First they considered 
the admissibility of pre-Parliamentary material. In 
principle they thought it right for the courts to consider 
this material uhich "must be aS,sumed to be in the 
contemplation of the legislature. 1I106 They also thought 
that in principle a court should be able to consider 
this material not only to determine the mischief" at 
which the provision was aimed, but also to determine the 
nature and scope of the remedy provided. 107 In clause 
1(1)(b) of their draft proposals they made provision 
to this effect: 
"In ascertaining the meaning of any provision 
• • • matters that may be considered shall 
include. • any relevant report of a Royal 
Commission, Committee or other body which ' 
had been presented or made to or laid before 
Parliament or either House before the time 
when the Act was passed." 
It would be for the court to decide whether any 
recommendations were in fact embodied in the resulting 
Act. Reference to 1'lhi te Papers might provide usefui 
information on this point. 10B Clause 1(1)(a) of their 
draft proposals was designed specifically to include 
reference to White Papers. In its original form the 
19BO Interpretation Bill (U.K.) contained a similar 
clause, but this was later dropped. Alternatively, the 
106. 
107. 
10B. 
See Govindan Sellanpah Nayar Kodakan Pillai v Punchi 
Banda Nundanayake [I 953]AC 51l~ (Law Com. No. 21 p.30). 
Law Com. 21. p.30. 
Ibid. p.31. 
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Commissioners thought that a specially prepared 
explanatory document could provide guidance on this 
. t 109 pOln • 
The Renton Commi ttee disagreed 1vi th both the 
proposal relating to Committee Reports and that relating 
110 to material such as l<fhi te Papers. . Parliament may 
in fact have intended to depart from the _report; there 
might be difficulty in deciding if a particular report 
was in fact 'relevant'; and most important, to admit 
such material would place too great a burden on litigants, 
their advisors and the courts. Particular difficulties 
would arise for lawyers trying to advise their clients 
before a specific dispute had arisen. 
In its original form Lord Scarman's Interpretation 
Bill 1980 contained a clause identical to that proposed 
by the Law Commissions in relation to Committee Reports. 
The Bill in this form failed to get its second reading in 
the House of Lords. The principal cause for its failure 
was this attempt to alter the existing law in relation 
to pre-Parliamentary materials. In 1981 Lord Scarman 
introduced a new and considerably modified Bill. No 
such clause was included. 
The La1v Commissions adopted a different stance 
with regard to Parliamentary materials. In general they 
thought that reports of Parliamentary proceedings should 
111 
not be used by the courts for interpreting statutes. 
109. Ibid. p. 31. The Commissions' recommendations on 
explanatory material will be discussed below. 
110. See paras 19.15, 19.17 and 19,23 of their Report. 
111. Lmv Com. 21 p. 36. 
205 
In so deciding they were influenced by three considerations: 
a) The difficulty of isolating information ,.hich would 
be of assistance to the courts, 
b) The consequent difficulty of providing the information 
in a reasonably conv'enient and readily accessible form, 
and 
c) The possibility that in some cases the same function 
could be better performed by specifically prepared 
explanatory material available to Parliament IV"hen a Bill 
is introduced and modified if necessary to take account 
of amendments during its passage through Parliament. 112 
Such explanatory memoranda would be prepared by the 
promoters of the Bill. The bill itself would then 
specifically authorise its use as an aid to interpretation. 113 
The memorandum would be especially valuable if it 
114 
received some form of Parliamentary approval. 
The Commissioners recognised two basic criticisms 
to their proposal. First, opponents had argued that such 
memoranda would lead to Parliament conveying its intention 
in two documents instead of one. This, they argued, 
would create as many difficulties as it solved and might 
sometimes present the courts with an irreconcilable 
conflict of meaning. The Commissions answered this 
criticism by stressing that the explanatory materials 
would be no more binding on the courts than much other 
contextual material which is presently available. 115 
112. Ibid. p.36. 
113. Ibid. p.40. 
114. Ibid. p.40. 
115. Ibid. p.41. 
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The courts must still make the final decision as to 
meaning. It could well be that they regard a particular 
meaning as so compelling in the light of other contextual 
materials that it must be preferred to that suggested 
116 by the memorandum. The second criticism related to 
the time and labour involved in preparing explanatory 
materials. On the whole the Commissions thought this 
objection to be rather overstated. However they did 'limit 
their immediate proposal to use in selected cases only. 
Clause 1(1)(e) therefore included among the list of 
contextual materials to be considered !lany document which 
is declared by the Act to be a relevant document for the 
purposes(of ascertaining the meaning of any provision.)11 
The Renton Committee also favoured retention of 
the presentla,,, rela t to Parliamentary proceedings. 
They did not ho,,,ever favour the use of explanatory 
117 
memoranda. As originally presented to the House of 
Lords in 1980, the U.K. Interpretation Bill contained 
a paragraph to the same effect as the one proposed by 
the Commissions. This was dropped a~ter debate and the 
1981 Interpretation Bill contained no provision relating 
to the use of explanatory materials. 
Finally the Commissions considered the use of 
treaties in the interpretation of domestic acts •. They 
stressed that such treaties were part of the total 
context in which an act is to be considered and in 
clause 1(1)(d) recommended reference to "any relevant 
116. Ibid. p.42. 
117. See para. 19.24. 
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treaty or other international agreement which is referred 
to in the Act or of ,,,rhic,h copies had been presented to 
Parliament by command of Her Majesty before that time, 
vlhether or not the United Kingdom "lere bound by ita t 
that time." The Ren:ton Committee approved of this 
118 ., 119 
proposal. The Fother~ill case has in part over-
taken this recommendation. But unlike the Fothergill 
case, the Law Commissions' proposal included reference 
to international agreements even though the country has 
not incorporated the agreement into domestic law. fhe 
1981 U.K. Interpretation Bill included a clause to the 
same effect. 
, Recently, the Australian Parliament has also 
given attention to the question of reforming the law 
relating to the interpretation of statutes. Their 
reforms and proposals will be discussed in the following 
chapter. Notable among the proposals are plans to extend 
the use of explanatory memoranda as an aid to construction 
and to make a full inquiry into the use of committee 
reports wi th a ~viei",r to laying specific recommendations 
before: Parliament. 
V. CRITIQUE AND CONCLUSIONS 
Lord Scarman's Interpretation Bill follows 
basically the same format as the Commissions' draft 
proposals. Clause (1) deals with aids to interpretation~' 
It sets out various contextual matters which are to be 
118. See para. 19.16. 
119. Loc. cit. 
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included among the matters at present considered !lin 
ascertaining the meaning o:f any provision o:f an Act." 
120 Two comments can be made on this initial :formula alone. 
First, despite the Law. Commissions' duty to codi:fy the 
121 lmv, this was not attempted here. Second, the 
:formula treats statutory interpretation as a one-stage 
operation. It :fails to recognise that there is a 
preliminary stage to interpretation in which a court 
decides whether or not a doubt exists.. It is only in 
the second stage that a court determines hmv the doubt 
is to be resolved. As F.Bennion notes, interpretative mat-
.erial ruled out o:f consideration at the second stage 
may ne.vertheless be admissible at the :first. 122 
Clause (1) begins in paragraph (a) with a consider-
ation o:f internal indications as to meaning. Only the 
proposals relating to punctuation need concern us. here. 
As a matter o:f common sense this should be included. 
Any reader o:f English is guided by punctuation. While 
some old Acts may not have been punctuated when entered 
on the Parliament Roll, this is no longer the case. Now 
that punctuation is used in legislation it should be 
·considered in the interpretation o:f that legislation. 
The main criticism that can be·aimed at paragraph (a) 
is that it :fails to deal with the situation where one 
o:f the internal 'indications' contradicts the substantive 
120. See F. Bennion 'Another Reverse :for the Law Commissions' 
Interpretation Bill' Ne"\v Law Journal, 13th August 1981 
p. 840. 
121. Lalv Commissions Act 1965 s.3(1). 
122. F. Bennion op.cit. p.840. 
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text. 123 In Attorney-General v Prince Augustus of 
124 . ' ' 
Hanover it was held that the text is to be preferred. 
Not all judges follow this practice, however. Recently 
in , 125 Inftabrics Ltd v Jaytex Ltd the clear meaning 
of the text was held to be overridden by a narrower 
h d · 126 ea 1ng. 
Contrary to the 'recommendations of the Renton 
Committee, the 1980 Bi~l contained a paragraph allowing 
reference to a report on '''hich the Act "las based. This 
was d~opp~d from the.1981 Bill. Lord Hailsham L.C., had 
this to say about the movers of the amendment: 
"If they really think that courts and practi-
tioners do not read blue books in order to 
find out what statutes mean, they are living 
in a complete fool' sparadise. i{hen I was 
at the Bar I was constantly having to advis,e 
as to the meaning of statutes and as constantly 
I was finding, as I do in this House and as 
I do when I sit judic ially , that the ,vords 
of the Parliamentary draftsman are at first 
sight incomprehensible • • • I always look 
at Hansard, I always look at the blue books, 
I always look at everything I can • 
The idea that this is going to generate a 
lot of expensive work - dear, dear solicitors, 
dear, dear barristers, do grow up! II 127 
F. Bennion discusses the relationship between Lord 
Hailsham's comments and certain earlier findings of the 
L C .. 128 . aw omm1SS10ns. First, the 1969 Report had spoken 
of the need for an informed construction. Initially 
"a judge might wish to inform himself about the general 
legal and factual situation forming the background to 
129 the enactment. II Such information may thro,,, light 
123. Ibid. p. 840. 
124. f1957J AC 436. 
125. 198tl 1 All ER 1057. 
126. See 131 N.L.J. 749. 
127. House of Lords Debate 26th March 1981 Co Is 1345-6. 
128. F. Bennion op.cit. 
129. Law Com. No.21. para 47. 
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on the passages which to Lord Hailsham are "at first 
sight incomprehensible lT • Indeed, "there do not seem to 
be any specific limitations on the information to which 
the court might refer,1I 130 in gaining·this background 
information. Surprisingly, neither the Interpretation 
Bill nor the Lmv Commissions I draft proposals on 1-lhich 
it was based made any attempt to differentiate betlveen 
admissibility of reports for securing an informed 
construction and their use for resolving doubts as to 
meaning where these exist. In the latter case, the 
interpreter must not use the knovlledge he has acquired 
131 to produce an unexpected result. 
On its first introduction to the House of Lords 
the Interpretation Bill contained two other clauses 
recommended by the Commissions, but later dr?pped. The 
first of these was intended principally to allow reference 
to white papers and other command papers. The same 
arguments that apply to committee reports apply to 
these documents. To admit them as evidence of intention 
could give rise to many difficulties. In principle !lit 
would seem wrong that a w~ite paper setting out in 
political terms the broad aims of a government policy, 
often in vague language, should be allowed to determine 
the precise legal effect of the legislation • .II 132 
130. Ibid. para 48. 
131. F, Bennion op.cit. 
132. J.R. Farrar, 'Law Reform and the Law Commissions', 
p. 52. 
The second provision was inserted to ease 
reference to specially prepared explanatory pemoranda. 
Many argue that such material would only create more 
d.Olll)ts ~ Whether this would indeed be the case seems 
The decision to drop the provision 
from the 1981 Bill appears to have been based mainly 
on considerations of cost and convenience. 
Context is an essential ingredient of communication. 
The relevant context must be a shared context; shared 
between communicator and audience. Here, bet"een 
Parliament and those to whom its laws are addressed. 
Even ",Then relevant and reliable 9 many extrinsic materials 
are unavailable to the ordinary citizen. For this 
reason alone they do not form part of the shared context 
and should not be taken into consideration by the courts 
when interpreting statutes. To do so would be to 
place interpretation of the laws of Parliament even. 
further out of the reach of the ordinary citizen, the 
audience to \vhom many statutes are addressed e 
The arg-uments against the admissibility of pre-
parliamentary material are not as strong as those 
against parl£amentary material. The distinction 
between admitting the former as evidence of purpose but 
not o~ meaning seems an artificial auet and the case 
for altering the present law is strongest here. Yet 
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the above reasonlng still applies 
cost to the ordinary citizen. 
from its use may 
small number of cases. 
be based on a cost/bensfit 
additional benefit of admitt 
After all, the assistance 
be of benefit in a very 
, any decision must 
sis. At present? the 
extrinsic materials 
does not outweigh the consequent cost¢ 
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CHAPTER XIV 
REFORH PROPOSALS 
The first Commonvleal th jurisdiction to consider 
reform of the common law approaches to interpretation 
~as Canada in its Revised Acts Act 1886 c.1. s.7. This 
contained a provision which is the ori of Section 5(j) 
of the New Zealand Acts Interpretation. Act 1924. 1"e 
have considered this section in detail above. Neither 
the enactment of the Canadian section nor its New Zealand 
counterpart seems to have been attended by any detailed 
debat~ on the common law position. Indeed their origins 
remain obscure. The only comprehensive debate that has 
taken place on the common law position is contained in 
the Report of the ish and Scottish Lmv Commissions 
on The Interpretation of Statutes, 1969. 1 Reform in 
this area had appeared in the First Programme of the Law 
Commissions as a matter of priority. The Commissions 
recognised that any reform of the general law which it 
recommended would have to be implemented through 
legislation. The successful realisation of the reform 
programme would then depend on the interpretation given 
by the courts to that 1 slation. The importance of 
this topic for reform could be seen from the increasing 
number of cases involving statutory interpretation, 
2 particularly at the appellate level. However the Report 
1. Law Com. No. 21. 
2. Ibid. p.3 n.2. 
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drew attention to the fact that a statute is not 
exclusively a communication between the legislature and 
the courts. 3 It is directed according to its subject 
matter to audiences of varying extent. The problem, then, 
was to devise a set of rules or approaches which 
produced an accurate implementation of legislative policy 
by the courts and yet at the same time was intelligible 
to lay people. This did not necessarily mean that the 
Commissions subscribed to the view that all legislation 
should be drafted in simple terms. They recognised that 
. 1 fl· 4 the problem lS not one capab e 0 any easy so utlon. 
The Report examined the three traditional canons 
and traced their historical development. 5 Of the three 
the Commissions favoured the mischief approach although 
they recognised that it suffered from certain defects. 
They were sharply critical of the literal approac? 
It assumed an unattainable perfection in draftsmanship; 
it ignored the limitations of language; it afforded no 
.solution in cases where the legislation left the courts 
a limited creative role. Also, it was capable of 
producing an over-technical result. The golden rule 
was also criticised. The main criticism was that it set 
a purely negative standard by reference to absurdity, 
inconsistency or inconvenience, but provided no clear 
means to test the existence of these characteristics 
or to measure their quality or extent. On closer 
3. para. 4. 
4. para. 6. 
5. paras 22-28. 
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examination they thought. the golden rule to be merely 
a less explicit formef ,the mischief approach. The 
criticisms aimed against the latter were: 
1) that it does n6t make clear to what extent the judge 
should consider the actual language used. 
2) it assumes that statute law is subsidiary or 
supplementary to the common law. This may have been 
true in the sixteenth century but is not necessarily 
the case today. Statute law often ma!r'ks a new departure. 
3) th~ rule was,laid down before the extrins~b evid3nce 
6 
exclusion rules were formulated. 
Despite these criticisms, the Commissions 
recommended the enactment of a more updated version of 
the mischief approach. 7 This 1"as to be in terms of the 
promotion of the general legislative purpose. Unfortunately 
the draft clauses, set out in Appendix A to the Report, 
were worded very badly. The purposive approach was to 
be "included among the principles to be applied in the 
'" 8 
interpretation of Acts". This seems to recognise that 
the common law canons still survive. If so, one is still 
left with their existing ill-defined relationship to 
each other. To this is added a further ill-defined 
relationship 1"i th the proposed statutory provision. 
It is true that clause 2(a) states that a purposive 
construction is to be preferred to a construction which 
6. For the Commissions 1 criticism of the three traditional 
canons see paras 29-33. 
7. See para. 81 and Clause 2(a) of the draft proposals. 
8. Clause 2{a). 
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is not so purposive; but the relationship of the 
purposive approach to th.e golden rule, and indeed to the 
old formulation of the mischief rule, is not clear. 
Presumably the literal approach continues. The summary 
, ' 
of conclusions criticised over-emphasis on literal meaning, 
but this is not neceSsarily reflected in the wording of 
the draft clauses. 
The Commissions made some general criticisms 
with regard to pre~ump~ions.9 In their opinion a court 
is not effectively bound by the presumptions because 
a) there is no established order of precedence in the 
case of a conflict of presumptions. 
b) some are of doubtful ,status or imprecise scope. 
c) a court can adopt a construction which is inconsistent 
\-lith a particular presumption without referring to it 
and this does not invalidate its decision. 
d) there is no accepted test for resolving a conflict 
bet1-1een a presumption and the purpose or policy of 
an Act. 
The meaning of d) is not particularly clear since 
a presumption would always be rebutted by a clear state-
ment of legislative policy in the Act. ll:; had been 
suggested to the Commissions that they might attempt 
some statutory classification of legislation with 
appropriate presumptions. This was obviously impracticable 
and the Commissioners contented themselves by recommending 
statutory presumptions in three difficult areas of 
interpretation; a presumption of mens rea, a presumption 
9. See paras 34-39. 
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of an action for breach of statutory duty and a presumption 
of conformity of domestic legislation with international 
treaty obligations. 
The Commissions examined the general question 
of context 10 anddiv~ded their recommendations between 
intrinsic and extrinsic materials. Their recommendations 
on this matter have been discussed in detail above. 
Briefly, they made detailed recommendations on the 
former, but in relation to the latter they did not 
favour a general relaxation of the extrinsic evidence 
exclusion rules. They were hO\-lever prepared to recommend 
the preparation in selected cases of explanatory material 
to acc,ompany an act and be available for use by the courts. 
The Report met "Ii th a good deal of professional 
hostility. Hany.of its recommendations ,.rere condemned 
as impracticable. Further discussion on the matter of 
reform was delayed by reason of the negotiations in 
connection with the Yienna Convention on Treaties, the 
Uni ted Kingdom's entry i;nto the Common Narlcet and a 
domestic debate ,over Parliamentary procedures. Then in 
1975 the Renton Committee published its Report on the 
,Preparation of Legislation. The Committee agreed 1vi th 
the Law Commissions that a comprehensive new Interpret-
ation Act should be prepared and that a provision, to 
the effect that a construction promoting the general 
legislative purpose is to be preferred, might usefully 
form part of such an Act. It did not think that any 
general change in the law concerning the admissibility 
10. See paras 40-62. 
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of extrinsic materials should take place. To admit 
such material would "place too great a burden on litigants 
and their advisors, and indeed 1 1 on the courts. 1I In 
particular it criticised the Lmv Commis sions I proposal 
for explanatory memoranda. 
In February 1980 L~rd Scarman, who as Sir Leslie 
Scarman had been the Chairman of the English Law 
Commissions at the time of the Report, introduced an 
Interpretation Bill into the House of Lords. The Bill 
basically enacted the La\v Commissions draft clauses. 
After severe criticism on his motion for a second 
reading Lord Scarman '4i thdre,v the Bill. Then in 1981 
he introduced a modified, more limited version. A copy 
of this 1981 Bill is set out in Appendix I to this thesis. 
The Bill in its ne,.". form passed the Lords but was 
objected to on the motion for a second reading in the 
House of Commons. It is dead for the present session. 12 
The proposed Eill obviously had many opponents." The 
discussions concerning it highlight current attitudes 
in the United Kingdom to interpretation generally and 
warrant some consideration. 13 
In its original form the Interpretation Bill 
·11. The Preparation of Legislation - Report of the Renton 
Committee para. 19.23. 
12. See F. Eennion 'Another Reverse for the Law Commissions' 
Interpretation Bill' New Law Journal, Aug.13th 1981, 
p.840. Note also the comments of the First Australian 
Parliamentary Counsel, written in reply to a letter 
from J.H. Farrar. G.R.Kolts writes: II; • I have recently 
returned from London where I participated with a 
colleague in discussions with Lord Scarman and various 
senior Government officials. It was made quite clear 
to us that the Bill has been effectively 'killed', 
at least as far as the present session of Parliament 
is concerned. ." (dated 28th July 1981). 
13. For general discussion on the Bill see F. Bennion, ib ide 
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contained three main.clauses. The first specified 
various aids to inter~retation. These related to the 
14 
statutory context and have already been discussed above. 
The second clause set out principles of interpretation 
and the third laid dO\vn a presumption in favour of an 
action for breach of statutory duty. Lord Scarman 
regarded the second clause as by far the most important. 
In its original form this clause laid down two principles 
of interpretation but ~ third was added to the 1981 Bill. 
. . . . 
The firs~ and most important principle was an embodiment 
of the purposive approacho On the I"hole its inclusion 
received a cool response from the House of Lords. 
F. Bennion has made the foll01"ing comments: 15 
HIn one sense this a statement of the obvious 
as many critics have pointed out. In another 
sense i,t begs question. order to 
contemplate applying a construction that 
would not promote the legislative purpose, 
the court must have a powerful reason • 
The most likely reason is that this is the 
clear literal meaning. Does the principle 
overrjde the literal meaning in all cases, 
or only when the literal meaning is doubtful? 
The latter (assuming an informal construction) 
seems to be the present lai". II 
Many of the Lords regarded the provision as saying n,othing 
more than what is presently the law. Lord Simon of 
Glaisdale described the clause as IIdeclaratory of' the 
better practice of the courts. 1I 16 Some thought that, 
being declaratory, the provision could do no harm, while 
others thought that there was no need for Ie 
17 on the subject at all. 
14. See pp. 207-211. 
slation 
15. In his article on the Bill, op.cit. p. 841. 
16. House of Lords Debate 9th March 1981 Col. 78. 
17. See e.g. Viscount Dilhorne at Col. 198, House of' Lords 
Deb2te 13th February 1980. 
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The second principle of interpretation concerned 
the comity of notions. Like the above principle, this 
too states existing law. But it is perhaps even less 
in need of legislative expression since the judicial dicta 
I 
are not in conflict.18 Little was said about this 
second principle in the debates. Nor was much said 
about the third principle, added in 1981, and dealing 
with rarospectivity. F. Bennion considers that, although 
apparently simple and harmless, the provision in fact 
papers over the difficulties'that arise in practice. 19 
The 1980 Bill included a further clause to the 
effect that where a future act imposes a positive or 
negative duty, it is to be presumed, unless the act 
expressly negatives this, that any person '\vho sustains 
damage by breach of the duty is entitled to sue for 
, 20 damages or other civil remedy. Little was said in 
the debates about this clause apart from comments by 
Lord Elwyn-Jones and Viscount Dilhorne. Both considered 
the clause to be too wide. The clause '\V'as dropped from 
the 1981 Bill. 
Objections to the Bill have been based generally 
on one of two grounds. Some regard the whole topic of 
statutory interpretation as unsuitable for legislative 
enactment. Others have criticised the inadequacy of the 
Bill. Many questions are left unanswered. F. Bennion 
18. See F. Bennion op.cit. p.842. 
19. op.cit. p. 842. 
20. Note that in the 1969 La,\-{ Commissions Report the 
inclusion of such a clause "as justified on the gound 
that the exist la'\" on the subject ,-vas rather uncertain. 
Lord Diplock's exposition of the law in Lonhro v Shell 
Petroleum ['I 981J 2 All ER 456 has largely clarified 
the position. 
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sums up this criticism in the ~ollowing passage ~rom 
his article: 
"The ~act is that this subject is much too 
complex to be tidied up by one or two 
simple clauses. Instead o~ a hand~ul o~ 
general principles it needs a large number 
o~ care~ully-constructed statements each 
go no ~arther than it is practicable to 
go, and each dovetail with the others. 
In other words a full-scale code. Fail 
this, the view ~~ most people who have 
considered the Bill appears to be that we 
,{ill do better i~ we continue to rely on 
judicial development. 1I 21 
21. F. Bennion op.cit. p.842. 
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Current awareness of the need for reform in the 
area of statutory interpretation is not confined to 
Britain~ In Australia, legislation providing for the 
insertion of a p~rposive clause into the Australian Acts 
Interpretation Act 1901 was introduced into Parliament 
by the Attorney Gen~ral on 27th May 1981. At the same 
time the Attorney General foreshadowed proposals to 
allow the courts to take into account an explanatory 
memorandum approved by Parliament as an aid to interpret-
t . 22 a 10n. A new Section 15 AA( 1) ,.;ras inserted by the 
Statute LmV' Revision Act 1981 and came into operation 
on 12th June 1981. The section reads as follo"'\.;rs: 
"15AA(1). In the interpretation of a provision 
of an Act, a construction that would promote 
the purpose or object underlying the Act 
(whether that purpose or object is expressly 
stated in the Act or not) shall be preferred 
to a construction that would not promote 
that purpose or object. 
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall 
be construed as authorizing, in the inter-
pretation of a provision of an Act, the . 
consideration of any matter or document not 
forming part of the Act for any purpose 
for which that matter or document could 
not be considered apart from that sub-section.1l 
Sub-section (1) follows the same general form as 
Lord Scarman's proposed purposive clause. Note, how'ever, 
that the .Australian provision talks of the purpose 
"underlying the Act" "'\V'hereas the United Kingdom provision 
referred to the purpose lI underlying the provision". 
The Australian clause thus follows the form favoured 
by the Renton Committee. The clause is designed to operate 
22. See 'New Guidelines For The Interpretation of 
Commomveal th Laws I p.1. - a pamphlet issued by the 
Attorney General when the amendment to the Acts 
Interpretation Act received Royal Assent. 
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alongside the existing rales of construction. No 
doubt these ",ill continue to be used ",here they assist 
in ascertaining the legislative intention. However, 
1"here two alternative: constructions are open, the one 
that promotes the statutory purpose is to be preferred 
to one which does riot. Sub-section (2) stresses that 
the law relating to the admissibility of certain material 
as part of the statutory context is in no way altered 
by the first part of the provision. 
In introduciri~ the legislation Senat6r Dur~ck, 
the Attorney General, spoke of the need for such a 
provision: 
"The effect of·the provision to be inserted 
in the Acts Interpretation Act will be to 
confirm that in interpreting provisions 
regard is to be had to the object or 
purpose underlying the Act in question. 
I am not among those who would say that 
the general approach of our Courts is at 
present overly legalistic, but I do think 
that there is scope for expressly stating 
that the statutes we make are to be 
interpreted in a purposive manner. Tax 
decisions constitute a topical and important 
example that 1·dll come readily to all 
Senators' minds, but the matter has wider 
implications that extend to many other 
statutes." 23 . 
Senator Durack 'vent on to discuss future reform proposals 
relating to the use of explanatory memoranda and 
committee reports: 
II. • Explanatory material is often provided 
by the Government to assist senators and 
members, and subsequent users of legislation. 
23. The Attorney General's second reading speech, quoted 
in 'New· Guidelines for the Interpretation of Common-
wealth Laws' at p.l. 
The material is of p2.rticular 'value ""here 
legislation is complex or specialized in 
subject matter or both. • 
I think we need to consider placing this 
practice on a more regular basis, even to 
the extent of having an explanatory 
memorandum approved by the Parliament and 
able to be taken into account by the Courts 
in interpreting difficult provisions in 
the Act. The memorandum could not and 
would not be controlling. However, apaDt 
from contributin~ to the ease with which 
an Act can be understood by the public as 
well as by senators and members, such a 
practice offers the hope that the draftsman, 
,,,,hen faced ,,,i th the difficult choice of 
ei ther using general language ',hich might, 
however, leave the Courts "ithout sufficient 
guidance, or introducing lengthy detailed 
provisions. could feel some security in 
choosing the former course if he knew 
that a memorandum approved by the 
Parliament "ould embody its intent. 
The fear has been expressed that the use of 
extraneous materials such as reports and 
explanatory memoranda will increase the 
cost and length of legal proceedings. 
Certainly the possible disadvantages have 
to be considered and "eighed against the 
benefits that would flow from the use of 
such materials. The time has come. hm,ever. 
when the matter should be fully explored and 
I take the opportunity of stating to the 
Senate that I propose to do so with a view 
to developing specific proposals that can 
be brought into the Parliament for further 
consideration • • II 24 
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It will be interesting to see the reception of such. 
proposals. 
24. Ibid. pp.1-2. 
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In Part A of the thesis we looked at the nature 
and ascertainment: of meaning :f'rom a saman:tic and 
philoso cal point of view. In Part B we considered 
Ie approaches tc rneaning~ In particular we considered 
statements of iple by the judic and Ie 
academics. We sa',j that in-'cerpreta tion has traditional 
been subject to theoretical classification into three 
main Irules '; the literal. golden and mischief rules~ 
More accurately these are described as approaches to 
meaning. The modern tendency has been to amalgamate these 
traditional approacheso The lordinary m I approach 
has been combined with a fuller understanding of the 
influence of context and indeed of statutory purposee 
From a semantic point of view this tendency has much to 
recommend it. The application of one of a number of' 
rigid and distinct Irul es ' is a totally inadequate means 
by which to ascertain meaning. 
Having considered the theory of' judicial interpret-
ation, it remains to consider actual judicial practice. 
The object of Part C is to consider how judicial practice 
measures up to the linguistic and legal tbeory discussed 
above. Evidence of judicial practice is taken from a 
survey of' two years of the New' Zealand Law Reports; 1958 
and 1978 e A total of two hundred cases involving 
statutory construction have been read and analysed. 
I. PURPOSE OF 
The })'l).;:'"po s e ()f tl'le sur'lIey 1ttaS 
1) to deterrnine. 'i-lhether in the caSBS considered the 
judges in fact applied the traditional canons of 
interprete.tion, 
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2) to determine ',,{hich of the canons they ied most 
frequently and whether there was any s ficant 
in the reported cases between 19 and 1978~ 
3) if the j s did not apply the traditional canons, 
to determine on what basis they made their decision, 
4) to determine the use made of section S(j) of the Acts 
In-terpretation Act 1921j and iVhether there was any 
si ficant change between 1958 and 1978~ 
II. HETHOD 
The basic method used in the survey was an 
examination of every case involving statutory interpret-
ation in the two years under consideration. Thus the 
survey was based on the 'total population' of statutory 
interpretation cases in these years in the sense that a 
volume of reported cases can be regarded as a single unit 
and the statutory interpretation cases as a sub unit. 
It was both possibl~ and practicable to survey the whole 
of this population. 1978 lvas taken as. a recent year. and 
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1958 as a period 
that 0(1 £'01'" aSCE:l~ 
possibly have adopted a more so isticated methodology 
but as a non-statistician it was difficult to see how a 
more useful survey could have been carrj.ed out on the 
basis of random samplin,';'; .. It seemed more sensible to 
take every case in two particular years than s e cases 
over a number of years e One main reason for this is 
that not every case reported necessarily involve~ 
statutory interpretation. Also, random sampling could 
give a misleading indication of judicial approach. 
Taking the total population is more likely to show the 
judges dealing with a range of subjects and adopting a 
range of approaches. Given the smallness of the total 
population involved it is unlikely that random sampling 
would give an a~equate spread of subject matter. 
The initial system of classification adopted was 
as follows: 
(1) Year, Pa$~L Name of Case 
(2) £ourt t Judge/s 
(3) TYpe of Statute 
Under this heading the main system of classification 
f'ollolved lvas basicalJ_y that used in New Zealand legal 
1 
education" . 
1" The classi:fication of statutes adopted in the Ne~" 
Zealand Law Reports itself was far too detailed for 
the purpose of the survey_ This classification 
comprised approximately fifty categories and was 
intended for index purposes. 
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1'118 iss't.le vla.S aSC8l"'tai:r18cl f~:C'on1 :.reaclirlg" 118ctdnotes 
and the Go odh"trt I s 
criterion of ratio decidendi was ado ed, i.e. a prine e 
based on the material facts of a case. 
(5) 
A system or ion into the major Ii stic 
sources of uncertainty (vagueness and open texture, 
arub ty~ ity) was originally adopted. 
(6) 
The distinction between interpretation and 
application made by writers such as Reed Dickerson2 
adopted as the basis of this head 
'fhe broad head 'purposive' was adopted instead 
of 'mischief' to cover cases where the judges used the 
former ,,,i thout making express reference to the old 
formulation of the mischief rule. In the surveyts 
original form each approach was further divided into 
express and implied applications. It was felt that in 
some cases a particular canon was implicit in the court's 
decision although not stated expressly. For example, 
a reference to the meaning being 'ordinary' or 'plain' 
has been taken as an application of the literal rule. 
(8) §ection ,(j) or Other Sections of the Acts 
Internretation Act. 
,_ So-
Under this heading were noted cases decided 
2. In tThe Interpretation and Application of Statutes'. 
lyon the basis o~ some legal presumpt on. No 
note was made of cases where reference to a presumption 
1-Jas mereljT 2tricil to a decision based on other 
ThiSJ~S a 'broad category '\\111.ich irH:ludes statu DT}' 
definitions, dictionary definitions ana o 1 CJ....c'1...l.. 
definitions includ definition by means of a test. 
( 11 ) 
This heading ,vas incorporated primarily for personal 
reference and for use in Parts il_ and B of the thesis. 
(12) 
No deep analysis of policy was in~ The 
reason for this he was simply to identify when 
policy factors were clearly a relevant cbnsideration 
in the decision-making process. 
(1)) Use o~ .. Preceden! 
Cases were noted where the court's decision was 
based largely on judicial dicta in previous cases. 
III. PRO BLElvl S 
1) Difficulty was often encountered in formulating the 
ratio decidendi. Furthermore, this particular heading 
did not seem to have much bearing on the object of the 
survey. 
2) The division of cases on the basis of linguistic 
uncertainty proved difficult to carry out and '"as 
eventually dropped. Decisions seemed to involve something 
more than a simple resolution of problems of meaning in 
of classific tion was 
in part also due to (3). 
ication distinction seemed to be 
u:rlo;vork.8."i:;le in pTactice and 'I8.S dropped"J The court 
did not seem to app this distinction consistent 
themselves, although wider COTlsidera,tioD~S 
"ere taken into accourlt in many c ses. 
4) The division of the canons into express and led 
applications proved difficult. In practice it was 
impossible to discern in all' cases s 
had particular canons in reference 
was made to them us the usual terminology. Since 
the canons do not necessitate decisions, in retrospect 
this is not surprising. In the final sis of' the 
survey this distinction was dropped except for a 
category reco sing an implied purposive approach. 
This category '(,'as used ,,'here there 1,.;as some reference 
indicating attention to the statutory purpose or policy. 
This was a type of implied application that was easy to 
discern" It should be borne in mind therefore that not 
all cases tabulated as applying a icular canon did 
.so expressly. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
( 1 ) 
Out of a total of 164· cases ~ 113 cases involved 
___ m __ .~ ____ "'~~. ____ o ____ _ 
J. Cf. the theoretical difficult es of this distinction. 
See p. 92., 
an issue of statu in terpre to.t::L 
of these cases into subject headings is as follows: 
\ 
I 
Crimes 
8 
I 
Procedure 
Family 
18 
Coy/ 
Tax Corr,merc ia.1 
10 ? 21 
Tort I Ind=ia~-I 
~ ___ . __ 14 ______ ~ ___ 6 ____ ~ __ 1__ ""~1_~ 
Public 
'18 
TraT1S 
Out of' a total of 137 cases, 87 cases involved an 
issue of' statutory interpretation. The division of' 
these cases into subject headings is as f'0110"('IS: 
I 
P:MiC I Coy/ Crimes Family Tax Commercial Land 
22 17 5 10 2 9 
J 
Procedure Equity Tort Industrial I Transport Other 
9 2 1 2 5 3 
(2) ApJ}roaches adopted -yarticul.e.1;' class of' st"2:tutes 
2 
I SECJ~IO]>J 
LITERAL GOLDEN PUP.POSIVE I S(j) 
J 
Crin10s 0 1 1 I 0 
I 
i I 
Fami 1 1 , 1 
_t 
Tax 4· 1 1 ! 0 ! 1 
I 
I 
Coy! I I I 
Commercial 1 0 2 I 0 I 
- I 
---I 
I I Land 6 1 1 1 I 
I .~~ 
-
... ~ , 
ic 6 1 3 ! 2 I I I 
I : Procedure 3 0 1 I 0 , 
I 
--{ 
I 
Equity 2 0 0 0 r I I 
Tort 0 0 0 I 0 l 
I J 
I ! Industrial 1 0 0 I 0 
I I 
I ~ Transport 0 1 0 I 1 I , 
1 
I TMPLIED NO CLEAR PREStJ1I.1PTION 
1 PURPOSIVE RULE 
I 
J 
Crimes t 0 6 0 
-. 
I 
Family I 1 13 0 ~ , 
I I Tax 0 6 0 
, 
i 
Coy! I 
Commercial I 0 5 0 
--
I 
Public 
I 
Procedure 
I 
ty 
I 
Tort 
- d . . 1 i l..n us "Grla~. I 
-'- I orv[ 
o 
o 
o 
o 
3 
:GTG CI-"l~i~Fl l)r{J~STJI'lP·l~IC'I·J 
F~TjI ... f!~ 
12 
7 
9 o 
4. o 
1 o 
5 o 
1 
~--------------~--------~--------~-----------r----~------~ 
I GOLDEN I PUHPOSIVE i 
Crimes 
Family 
Tax 
Coy/ 
Commercial 
Land 
Public 
Procedure 
Equity 
Tort 
Industrial 
Transport 
Other 
11 
3 
o 
1 
o 
4 
3 
o 
1 
2 
4 
1 
1 
o 1 
1 o 
1 4 
o o 
1 3 
o 2 
o 1 
o o 
o o 
o 1 
o 1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
SECTION 
S(j) 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
I 
, 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I :[>lPL.IJ~JJ C I.;:C i\ r:~ P IJ, E S t3J'-'1, J? 1" 10 l'T 
I }')1.JTtI) C1 f) 1\' 1~ HULE 
I 
I 3 ? 1 s I 
I 
1y I 2 
'I'flX I 0 q. 0 
J 
Coy/ 
I 
I 
Commercial. 0 5 
J 0 2 
I 
Public I 1 1 
I 
Procedure 
I 
0 
.5 0 
ty 
I 
Tort 
0 0 
I 
0 
I 
0 0 
! 
(3) Approaches as,'topted - general totals and 
percentages 
19"'8 ) 
I 
LITERAL GOLDEN PURPOSIVE j SECTION 
I 5(j) 
I 
.GENERAL I I 
TOTAL 27 6 10 I 5 
I 
PEHCENTAGE I 
OF TOTAL I 
CASES ON I 
INTERPRET"" 23 .. 9 5.3 8.8 I 4.4 
ATION OF I 
ST'j~TUTES I 
I 
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I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
TUI'A.L 
PERCENTAGE: 
OF TOTAL 
CASES ON 
Il;;TEl1PRET;., 
ATION 
STATUTES 
GENERAL 
TOTAL 
PERCENTAGE 
OF TOTAL 
CASES ON 
INTERPRET-
ATION OF 
STATUTES 
GENERAL 
TOTAL 
PERCENTAGE 
OF TOTAL 
CASES ON 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
INTERPRET- I 
ATION OF I 
STATUTES I 
I 
I 
I 
! 
! 
I 
II"11")IJI]I;lJ 
PUHPO 
2' 
LITERAL 
30 
34 .. 5 
IHPLIED 
PURPOSIVE 
7 
8 
l\ICl CLJ~ij.:P'. PICLGS·Ul,·ilF fI()l,J 
'7:)TTT 1.;-' 1: \. \j .!. . .J ~._j 
61 • 1 
2 
1.8 
GOLDEN PUHPOSIVE! SECTION 
I 5(j) 
I 
I 
L, 16 I 0 
I 
j 
I 
4.6 18.4 I 0 
I 
j 
! 
NO CLEAR 
RULE PHESUHPTION 
39 2 
44.8 2.3 
I 
I 
f 
J 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
f 
I 
I 
, 
(4) Further analysis of cases ap~lyirig no clea~ 
'rule l or canon of interpretation: 
Out of the 69 cases applying no clear canon of 
interpretation: 
19 were based on precedent (of which one was 
decided on the basis of a definition laid 
down in a previous case, and two were based 
on analog"y :from the me to similar 
words in another Act). 
18 involved an exercise of' discretion. 
1 1 seemed to involve ication 
b,. 
only. 
3 applied common law principles. 
3 were bas ed on defini tiona laid dmvn by the judge 
(of which two definitions were by means of a 
test)~ 
was based on 'common senseI. 
1 applied principles applicable to another 
statute by way of analogy. 
Out of the 39 cases applying no olear canon of 
interpretation: 
14 involved an exercise of the court I s d~isoretion. 
11 seemed to involve application only. 
3 were based on precedent (of which one was 
decided on the basis of a definition by iest 
which was laid down in the previous case). 
J were based on definitions laid down by the judge 
(of whioh one definition was by means of a test). 
J were based on clear policy considerations. 
1 was based on 'common sense'. 
4." Although the interpretation/application distinction did 
not seem to be gep"e~al~.y applicable and a consistent 
analysis along these lines was dropped from the survey, 
there did seem to be a few cases that could be 
explained in terms of application. 
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The aims of the to 
from a _I" , -'!.. 
the traditional cana~s of interpretation to determine 
the use made of Section S(j), and t determine the basis 
of decision in thos~ cases where neither the canons nor 
Section S(j) featured as an acknowled part of the 
judicial reasoning. An attempt was made to detect s 
and trends over the twenty yaarperiod from 1958 to 1978. 
As far as the canons are concerned, it is intarest-
to note an increase in ication of both the literal 
and purposive approaches in 1978; the latter approach 
the greater inc~ease. Applicatipn of the golden 
rule seems to have remained relatively constant. 
interesting still is the number of cases in both years 
where no clear rule or canon of interpretation seems to 
have been applied by the judges. This category included 
the majority of cases in 1958 but ranked approximately 
equal to the number of cases adopting a literal approach 
in 1978. Several factors formed the basis of judicial 
decision making in these cases; among them reliance on 
precedent, the exercise of a discretion, the application 
of common law principles, the application of a definition, 
analogy, policy considerations and common sense. A 
sizeable proportion of the cases seemed to involve an 
issue of application and were not specifically concerned 
with interpretation as such. The notable decline in cases 
based. ily on precedent 
on~ The sizeable increase in the cases 
current trends in Ie ielative draft tIle l.acJ~ 
of cases express reference to SectiOJl J.S of 
interest~ a1 rtot necess8.ri 2· s 
Are these ~ • 1 J l11.0 s re onci1abl Ivi th the 
aIr reached in Parts A and B of the thesis? In Part A 
emphasis was placed on those aspects of langtlage likely 
to give rise to a lem case of interpretation and on 
t.hose factors necessary for the satisfactory resolution 
of linguistic doubt~ In particular emphasis was ed 
on context and its fundamental importance f'or the ascertain-
ment of the meaning of both clear and doubtful provisions. 
In Part B the theory of judicial interpretation was 
considered; in particular the use of so-called 'rules' or 
canons of interpretation. Upon closer examination each 
of these 'rules' proved to be of only limited adequacy 
as an index of statutory meaning. This conclusion is 
consistent with and even supported by the find that 
frequently no reference was made to the canons in the 
course of judicial decisions. Arguably this omission 
could result from recognition of this inadequacy_ It 
would seem that judges of late are beccm increasingly 
aware of certain fundamentals of linguistic theory as 
well as the inadequacy of traditional reasoning patterns. 
1. See p. 91. 
2. See comments on ~ne application of Section S(j) by 
J.F. Burrows in 'The Cardinal Rule of Statutory Interpret-
ation in New Zealand' [1969J3 N.Z.D.L.H. 253. 
2:39 
register anrl its effect on ordinary rr:canlng is one indicat-
judicial reference to the relevant statutory context is 
an.otb.er. The further the traditional canons are seen to 
diverge from modern linguistic theory, the less plsusible 
they are as reasons for·meaning. Alternatively~ . ~ .., -; II C OLLLCl 
be that many of these caSBS just did not lend themselves 
to the application of a canon anyway_ This is the most 
probable explanation in cases in"volving the exercise of a 
discretio!'1 and 9 by definition, in cases involving an 
issue of application only& 
Where the canons were cited, it was often difficult 
to categorise decisions under the traditional three-fold 
classification. Either this has always been the case 
and the traditional classification was from the start a 
misconception of actual judicial practice, or there has 
been some change over the years in the nature and content 
of the canons. While it would be difficult to prove the 
former, the conclusions reached in Part B certainly support 
the latter proposition. The literal rule no longer supports 
a narrow, isolationist approach to the meaning of statutory 
words: ordinary meaning must be determined in light of 
the relevant statutory context, arguably even the statutory 
purpose. The golden rule, even if originally applicable 
only to cases involving some internal inconsistency, now 
extends to cases where the consequences of adhering to the 
2a. For example see Lord Simon of Glaisdale in Maunsell v. 
Olins [1975] AC 373, 391E. 
'} 
o of' l-JO~~(~J5 are G()J15~~(ler'E:c1 ~ Sllrdc.~ rl~j~le 
somewhat outdated mischief ru ~ ha5 now been superseded 
by the more modern osive 
between the traditional canons has become blurred; 
have begun to merge ~. E.1\" Dr:ie concludes that the 
canons have been c 01:.:e ed into one uniform 
approach to As yet this would appear to 
be an overstatement of Judicial practice in Ne,v Zeal.arv.i¢ 
There is no doubt ho'vever that the traditional canons 
a change in formulation. 
The finding that only a few cases make express 
reference to Section 5(j) is consi~tent with the conclusion 
reached by J.F. Burro~s that Section 5(j) is little used 
I':' 
by the New Zealand judges.~ This does riot necessarily 
mean that the judges are uninfluenced by the section 
which basically represents a statutory codification of the 
mischief approach. Arguably the section also represents 
an attempt by the Ie slature at codification of acc able 
judicial attitudes in relation to legislation in a modern 
society. As such the section could \vell be largely taken 
as read insofar as it is useful and ignored ;"rhere it is not. 
Its very generality permits both possibilities. It is 
impossible to tell whether the increase in cases applying 
a purposive approach is a direct consequence of Section 5(j) 
or whether the same trend would still be apparent regardle s 
of legislative intervention. In Britain and other 
3. Compare this with tbe position adopted by E.A. Driedger. 
See pp. 138-141" 
L~~ See p. 157., 
5. J.F. Burrows 'The Cardinal Rule of Statutory Interpret-
ation in New Zealand' op.cit~ p. 256. 
seems to be appare~t dn the absence of such a provls on. 
ications o~ n more nature 
3:-ise the car:.on:s 
cited, what is thei~ function in those cases where they 
are oi tE;d? leads to questions cone 
the true basis of in cases 
invo statutorj interpretation. tl"l€ fac t tJ1.at 
the canons need not be cited mean that they are useless 
and mere cited tously? Th~re are three possible 
alternatives; first, one could argue that the canons are 
of no real use, second that a~e of some use and third, 
that the canons necessitate _decisions. Cle the latter 
proposition is an untrue statement of their cal 
nature - the canons are not trl1e 'rules' and do not 
necessitate decisions even in the loose sense that legal 
rules can be said to necessitate decision. Since in many 
cases the canons are used one must infer that they are of 
some use; the first proposition is therefore unlikely. 
The question is, "That use do they have? The canons are 
not th f d .. 6 e cause 0 a eC1S1on. Ultimately this will -be the 
result of practical reasoning and will have its in 
evaluation. 7 Acting within the limits set by the statutory 
words the judge will try to give effect to what is in 
practice a lreasonable1 result not for the litigant 
but for socie as a ,~hole II> 
Judicial decisions in the proble~ case will thus 
inevitab involve an element of creativity. 
6. Cf. A~ noss IOn Law And Justice' pp. 136-138. 
7. Ibid" 
cia1 runction sale 
interpretation w~ere a pre- rule of law 15 readi 
ied, it is unrealistic to do so in th 
problem case. in such a case there is no pre-
Q 
eXls~lng rule of lrui cove the case at hand.~ Instead 
e is a dispute about what the appropriate rule may be 
and the court's function is to choose the appropriate 
~orm and content of that rule. The court does :not discover 
a pre-existing norm~ it ere as one. 
penumbral C8.se t}J.e court decides Hhether the particular 
facts berore it are included or exclu.ded from tbe relevant 
statutory rulee makirlg 
fact redefining the rule; 
court creates a new rule. 9 
its decision 
red 
the court is in 
the rule, the 
This constructive element in decision making is 
rarely acknowledged by the judges. Terms such as 'inter-
pretation' which imply a purely co ive search for some 
pre-existing meaning tend to obscure the true nature of 
the judicial function. 10 There are two main reasons for 
this hesitance to admit creativity. First, the doctrine 
of' s ion of powers has largely been responsible ror 
the myth +11a+ ., d t'" ~ 11 w u Junges 0 no ~egls~a~e. As slation 
is supposed to rest primarily in the hands of a democratic-
al elected Parliament, the suggestion easily arises that 
it be per for judges to be creative. 
----------.~.-.--
8~ See R.B Seid an $oToe Judicial IJrocess Heconsidered In 
The L t of Role Theory' (1969) 32 MLR 516, 521. 
90 Ibid" p.522. 
10. See B. Abel-Smith and R. Stevens 'Lawyers and The Courts' 
p .. 2 
11. See R.B. Seidman op;c.it. pp~ 529-5JO. 
have seen, is a naive and s listie view of the judicial 
8 appear to be in£luenced 
value considerations. Such decisions, it is supposed, are 
e S s 0-Tltis.l subj~ctiye in nature and possibly the result 
of individual emotion. At tbe v ry least they rui t result 
from the political and Bocial bias of the j 12 This B. 
Be6ms to strike at one of' the f'undamentals of adjudication, 
namely impartiality. The fact that the views of the 
judges on value que stions are often out of touch 'l;.:i th the 
views of society as a whole~ coupled with the fact that 
these views can be backed up by force and the paraphernalia 
of law, serves to increase scepticism. Such arguments are 
based on a misunderstanding of the true nature of evaluation 
and of practical reasoning in general. These are not 
necessarily arbitrary processes. 13 The judge's decision 
mast accord with the existing legal and social framework 
as indicated by the surrounding 'clear' law. In the great 
majority of cases the scope for judici choice is narrow 
and the values involved instrumental ratl1er than ultimate. 
Usually there will be consensus on the more general values 
14 
to be served. The judges h01-!ever have not been unaffected 
12. 
13. 
See B. Abel-Smith and Re Stevens op.cit. Chapter XI. 
For a discussion of judicial reasoning and subjectivity 
scepticism see H. S. SUlllmers 'T,,,o Types of Substantive 
Reasons: The Core of a Theory of Common Law Justifica-
ti on! (1978) 63 Cornell La,,, Rev. 707 ~ Summers identifies 
three strands to subjectivity scepticism which he calls 
the "value-plurali ty" thesi s, the I1 no -- s hared values If 
thesis and the "value-indeterminacy" thesis" In 
relation to each of these he tries to show that judicial 
reasoning is not an arbitrary process. 
See H.B. Seidman op&cit. pe525~ 
scepti lsm and criticism. 
surprising that they are he itant to acknowl the 
creative clement in their decisions. 
It is with this ba 
nature and function of e canons becomes 
Because the jUdicial l function is c expressed in terms 
of a rational search f6r some pre-exist 
canons are conventional forward as reasons for 
decision" In fact it is possible to re them either 
as reasons for meaning or as reasons for decision. 
the tHO are dif'ferent in logical status although ei tb.er 
function could be fulfilled by the same canon. The 
term l.reason' here is used in the sense of !justification' 
and not in its alternative sense of 'cause'. 
In Part B the canons were assessed as an index of 
statutory meaning e 1'lhile their 10 cal status could 
bro be described as 'reasons for meaning', it was 
obvious that they were of only limited adequacy in this 
capacitYr but to talk about the canons en masse as having 
a single legal or rhetorical function can be deoeptive. 
Different canons have different justificatory functions. 
-The literal approach indicates presumptive meaning resting 
on the ordinary meaning of words and, in this sense, it 
is an index of Tn The go en rule, on the other 
hand t is as much concerned with evaluation of consequence 
ly 
as 'Hith presumed meaning. In this way it functions largely 
as a reflexive approach to me and more as a reason 
for decision. Finally the mischief rule represents an 
1 1::" 
historical aT, more accurate a continuum'J approach 
s consideration not only 
of the past lmischief', ln1t also the present Iremedy' 
and how it can be~t be terpreted to accord with the 
statute!s purpose as re 8 future actions. In the 
sense that the Ie ature is rresu~ed to intend a 
meaning that promotes th statutory purpose, this too 
can be described as en index of statutory meaning. 
An al-'cernat is to express the canons as 'reasons 
for decision. I While not the motivating cause of a decision, 
they certainly provide tification for that decision. 
In the words of Alf Ross, the cauohs provide a sfacade 
f · ~. f' t . II 16 th ", .L. f tJ I' , l' .p o JUS!:;l lca lon, - ey Iorm parl> o'.1.e '1;eC1.nlque 0-,-
arg'umentation" used the judge to make' it appear that 
his decision was arrived at objectively and is covered 
by the "me of tl~e statute!! or the !!intention of the 
1'" Legislature" 0 ( The American fliax Radin expressed the 
same sentiments in the following passage: 
liThe maxims are not really 'rules' in the 
sense that they require ,us to reach one result 
rather than another in the application of a 
statute to an action at law~ but they do 
const e a vocabulary and a method of 
presentation when for reasons entirely apart 
from those 'rules' and their 'exceptions' 
a result of some kind is reached in the 
effort to kn01'; t-:hether any act is prohibited 
or permitted under a statute.\! 18 
15. C£'. R.W.M. Dias 'Jurisprudence! 4th ed. Dias talks 
about present and continuum time :frames an relation 
16. 
17, 
18. 
to Ie theory. 
A. Hoss, o'p.cit. p. 152. 
Ibid. p. 152. 
r':J. Had in t California Law Rev., 33, 219. 
ed. 
the uest crt 0 wheth 
- "1 
:L S -'- istical y permis ibIs, if the context warr~nts 
Similar , Alf Ross descri es the canons as ClTcum-
s cril~ tl'16 fre edam G the j 
area of '". . 20 it justif'i.2:ble SO~L1J,t:1.0n.s & Ii In view of the fact 
that in practice the court of·tcn~ do liOt 
at all these corr~ents are too widely stated •. Either 
they need ification to account for this fact or 
one has to· resort to. in:ferel1.ce the canons are still 
tac~tly accepted as de the scope of the inquiry~ 
Arguab it is possible to make this inference if the 
court does inconsistent with the ca ons and, as 
we have seen, in some cases this implication seems to be 
')~ 
bl t · (- f a reasona e assump 10n. It should also be noted that 
as :flexi bi Ii ty 1"i thin the individual canons allo\1T8 them 
to be used to reach quite contrary results, the area 
of" justifiable solutions" \<1ill be a Hide one Q 
If evaluation of consequence is regarded as a 
proper and integral part of practical decision making then, 
in order to be an adequate source of reasons for de6ision, 
the canons must account for this evaluation. Arguably, 
the golden rule is the only canon which provides for an 
explicit assessment of the consequences of an interpretation, 
and this by its very nature is limited to the exceptional 
case, The traditional canons are thus not only of limited 
adequacy as reasons for meaning. but inadequate as necessary 
-----. 
Hart and Sacks 
A. Hoss op.cit. 
21. See p.2JOe 
'The Legal 
p.1SJ. 
------------.-----------
Process'. 
and sufficient reasons for C':LS:':~O iIi 
as reasons for decision is 8.S one 0 
reasons pointing in a lCULer dire tiona 
their nature and content apucers to have uDder~one 
a ted 
as yet an overstatecient of judicial practice lD New 
Zealand, there does seem to 
unified and consistent approach to interpretation. 
together with the t that the traditional canons 
frequently are not cited at all, raises further implications 
for the 1m" of statutory interpreta tioD. It is subm.itted 
that the cases reve.al a shift in the domim:u1.t pi3.radigm 
applicable to the construction of statutes. 23 The tradition-
al canons are in the process of be replaced a ncw 
paradigm "'hose features include a presumption in favour 
of ordinary Fleaning, a liberalisation of context to 
include tlie tatutory purpose and a long-stop measure to 
avoid possible in.justice and absurdi 
The find that the tradi tional canons often ",'ere 
not cited is consistent with this submission. 1958 th.e 
number of the8e cases ,,,ere g-reater than in 1978. Arguab 
22 .. Cf" J·os Haz~ 'Practical HeasoD and Nornls f ' Haz 
does not deal with such practical matters as interpret-
ation of statutes. He does not discuss reasons for 
meaning but he has a category of hhieh 
serves to an act which there is reason to 
perform. (p.] canons can p s be re ed as 
a species of raason identifying the statutory rule. 
When used as a reason for decision the canons can perhaps 
be regarded as second order reasons i. reasons to act 
for the reasons contained in the at tutory rule (Ibid. 
p.39). There is a 10 cal difference between the two 
types of function. 
23. For a discussion of dominant ir.-ms in re12,tiou to 
language in general see pp. 10-11 ~ 
the ~958 f' es reflect a grow sf'a,ction wi th 
years until 1978 a clear d97010 in jUdicial 
approach was apparent. The judges became increas 
aware of certain fundamentals of 1 i tic theory and 
the need for some oonformity between 5 al1.cl lcial 
theories of interpretation. In 1978 cases adopting both 
!literal' and 'purposive' approaches increased in number 
and those clear rule were reduced. These 
increases accord with the liberalisation of the literal 
rule and the increasing re for context, including 
statutory purpose - the increase in cases adopting the 
ordinary meaning of words does reflect a return to a 
stricter approach to interpretation. 
Unlike Driedger who cl an tamalgamated approach' 
'/4 
to be already operational as the basis of interpretations~ 
it is submitted that the shift has not yet been 
fully 1vor1ced out by the courts" This is indicated both 
by j~dicial practice (in 1978 there still existed cases 
adopting the traditional formulation of the canons) and 
by theory. Complete adoption of the new paradigm w6uld 
only be possible after certain differences of opinion 
have been resolved. If the dominant approach to interpret-
ation is to be one where the ordinary meaning of words is 
determined only after a full consideration of the immediate 
context and the statutory purpose, then agreement must be 
reached on the means by \>Thich this purpose is to be 
ascertained. It is on this question of the admissibility 
24~ E.A. Dri r 'The Construction of Statutes'. 
o 
some .j 25 5 are prepared 0 liberalise 
the prese:u 
must be rational in the sense of 
teristics of logical consistency, 
c OI"le Gr::·tlla~l col1ereI1CG 
2'7 
PO"hi 01.""' Ii< i 
of 10 cal consistency 'requires that the 10 cal cOIlsequerlces 
O +' ,1. should harmoniously coexist and should not 
1 - , ~ b 28 axc ude eaCD oC.er •. Not only is th~ traditional formul-
stion of the literal rule ly contradictory to th2~t 
of the mischief rule, but the relationship between the 
mischief and golden rules is itself ill-defined e By 
c son the elements of the ne,v paradigm relate to each 
other with no contradiction or overlap. To be conceptually 
coherent a paradigm must not offend common sense and 
general 2. .. CC < 29 ed views as to the nature of language. 
As ,,ie have seen the ne,,, paradigr;l is aris out of the 
10 6&1 inconsistency and incoherence of the traditional 
canons. Finally, a paradigm must offer a possible solution 
t +1 bl th t t d 't 30 o ~le pro; em a- promp e 1. What appears to be the 
outline of the new paradigm suggests a greater explanatory 
power than previously existed. 
In addition to the formal requirements of ration 
a ism icable to the interpretation of 
statutes mu~t be capable of functioning as a source of 
e 1 Lord Scarman, House of Lords Debate, 13th 
" For ex:::unple, Lord iJiplock, nouse of Lords Debate, 13th 
19 
. See J. Kekes 'A Justification of Rationality', p. 133~ 
2EL Tbid. p. "35. 
29. Cf. Ibid. pp. 149 et seq. 
30 Ibid. p. 153. 
and reasons fe d e~Slon J=rld~j""'Jli 
the traditional canon~ are of ilni t<.-;cl CltJ.8,C}' C:'~s ei t]J.e:r~~. 
The 1'19:1.'"1 taI1ce 
J- ~r 
-.1 
ordinary an comes much closer to accepted 1 stir: 
theory. interpretation is a s ecialis 
branch of practical 'reasoning. To be an ade e source 
of reasons for decision ~he new ig-nl rn"~st rec so 
practical reasoning evaluation to be the true basis 
of' judicial decisionrnaking. This it would seem to do 
,,,ith its icit provision for an assessment of th~ 
consequences of interpretation. 
Despite the fact that the new igm comes nearer 
to affording adequate reasons for meaning it is doubtful 
whether the theory and practice of judicial interpretation 
could ever be wholly acceptable to the linguist. The 
judicial function is very different from that of the 
linguist, or the philosopher, or even the legal 'academic f 
and does not lend itself to analysis solely in terms of 
1 stic considerations. Ultimately a judge must 
administer justice in the case before him and justi6e is 
not al\"ays advanced by adhering strictly to the natural 
linguistic meaning of the statutory text~ 
A final question remains for Net, Zealand la,,,,. How 
does the evolving case law igm differ from Section S(j) 
and why has Section 5 (j) not represented the new parad ? 
The main difference is that ",hereas the ne,V' paradigm 
attempts to provide a comprehensive and consistent guide 
to the meaning of a statute, Section S(j) seems to deal 
25 
with only one of the elam 
tatutory purpose ~b 
part of the context in s are to be read but, 
like tbe mischief rule i elf fails ~o make clear the 
'-Tords ~ Sim:Lla~cly ~ al 8S more scope for a 
court to do justjce, in its terms tho section omits to make 
e • • +-lCl ~,.f provision for an assessment of the COllsequ8Ilces 
of an interpretationc Pe s the most important reason 
Section 5(j) has D_ot been adopted as the neH paradigm 
is that in its present form it is of no real assistance 
in the interpretation of obscure sions. It is there-
fore inc Ie of offering a solution to all the problems 
tb t pr ed it. The section 0 es alongside existing 
rules gove the admissibility of extrinsic evidence. 
If there is no evidence of Parliament's object apart from 
, ~ I 
the words of the statute, i~begs the question/to instruct 
a court to interpret the words so as to effectuate Parlia-
, 31 
mentIs object,. This illustrates pe the s of 
legislative reform. While not necessarily agree that 
statutory interpretation is a 'non-subject', one can 
ultimate agree ,,1 th Lord 1{il berTorce that it is "a 
matter for educating the judges and practitioners and 
hoping that the work is better doneo lt32 
3 1 . ~ 
--------------------------_ .. ------_._ ..--.. --
See J.P. Burrows 'The Cardinal Rule of Statutory Inter-
pret8tion in r\"8-",' Zealand I op.cit o p~ 278. 
House of Lords Debate 16th Nov. 1966. Col. 1294. Cf. 
this \vi th a later speech of Lord_ \{ilberfor'ce on the 
Interpretation of Le slation Bill - House of Lords 
Debate 13th Peb. 19 ~ Col. 277. 
252 
Since the typing of this thesis, the House of 
Lords have once a~ain considered the matter of reference 
to pc~rliament2Lr-y materials in the interp:,,:'etatio!~'_ of' 
1982", 
In the course of his speech Lord Diplock. with 
whom all their Lordships agreed, took exception to a 
." 
passage in the judgement of Lord Denning in the Court of 
Appeal in \"hich;> his Lorciship said:. liThe Master of the 
sought to justify the c6nstruction that he 
placed on section 17 (8) [of the Employment Act 1980J by 
referring to the report in Hansard of a speech made in 
the House of Lords by a peer, who is a distinguished 
academic lawyer 9 Lord Wedderburn, when moving an opposition 
amendment (which was defeated) to delete the subsection 
from. the Bill .. 
"There is a series of rulings by this House 
unbroken for a hundred years • that recourse to. 
reports of proceedings in either House of Parliament 
during the passage of a Bill that upon the signification 
of the Royal Assent becomes the Act of Parliament that 
falls to be construed~ is not p~rmissible as an aid to 
its construction. 1I 
A 
[AS AMENDED 
INTITULED 
An Act to make provision for certain additional A.D. 1981 
to be considered and principks 
interpreting Acts of Parliament other lustrum.ents. 
E IT ENACTED by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and 
with the advice and consent the Lords Spiritual ar:d 
Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliarnent 
assembled, and by the authority of the same, as fo11ov/s:-
5 1.-(1) In ascertaining the meaning of any provision of an Act, ~jds to . 
the matters which may be considered shall, in addition to those mterpretatlOn. 
which may be considered for that purpose from this section, 
include the following, that is to 8ay-
(a) all indications provided by the Act as printed by authority, 
10 including cross-headings, punctuation ana side-notes, 
and the short title of the Act; 
(b) any relevant treaty or other international agr~ement 
which is referred to in the Act or of vvhich copies had 
been presented to Parljamc;nt by command of Her 
15 Majesty before the time when the Act was passed, wheth0r 
or not the United Kjngdom were bound by it at that time; 
(c) any provision of the European Communities Treaties 
and any Community under any of 
the to which the Act is intended to give effect. 
(1 48/2 
Application to 
Measures, 
Orders in 
Council and 
subordinate 
legislation. 
Citation and 
extent. 
.) 
3. 
(b) 
(c) m the 
contrary, 
spectivc 
\vbich 
neceSS~HV 
virtue of any Act or 
to orders, rules, 
made by virtue of any (whether 
Act), as they apply in relation to 
IS 
to 
to be 
is 
to the 
the 
by 
prerogative) and 
10 
instrumem:s 25 
4,~(1) This Act may be cited as Interpretation of Legisla-· 
tion Act 1981. 
(2) This Act shall to Scotland and Northern Ireland. 
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